On August 13, 2024, Jakarta played host to a pivotal moment in international diplomacy with the inaugural Senior Officials’ Meeting of the Joint Foreign and Defence Ministerial Dialogue (2+2 SOM) between Indonesia and China. This meeting, which sets the stage for a more comprehensive ministerial-level dialogue planned for 2025, was framed as a significant step forward in bilateral relations. Yet, beneath this veneer of progress, several complex challenges merit closer scrutiny.
Indonesia’s Director General for Asia-Pacific and African Affairs, Abdul Kadir Jailani, framed the meeting as a landmark in strengthening ties and preparing for future high-level engagements. Chinese representatives echoed this sentiment, seeing the dialogue as a testament to their expanding influence in Southeast Asia. However, the enthusiasm surrounding this diplomatic milestone must be tempered with a critical examination of the broader implications.
This is not the first time this year that China and Indonesia have engaged in high-level meetings to bolster their bilateral relations. Earlier in March 2024, China’s Minister of Public Security, Wang Xiaohong, met with Mohammed Rycko Amelza Dahniel, the Head of Indonesia’s National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT).
The meeting focused on strengthening collaborative mechanisms and enhancing counterterrorism efforts. Both sides expressed a mutual commitment to intensify coordination and communication on international counterterrorism issues and to enhance practical cooperation in law enforcement. Wang Xiaohong emphasized China’s readiness to implement crucial agreements reached by their leaders, reflecting a strong momentum in their bilateral relations.
Additionally, on April 12, 2024, Chinese Defense Ministry Spokesman Wu Qian announced China’s intent to further military ties with Indonesia. This remark followed Indonesia’s president-elect Prabowo Subianto’s visit to China, which was his first overseas trip since winning the election in February. Wu Qian’s comments underscored China’s eagerness to deepen military cooperation, highlighting the strategic nature of their expanding relationship.
Addressing issues of transparency in intelligence sharing, reconciling differing views on counterterrorism and human rights, and navigating regional disputes like the South China Sea are crucial for fostering effective and equitable cooperation.
One of the most pressing concerns is the divergence between China’s and Indonesia’s definitions and approaches to counterterrorism. China’s counterterrorism policies, particularly regarding the Uyghur minority in Xinjiang, have been criticized internationally for alleged human rights abuses. Beijing’s depiction of these measures as essential for national security contrasts sharply with the global perspective that views them as severe violations of human rights. For Indonesia, a predominantly Muslim nation, cooperating closely with China on counterterrorism could risk complicating its stance on human rights. Addressing these discrepancies requires proactive measures, including establishing transparency and mutual trust in intelligence-sharing mechanisms.
It is crucial to create clear protocols to address Indonesia’s concerns about the potential misuse of shared intelligence and ensure that counterterrorism cooperation does not inadvertently support China’s controversial policies.
The South China Sea dispute further complicates the dynamics of Indonesia-China relations. This maritime region is a focal point of intense geopolitical contention, with China’s expansive territorial claims and assertive actions often clashing with the interests of neighboring Southeast Asian nations, including Indonesia. China’s construction of artificial islands and military installations in the South China Sea has exacerbated regional instability and heightened tensions with other claimant countries. Although Indonesia does not claim the Spratly Islands, it asserts its rights over the Natuna Islands, which lie within the overlapping claims area. China’s actions in these waters have raised significant concerns about regional security and maritime stability.
This dispute introduces a layer of mistrust that could hinder effective bilateral cooperation on security matters. Indonesia might fear that China could leverage shared intelligence to further its maritime claims or enhance its military presence in contested waters. Such mistrust could obstruct joint initiatives aimed at addressing common security challenges, including terrorism and transnational crime.
Resolving these underlying tensions will require diplomatic dialogue and confidence-building measures. Both China and Indonesia need to engage in constructive negotiations and reaffirm their commitment to international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Upholding international legal frameworks and fostering a cooperative environment are essential for mitigating mistrust and ensuring effective collaboration.
Another critical area is cybersecurity. Given the rise in state-sponsored cyber activities, both nations must enhance their cybersecurity cooperation to safeguard critical infrastructure and sensitive information. The threat of cyberattacks underscores the importance of robust collaborative efforts to address these risks and ensure that intelligence sharing does not compromise national security.
In conclusion, while the 2+2 SOM marks a significant step in Indonesia-China security relations, it also highlights a range of complex challenges. Addressing issues of transparency in intelligence sharing, reconciling differing views on counterterrorism and human rights, and navigating regional disputes like the South China Sea are crucial for fostering effective and equitable cooperation. By focusing on transparency, building trust, and reinforcing regional stability, Indonesia and China can work towards a partnership that advances peace and security while upholding human rights and strategic autonomy.
Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat is the Director of the China-Indonesia Desk at the Center of Economic and Law Studies (CELIOS)
