In this edition of M&M, I want to examine one of the most common claims not only in Vietnam’s foreign policy circle but also in that of the United States. The United States is a Pacific power with an extensive network of alliances and bases across the Indo-Pacific, and its exercise of that power matters to how Asian countries craft their respective foreign policies in the context of China’s rise.
The prospect of a U.S.-Vietnam alliance thus matters to the security of both Washington and Hanoi, and to whether China’s rise will be violent or peaceful.
What is the Myth?
As a small country next to China, Vietnam enjoys neither quality nor quantity advantages in balancing against China’s military power. Because Vietnam and China currently dispute the Paracel and Spratly islands, there is constant concern that China may seize Vietnam-held islands in the Spratlys, and little Vietnam can do to prevent such an outcome. China’s navy is the largest in the world. The logic of balance-of-power theory is that Vietnam will seek external assistance to help it offset the military imbalance vis-à-vis China.
The United States, with its Asian allies and a cutting-edge navy, is the natural partner in this endeavor. The logic is that the United States can help Vietnam defend its maritime claims and deter China from attacking Vietnam.
Why Do People Believe It?
“The enemy of my enemy is my friend” is the short answer to this myth. The United States poses little territorial threat to Vietnam, and both view China’s rise with some degree of skepticism. Anti-China sentiment in the Vietnamese public, which is the result of a millennium of Chinese occupation and invasions, nudges Vietnam to look for all kinds of external help. Between 1977 and 1991, Vietnam relied on the Soviet Union to defend itself against China’s border encroachments, China’s support for the Khmer Rouge, and China’s seizure of islands.
The more detailed answer concerns how the Vietnamese public perceives U.S. defense commitments to Japan and the Philippines, which also have territorial disputes with China. The United States continuously affirmed that its alliance treaty with Japan applies to the Senkaku Islands. Washington also confirmed that its alliance treaty with the Philippines covers armed attacks against Philippine “armed forces, aircraft, and public vessels” in the South China Sea. The Vietnamese public supports a robust U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific because they expect Washington to keep Chinese maritime assertiveness in check, similar to how Washington has helped Tokyo and Manila.
Also, because Washington doesn’t take sides in the island disputes, the U.S. commitment to Manila doesn’t hurt the Vietnamese public’s positive perception of the U.S. presence, despite Vietnam and the Philippines also having their own island disputes.
What Does the Data Say?
The myth is debunked if we take a closer look at Vietnam’s geography. Vietnam differs from Japan and the Philippines because it shares a 1,450-kilometer-long land border with China. This puts Vietnam squarely within China’s sphere of influence, as the United States lacks the capability to project power into continental Asia. Unlike Vietnam, U.S. ally Thailand doesn’t share a border with China. However, it well understands the limits of U.S. power projection in continental Asia and China’s paramount position in that domain, as it closed all U.S. bases in 1976 after the U.S. withdrawal from Indochina and has largely remained non-aligned in the context of the U.S.-China rivalry.
Regardless of how strong the U.S. Navy is at protecting its allies from Chinese harassment, China can easily punish Vietnam along the China-Vietnam border as it did in February 1979 after Hanoi allied with the Soviet Union in 1978. Even the Soviet Union, with 500,000 troops stationed along the Sino-Soviet border, could not do much to protect Vietnam, let alone the offshore power, the United States. If Vietnam were to enter an alliance with the United States, Vietnam would degrade its continental security for a marginal increase in its maritime security.
Even that marginal increase is not guaranteed. The U.S. commitment to the Philippines has not deterred China from harassing Philippine vessels and personnel. In fact, it is the opposite. China increased its harassment after the current Philippine President, Ferdinand Marcos Jr., strengthened defense ties with the United States.
Importantly, Vietnam has dropped the view that China is its main enemy, which was the official line during the Third Indochina War (1978-1991), and has replaced it with a foreign policy of multilateralism and diversification. This change in thinking enables a diplomatic, peaceful resolution to any flare-ups at sea. Thanks to its non-aligned foreign policy, Vietnam has been able to expand its maritime outposts since 2021 without Chinese harassment.
In March, Vietnam and China held a joint patrol and live-fire training exercise in the Gulf of Tonkin. This signals that both countries have a shared interest in maintaining a stable border, both on land and at sea. “The enemy of my enemy is my friend” logic doesn’t hold.
The Bottom Line for Vietnam
There are limits to U.S. military power. A U.S. security guarantee does not deter China if the United States cannot honor its pledge, either because of a lack of will or capability. Washington should not always assume that Vietnam needs its protection like Japan and the Philippines because Vietnam has successfully demonstrated that it doesn’t need to deter China via external assistance, so long as inter-party and inter-state ties remain robust. Importantly, observers should not assume that Vietnam considers China its principal enemy.
There is a difference between healthy skepticism and mass hysteria, and Vietnam belongs to the former.
