China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi is in Africa this week. It has become a Chinese tradition that FMs make their first overseas trip to Africa. It triggers a second (less red-carpeted) tradition: people like me puzzling over why certain countries were chosen over others.
The FM visited Egypt and will visit Tunisia, Togo, and Côte d’Ivoire. Afterward, he will also travel to Brazil and Jamaica. It should be noted that the reasoning behind the itinerary is never disclosed and that any speculation remains just that: speculation.
That said, the selection is notable in a few ways.
Geography
First, the FM’s Africa tour is usually arranged around the principle of geographical balance, with stops arranged to hit Northern, Eastern, Western, Southern and (sometimes) Central Africa. For example, last year Wang’s predecessor Qin Gang visited Ethiopia, Gabon, Angola, Benin, and Egypt.
This year’s trip favors West Africa and the continent’s Mediterranean coast. One likely factor here is that one of President Xi Jinping’s few foreign trips last year was to South Africa, so this year could be a rebalancing.
Another notable detail is that Egypt was also a destination last year. This kind of replication is quite rare. My guess is that the choice to include it again was likely informed by Egypt’s new status as a BRICS country, its adjacency to the Israel crisis, and its strategic position on key Red Sea shipping lanes as Chinese shipping companies are joining international competitors in rerouting their vessels to avoid attacks by Houthi militants in Yemen.
French Influence
The choice of Tunisia is also notable. While Tunisia is one of the PRC’s oldest allies on the continent, Beijing has also struggled to move beyond largely symbolic projects there. European (especially French) influence heightened this barrier.
However, the Tunisia-France relationship is under stress, due to clashes about the Israel crisis and migration. Tunisia returned about $65 million in aid to the EU in December after Tunis accused the EU of not following through on a June deal that linked stopping migration to funding.
France’s uphill battle extends to West Africa. While Wang’s trip avoids the coup-ridden Sahel, the stops in Togo and Côte d’Ivoire take him pretty close. Both these countries were French colonies until the 1960s and they face some of the cross-border spill-over effects of the Sahel crisis.
The Sahel coups have been characterized by anti-French animus. Compared to the French, Chinese projects were less affected. For example, despite the coup in Niger, the oil pipeline linking Niger to Benin, built by China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) was completed without disruption.
The choices of Tunisia, Togo and Côte d’Ivoire seem to hint that Beijing sees an opportunity in the hatred Paris faces in many of the countries that know French power the most intimately.
Atlantic Belt and Road
The West African bias could also dovetail with the renewed ambitions of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI.) Côte d’Ivoire’s Abidjan Port was expanded into a deep-water facility by China Harbor Engineering Company. This expansion is being hailed by the Chinese state press as an example of the more muscular BRI 3.0 announced at the Belt and Road Forum in October.
The port was one of three major West African port expansions involving Chinese players with Kribi Port in Cameroon and Lekki Port in Nigeria. These expansions are not simply construction projects. Abidjan Port signed a cooperation agreement with the Guangzhou Port Authority, and Lekki involves a rare Chinese equity and operation stake.
As always with the FM’s Africa tour, how Wang’s West African sojourn is linked with longer-term Chinese corporate involvement in the region’s ports sector remains a mystery.
However, at a moment when the attacks in the Red Sea are scrambling global shipping and when a U.S.-EU coalition is advancing a port-and-logistics corridor in Angola and a green hydrogen facility in Namibia, this Atlantic focus is notable and could link to Wang’s next destination: Brazil…
