Why is Türkiye Enhancing Cooperation with China?

Türkiye's Minister of Foreign Affairs Hakan Fidan met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing on June 4, 2024. Image via the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

By Buğra Süsler

One of the highlights of Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visits to China (3-5 June) and the BRICS meeting in Russia (10-11 June) was Türkiye’s renewed interest in joining the BRICS bloc, which signaled once again Ankara’s objective to develop alternative partnerships in the non-Western world and raised familiar questions about Türkiye’s shift away from the West. Overall, it reflects Türkiye’s pursuit of strategic autonomy in an increasingly multipolar world.

Türkiye’s closer cooperation with China has been mainly driven by economic concerns. Ankara seeks Chinese investments to address its ongoing economic crisis and fund major infrastructure projects, such as those related to nuclear and renewable energy. Despite taking some measures to keep soaring inflation under control, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has not made much progress so far.

The local elections in March were a major blow for President Erdoğan, marking his party’s first electoral defeat in two decades. The cost-of-living crisis played a crucial role in the results, signaling the electorate’s dissatisfaction with the government’s economic policies. Following these results, Erdoğan said they would address the country’s “urgent issues” and reassured the voters that they would soon see the positive outcomes of the government’s economic program.

In this context, Fidan’s visit aimed to strengthen economic cooperation in areas where Turkish and Chinese geoeconomic and geopolitical strategies align. For example, Fidan highlighted Türkiye’s potential role in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its potential alignment with Türkiye’s Middle Corridor initiative. From the two countries’ mutual stance on Gaza to a critique of the West through emphasizing the need for fairness in the international system, many of Fidan’s points signaled Türkiye was keen to cooperate with China.

Another highlight was Fidan’s trip to Xinjiang. The treatment of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, which President Erdoğan described as “almost a genocide” in 2009, was a source of tension between the two countries. In late 2022, relations soured over Turkish Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu’s open criticism of China as he said Ankara must speak up against human rights violations detailed in the UN report in August 2022 and claimed that Beijing did not allow Türkiye’s ambassador to freely visit the region.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan (C) tours the International Grand Bazaar in Urumqi, capital of Xinjiang autonomous region on June 5, 2024. Image via Anadolu Ajansı.

Recently, however, Ankara appears to have toned down its rhetoric. The absence of explicit remarks on Uyghurs during Fidan’s visit, along with seemingly positive pictures from the region shared on his social media, indicates that Ankara has curbed its rhetoric in favor of stronger economic ties. It was reported, based on information from an anonymous Turkish official, that Fidan urged Chinese officials to protect the cultural rights of Uyghurs, highlighting Türkiye’s “sensitivities” on the matter. Although it is unclear how exactly this interaction played out, it is likely that Fidan echoed President Erdoğan’s use of the word “sensitivity” regarding Uyghur rights in his UN speech in September 2023.

Fidan’s visit raised concerns among some observers and critics, including Uyghur activists and Turkish opposition MPs. In the Turkish parliament’s Committee of Foreign Affairs, for example, MPs from different opposition parties criticized Fidan for his lack of assertiveness.

However, in terms of economic ties, Ankara’s policy of closer economic engagement with China appears to be paying off, as many Chinese companies are increasingly interested in investment opportunities in Türkiye in various sectors, including defense and energy, potentially seeing Türkiye as a gateway to European markets. Notably, after Fidan’s visit, China’s electric vehicle giant BYD signed a deal to develop a billion-dollar factory with the capacity to produce 150,000 vehicles annually.

Strengthening bilateral ties also benefits China’s strategy in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean. From major infrastructure projects in Iraq to its positions on the Israel-Hamas war, China has increased its presence in the region in recent years, challenging US influence.

Overall, Türkiye-China relations thus seem to be improving. On 4 July, President Erdoğan met with Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Kazakhstan to discuss further cooperation and extended an invitation for Xi Jinping to visit Türkiye.

Yet, it remains to be seen whether Türkiye will truly reap sustainable economic gains from cooperation with China. Given China’s favorable trade balance and the power asymmetry in the bilateral relationship, Ankara should be cautious about the potential risks of economic dependence on China in the longer term.

Dr. Buğra Süsler is a Lecturer in International Organizations and International Conflict and Cooperation at the University College London Political Science Department and the Head of Türkiye and the World program at LSE IDEAS, London School of Economics.

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