By Lukas Fiala
Over the last week, all of us have pored over the latest U.S. National Security Strategy. As many have pointed out, one of the most striking developments is the shift towards recognising the Western Hemisphere as a primary theatre for U.S. engagement, at the expense of a further tilt towards Asia.
At first sight, such a recalibration would be a win for Beijing. Following Xi Jinping’s “Asia for Asians” mentality, a return to a Monroe Doctrine-esque international system with clearer spheres of influence could open the door for a more Sinocentric regional order in the long term.
On reflection, however, we should not rush to quick conclusions. Indeed, the NSS maintains plenty of references to U.S. deterrence efforts across Asia as well as to goals that require substantial global power projection, such as ensuring freedom of navigation across important sea lanes.
What some might miss, however, are the underlying assumptions of such a bipolar interpretation of the international system split into two rival spheres of influence. Indeed, order building comes at a cost and it is not clear to what extent Beijing would be prepared to shoulder such in the near term.
Xi has certainly spoken about a more Sinocentric order for over a decade and put forth ideas around “common security” to frame China’s contribution to regional ordering. But these ideas can only be seen as an alternative to U.S. alliances in narrative, not in substance.
Take the recent clash between Thailand and Cambodia, for instance. With China an indirect party to the conflict, given its historically close relationship with Phnom Penh and its strengthening security ties with Bangkok, it stands to reason that Beijing would also have an interest in deescalating the crisis. Such engagement ties up resources and presents public relations challenges, especially when ceasefires or agreements to de-escalate do not hold as advertised.
China has learned this lesson from its various entanglements with conflicts in Africa, from its decades’ long involvement in Sudan and South Sudan to its losses in Libya and the challenges of being involved in finding a solution to tensions across the Horn of Africa.
Just as China has withdrawn from certain hotspots in Africa, it will be difficult to square a more interventionist role in its wider neighborhood with its longstanding preference to keep even close partners at arm’s length to preserve China’s room to maneuver.
Finally, as is common in our debates about great power politics, our conversations often neglect the agency of third countries to shape outcomes in the long run.
Perhaps most importantly, even in a more divided world Beijing will have to appeal to regional governments and societies with an appropriate offering. Promoting the Global Security Initiative is perhaps a smart rhetorical strategy. But genuine mediation usually requires conflict parties to acknowledge the arbiter as an at least somewhat neutral party. And peace agreements often require security guarantors to stay in place. For a government whose primary objective is self-perpetuation, promoting regional solutions might prove more difficult than many seem to acknowledge.
Taken together, each of these elements complicates a neat “sphere of influence model”. Splitting the world into a Western and Eastern hemisphere might sound like an attractive frame of reference from a previous era of great power competition and comfort those seeking neat analytic categories. But the realities of our current transition are more complex than a bipolar model allows for.
In this context, we should shift our perspective to more complex frames of reference that capture the many actors, networks and power centers shaping world events today.
Lukas Fiala is the Head of China Foresight at LSE IDEAS
