By Alvaro Mendez and Chris Alden
Thursday marked the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between Brasília and Beijing, which began on 15 August 1974, when Brazil became the tenth country in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) to recognize the PRC. There are many reasons to celebrate this milestone. Economically, China has been Brazil’s largest trading partner since 2009, with trade between the two nations growing steadily.
Bilateral trade between Brazil and China reached $96.5 billion over the first semester of 2024, a 9.3% increase compared to the same period in 2023. Brazilian imports from China rose by 16.9% to $34.7 billion, with exports to China growing by 5.4% to $61.8 billion, resulting in a favorable trade surplus of $27 billion for Brazil.
Brazil and China remain close allies with strong political ties. The relationship deepened in 1990 when former President Yang Shangkun visited Brazil as part of a broader outreach to Latin America. In 1993, Brazil became the first country to establish a strategic partnership with China during former President Jiang Zemin’s visit. Jiang returned in 2001, reinforcing the partnership. This close relationship continued with visits from former President Hu Jintao in 2004 and 2010, and President Xi Jinping in 2014 and 2019.
Brazilian Presidents have reciprocated China’s diplomatic engagement through a series of significant visits. It began with Figueiredo in 1984, followed by Sarney in 1988 and Cardoso in 1995, each reinforcing the growing partnership. President Lula further strengthened this relationship with visits in 2004 and 2009, and during his first visit, the Brazil-China High-Level Commission for Coordination and Cooperation (COSBAN) was established. Rousseff continued the momentum with trips in 2011 and 2014. Most recently, Bolsonaro in 2019 and Lula again in April 2023 have maintained this tradition, ensuring the enduring strategic alliance between Brazil and China.
It was during this last 2023 visit to Beijing that Brazil’s President Lula further solidified this bond, marking a significant diplomatic engagement that resulted in the signing of several bilateral agreements, including a number of memoranda of understanding (MoUs) covering areas such as trade facilitation and cooperation in research and innovation. At that time, Xi Jinping sought another agreement, an endorsement by Brazil of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) but failed to secure it. This occurred months before the BRICS 2023 endorsement of Brazil’s campaign for a permanent seat on a revised UN Security Council, something that Lula sought from Beijing during his first term and received an unsatisfactory Chinese response. Indeed, Lula’s government signaled its displeasure by not implementing trade and FDI access as promised.
Although many countries across Latin America have eagerly embraced the BRI (22 in total to date), Brazil remains on the fence alongside Mexico, Colombia, and the Bahamas. Despite Beijing’s continuous efforts to secure Brazil’s endorsement, Brasilia continues to weigh its options carefully in full consideration of political and economic trade-offs. Recent developments, including Vice President Geraldo Alckmin’s visit to China in June 2024, backed by subsequent statements by President Lula, suggest that Brazil might be on the verge of reconsidering its position. And timing might be opportune with preparations underway for Xi’s official visit to Brazil in parallel to the Rio de Janeiro G20 Leaders’ Summit in November.
Brazil is keenly aware of the tremendous symbol a BRI endorsement would mean for China on the world stage and will seek to leverage any negotiation to secure amplified and predictable market access for its agricultural products. Today, petroleum, iron ore, and soybeans represent around 75% of the total value exported to China, providing ample opportunities for Brazilian trade diversification.
One critical pillar of such market diversification revolves around animal protein (beef, poultry, and pork), high-added value products where Brazil is highly competitive and competes with the likes of the European Union and the United States. Beyond tariffs and quotas, improving access will require tackling technical barriers to trade particularly in the area of sanitary standards. The recent February 2024 decision by Beijing to end an anti-dumping measure on Brazilian chicken will have be positively welcomed by Brazil as a goodwill measure.
It is true that Brazil has been increasingly voicing frustration over its meager 5% share of the Chinese market, coupled with its seventh import ranking. Officials appreciate that rebalancing the trade relationship will require more than market access; expanding Brazilian presence on the Chinese market depends on improving firm-level know-how in high-potential segments beyond primary commodities, such as leather, cellulose, and fruit.
Brazil’s reluctance to join the BRI without significant concessions from China may ultimately pay off. This strategy is bold and ambitious, but it could lead to one of those win-win situations that China often touts. For Lula, such a deal would be a political victory as he approaches re-election in October 2026. For Xi, securing Brazil’s endorsement would provide a much-needed boost to the BRI, which has faced resistance from Europe and the United States due to geopolitical concerns.
Alvaro Mendez directs the Global South Unit at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). He teaches international relations at LSE, Sciences Po Paris, and Fudan University in Shanghai.
Chris Alden teaches international relations at LSE and is the director of LSE’s foreign policy think tank, LSE IDEAS. He is also a research associate with the South African Institute of International Affairs.
