In mid-February, Peruvian president José Jerí was removed from his position of head of state after only four months in office. The ousting wasn’t particularly shocking. Peru has experienced a prolonged governance crisis, with seven presidents cycling through office over the last ten years, the shortest tenure being just six days. But this time around, the scandal points to a larger trend of growing political sensitivity around China’s presence in the region.
Jerí’s removal from office illustrates the intersection between Peru’s governance fragility and the region’s increasing distaste for appearing connected to China. The scandal, known as ‘Chifa-gate’ within Peru, has the potential to push Peru’s relationship with China into the spotlight ahead of the 2026 general elections.
‘Chifa-gate’
At the center of the scandal are a series of meetings between Jerí and a Chinese businessman named Zhihua Yang, held in late 2025 and early 2026. The meetings sparked controversy because they were not recorded in official presidential logs and appeared to take place outside of formal channels, including one meeting where Jerí showed up wearing a hoodie.
Yang, who owns several businesses in Peru and was at one point granted a state concession for an energy project, first caught the attention of the Peruvian Congress for irregularities in his dealings involving Chinese companies between 2018 and 2022. He was also linked to the so-called Dragon Club — Club del Dragón — a network which provides operative and logistic support to Chinese state-owned companies.
Jerí came under additional fire for his visits to Ji Wu Xiaodong, an individual under house arrest in Peru and accused of involvement in the criminal organization Los Hostiles de la Amazonía, where he facilitated a scheme that purportedly secured undue advantages for the acquisition and exploitation of timber concessions.
Jerí’s meetings with Yang broke to the Peruvian press in what was widely called “Chifa-gate,” a reference to Peruvian food with Chinese roots. The situation worsened for Jerí when Peru’s Attorney General announced that preliminary proceedings were underway to investigate Jerí for peddling and illegal sponsorship of interests.
The scandals were enough to prompt Jerí’s removal. Although there is no evidence of any direct coordination between Jerí and Beijing, or of any strategic intent by China, the perception that Jerí was connected to improper dealings with China was difficult to overcome.
The China Trend Hits Peru
If there was one country that appeared to be insulated from the China trend in the 2025-2026 electoral super cycle, it was Peru. In countries such as Bolivia, Argentina, Chile, Honduras and Costa Rica, electoral politics have increasingly featured calls for reassessing ties with Beijing. Peru, however, seemed to hold its relationship with China close: the two countries share a deep economic relationship, and Peru is home to the Port of Chancay, one of China’s mega-projects related to its Belt and Road Initiative.
Now, Jerí’s removal from office due to his perceived connections with China, along with a recent court ruling limiting the oversight powers of Peruvian authorities over the Port of Chancay, could call Beijing’s previously secure position into question ahead of the upcoming April 2026 elections.
The U.S. has reportedly expressed concerns over the recent ruling on Chancay Port, particularly on the basis of violations to Peruvian sovereignty, though those concerns were categorically rejected by China. If a Beijing-skeptical (and Washington-friendly) government comes to office after the elections, China’s position in Chancay could follow the same fate as Darwin Port in Australia or even as Balboa and Cristóbal in Panama.
Peru’s interim president, the left-leaning José María Balcázar, is also struggling to navigate this storm. Less than a month after appointment as Jerí’s temporary successor, his prime minister, Denisse Miralles, was about to face a confidence vote and resigned. This forced Balcázar to reshuffle his cabinet, appointing a new prime minister and ministers of Defense, Interior, and Economy. Miralles was replaced by the then-Defense Minister Luis Arroyo, who signed, on behalf of Peru and together with 16 other nations, the Washington-led Americas Counter Cartel Coalition joint declaration. The joint declaration pledges, among other things, to secure critical infrastructure — a promise that carries clear implications for the Port of Chancay.
It remains to be seen how Beijing and Washington will respond to the scandal that pushed Jerí out of office, and whether Peru will be able to maintain political stability ahead of the April elections. Whether framed as concerns about strategic infrastructure, political alignment, or corruption, the China question is likely to feature prominently on the campaign trail. All things considered, the China trend continues to gain traction in Latin America and the Caribbean, with Peru being its next big test.
Alonso Illueca is CGSP’s Non-Resident Fellow for Latin America and the Caribbean.
