On November 16, 2023, an overcrowded wooden boat carrying around 250 Rohingyas attempted to land in the Indonesian province of Aceh. They were unwelcome, and locals turned the boat away. The Rohingyas are a predominantly Muslim ethnic minority group in Myanmar. Thousands are forced to risk their lives each year to escape brutal persecution and killings.
The world watched in shock. Seeing the recent treatment by Indonesians has left some observers scratching their heads. Why is Indonesia, a Muslim-majority country and a staunch supporter of Palestine, refusing to accept the Rohingyas? It is just as confusing as Indonesia’s muted response to the Uyghurs in China, others would point out.
The answer to this seemingly stark contradiction is multi-faceted and therefore more complex than what it appears on the surface, according to experts CGSP spoke to. On Uyghur and Rohingya, Indonesia is restricted by “complexity in Indonesia’s foreign relations and its own domestic politics,” lecturer at the University of Queensland and Griffith University Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar said. China is a significant variable in this tangle, along with other factors including refugee management capacity, the absence of international support, and lack of information, according to analysis and information gathered by CGSP.
First, we need to understand how and why Indonesia came to pledge loud and unwavering support for Palestine. As succinctly summarized by Muhammad Habib Abiyan Dzakwan, a researcher at CSIS: “Bringing the Palestinian issue to Indonesia is like bringing the China issue to Americans — it can unite the country and secure bipartisan support from Indonesian nationalist and religious groups.”
Palestine is able to sustain a special place in Indonesia because of its colonial aspect and decades of accessible information surrounding the issue. These are the main factors that are not present with the Uyghurs and Rohingya.
In 1944, Palestine was the first to support Indonesia’s independence, nearly a year before Indonesia officially declared independence on August 17, 1945. Palestine also lobbied other Arab states to recognize Indonesia as an independent state.
Indonesia, which was colonized by the Dutch for three centuries, was grateful. For Indonesia, the creation of Israel following the mass displacement and dispossession of Palestinians in 1948’s Nakba is a colonial project similar to what it had experienced. In the Asian-African conference of Bandung in 1955, Indonesia rejected a plan to invite Israel. Up until today, Indonesia does not recognize Israel as a state.
As time passed, particularly after the 1998 Reformation, Indonesian conservative Muslim groups grew the habit of using Palestine to gain more power in domestic politics, often in electoral campaigns. Because of this politicization, perception towards Palestine shifted, and it was increasingly considered as an exclusively Muslim conservative and ultra-conservative domain. Seculars, non-Muslims, and moderate Muslim groups avoided talking about Palestine out of reluctance to align themselves with the ultra-conservatives.
But the most recent Israel bombings of Gaza — broadcasted on social media in real-time — has reminded the public of the colonial core of the Palestine problem, inciting a new wave of support, including from tech-savvy youths. Two million Indonesians rallied on November 5, 2023, to show solidarity. Arab News called it the “biggest pro-Palestine demonstration the country has seen so far.” The Jakarta Post, Indonesia’s largest English-speaking newspaper, called the rally “interfaith”, emphasizing cross-religious support and solidarity for Palestine from Indonesia.
JUNI KRISWANTO / AFP
“Palestine is no longer considered a religious issue, but a humanitarian one,” Ahmad, the University of Queensland lecturer, said. “[Indonesian ruling political party] PDIP, along with the Soekarnoist anti-imperialist line, now sees the Palestine issue as a problem of occupation, where Palestinian people were denied the right to self-determination.”
Therefore, it is the memory of colonization that sustains Indonesians’ backing for Palestine. Additionally, Abiyan, the CSIS researcher suggested the Palestine issue has been known to Indonesians for so long, beginning from the first president Soekarno’s regime. This is why people across generations, and backgrounds, in rural areas and urban cities, are more familiar with the subject.
With Uyghur and Rohingya, information came much later. Even within groups who have the awareness, the two are seen as cases of repression within their own countries — a domestic social problem rather than a colonial project endorsed by the Western world.
In 2019, China invited the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) along with two of the country’s largest Islamic organizations, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, to visit Xinjiang. This was the visit described by The Wall Street Journal as China’s efforts to silence Indonesian Muslims. The delegation group reported back. On one hand, they didn’t find Nazi-like concentration camps as reported by Western media, but on the other, they admitted there was a real lack of freedom to practice religion in the province.
“The problem for us is that our Muslim brothers there do not get full rights, especially in terms of worship. This is a problem for us,” said Masduki Baidlowi, an official with Nahdlatul Ulama, as reported by BBC Indonesia. “If you wear the hijab and leave the room, you are considered a radical. If you are a radical then you have the right to be sent to a re-education center,” said Muhyiddin Junaidi, head of international relations for Majelis Ulama Indonesia, in the same report.
The delegation denied that they have been “bought off” by the Chinese, saying that they are using “soft diplomacy” instead to pressure China.
Indonesia’s official position supports the Uyghurs and Rohingyas, Ahmad the lecturer explained. “Only that for the last 10 years, Indonesia has had very close relations with China, and this has held Indonesia’s position [about the Uyghurs] hostage,” Ahmad said.
Meanwhile, on Rohingyas, Indonesia has in fact been a vocal supporter. Southeast Asia’s largest economy often leads conversations about the Rohingyas in ASEAN and United Nations forums.
Indonesia has also accepted thousands of Rohingya refugees since 2009 through nearly 40 boat landings, mostly in Aceh, according to data provided by Azharul Husna, an official with the human rights organization KontraS Aceh. In 2020, Aceh fishermen heroically rescued nearly a hundred Rohingya refugees, defying authorities.
However, the latest refugee arrivals were rejected by some of Aceh’s local residents in a rare event due to camps being overcrowded and social friction with the existing refugee population in the area, Husna said.
“This rejection requires understanding the complexity of the situation at the local, provincial, and national levels,” Gading Gumilang, spokesperson at the Jesuit Refugee Service told CGSP.
Local communities have faced years of challenges in handling refugees. Confusion, fear, lack of support from authorities, and limited resources, are some of the factors behind the rejection, Gumilang said. “The people’s compassion was still visible when in the process of boarding the refugees back onto the ship, food and clothing were still provided,” he added.
Some Palestinian refugees have faced rejection in Indonesia as well. For those who are “lucky” enough to reach Indonesia and be permitted to stay, life isn’t much better either. This shows that the main problem actually lies in Indonesia’s refugee management capacity.
All refugees in Indonesia live their lives in limbo, waiting for resettlement without the right to work or marry while having limited access to education. This is because Indonesia is only a transit country and is not a party to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention.
Indonesia has repeatedly called for developed countries to step up their responsibility and help by taking refugees in. “Our budgeting system and national legislation system is not designed in such a way that enables us to help refugees,” Director General of Multilateral Cooperation of the Foreign Ministry Febrian Alphyanto Ruddyard once said.
Gumilang, the JRS spokesperson, is once again calling for the international community to remember its “shared responsibility.” “Releasing refugees into the sea is not a humane solution,” he said. “This is the time to collaborate, to complement each other, and make decisions at the national level regarding conditions in the field.”
In other words, Palestine is able to sustain a special place in Indonesia because of its colonial aspect and decades of accessible information surrounding the issue. These are the main factors that are not present with the Uyghurs and Rohingya, which are instead ladened by complexities with China and the larger refugee predicament.
Commenting on the unprecedented pro-Palestine rally in Indonesia earlier this month, Ahmad concluded that “[It] is a result of persistent diplomatic efforts and growing consciousness over humanitarian issues in world politics,” which are now supported by the critical Indonesian millennial middle class.
