China’s relations with Solomon Islands are facing uncertainties after its critic and Opposition leader, Matthew Wale replaced Jeremiah Manele as the country’s new prime minister on 15 May 2026. Although it is still too early to predict the exact trajectory of Solomon Islands–China relations, as the new leader has only just taken office, there are already some important ‘knowns’ and ‘unknowns.’

The first ‘known’ is that Solomon Islands is a crucial diplomatic partner for China. With significant pledges to support the country’s development, China won over Solomon Islands from Taiwan in September 2019. This was hailed by Beijing as a milestone in its diplomatic competition with Taiwan in the region for several reasons.

First, Solomon Islands was Taiwan’s largest Pacific ally by population before the switch, giving Taipei one of its most substantial diplomatic footholds in the region. Second, Solomon Islands occupies a geostrategic location in the South Pacific, near Australia and important regional sea lanes. Its strategic value was evident during the Second World War, when it was a major battlefield between US-led Allied forces and Japan. Third, Solomon Islands has rich timber and mineral resources, in addition to fisheries. China was Solomon Islands’ largest trading partner well before the switch, but the shift has created further economic and investment opportunities for China in infrastructure, mining, and fisheries.

This leads to the second ‘known’: China has elevated the Solomon Islands within its Pacific diplomacy. It has framed the China–Solomon Islands relationship as a new model to showcase to other Pacific Island countries, particularly those that still maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Beijing aims to send a clear message that partnering with China—rather than with Taiwan or traditional powers—will yield tangible and substantial benefits.

The third ‘known’ is that China has poured enormous resources into building its ‘model’ relationship with the Solomon Islands. Examples include the National Sports Stadium (US$71 million, 10,000 seats), 161 telecommunication towers built by China’s Huawei (US$66 million), and the Comprehensive Medical Center at the National Referral Hospital (US$11 million). This relationship extends across nearly all sectors, including diplomatic, economic, and security domains.

The fourth ‘known’ is that, due to its large size and strategic location, the Solomon Islands has become a focus of geostrategic competition between China and traditional powers, especially Australia and the United States. A notable example is the competition between China and Australia to provide policing support; both nations donated equipment within the same week in November 2023 and on the same date in August 2025.

Regarding the ‘unknowns,’ the first concerns the extent of potential changes in China–Solomon Islands relations. Prime Minister Wale is known for his criticism of the Sogavare government’s diplomatic switch from Taiwan to China in 2019. However, the context has since changed.

It was easier—and politically advantageous—for him to play the China card as an opposition leader. Now, as Prime Minister, he must engage with China as the country’s largest economic partner and main infrastructure financier, given the large number of ongoing cooperation projects across sectors.

It remains unclear whether, in which sectors, and to what extent he will put the brakes on the growing bilateral relationship. Wale’s position on China has been softening in recent years. Back in June 2025, Wale led a delegation of Solomon Islands political parties to China. The Chinese government reported that Wale expressed his support for the One China policy, stating that “establishing diplomatic relations with China is the right choice.”

The second ‘unknown’: the future of security cooperation between the Solomon Islands and China is in limbo. Bilateral policing cooperation started in January 2022 when China stationed its first policing advisor group in the Solomon Islands. In addition, the two countries signed a security pact in March 2022, which was met with strong opposition from then opposition leader Matthew Wale, traditional powers, and some other Pacific island countries. It remains unclear whether the new prime minister will maintain, renegotiate, or abandon these arrangements. One possible test will be whether he pushes Beijing to allow the contents of the security pact to be made public.

Third, it remains unclear how the Wale government will recalibrate its relations with China and traditional partners in the current geopolitical environment. While emphasising its “friend to all, enemy to none” neutral policy, previous administrations under Sogavare and Manele were widely regarded as strongly supportive of deepening ties with China.

It is possible that the Wale government may rebalance by engaging more closely with traditional partners such as Australia. A similar shift occurred in Fiji’s foreign policy toward China after Sitiveni Rabuka replaced Frank Bainimarama as Prime Minister.

And the final ‘unknown’: it is still unclear how China will manage its relations with the new government. Within a week, Chinese Ambassador Cai Weiming met with Prime Minister Wale and several key ministers, including the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and External Trade, and the Minister of Police, National Security and Correctional Service.

While such outreach is standard diplomatic practice, the speed and intensity of these engagements also signal Beijing’s concern about potential shifts in the bilateral relationship—particularly the risk that the Solomon Islands might revert diplomatic recognition to Taiwan, a move that would be deeply damaging to China’s strategic and diplomatic position in the Pacific.

Unsurprisingly, the “One China” policy featured prominently in Ambassador Cai’s meetings. In his meeting with Prime Minister Wale, Ambassador Cai expressed China’s willingness to deepen the comprehensive strategic partnership based on mutual respect and shared development. According to China’s reporting, Prime Minister Wale “highlighted China as one of its most important bilateral partners” and reassured that “his government will continue to firmly adhere to the one-China principle.”

China is likely to use aid and financial support to stabilize its relations with the Solomon Islands. China is likely to offer more aid and financial support to court the new government and invite the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs to visit China. Meanwhile, Beijing may be preparing responses in case the new government seeks to revise major elements of the bilateral relationship.

Zhang Denghua is CGSP’s Non-Resident Fellow for the Pacific Islands.