This is a free preview of the upcoming Critical Minerals Weekly Digest, part of the new CGSP Intelligence service launching in Summer 2025.
Policy shifts this week widened Washington’s definition of “critical minerals,” as state-owned companies and trading houses stepped up workarounds to avoid Chinese-influenced supply chains. Fresh offtakes and trading platforms supported Western supply ambitions, but pricing pressure, political risk in producer states, and enduring Chinese midstream partnerships highlighted the difficulties of realigning global mineral flows.
This week in critical minerals:
U.S. publishes draft 2025 list of critical minerals
The U.S. Department of the Interior and the USGS published a draft list for 2025 that extended the covered commodities to 54 items. It notably recommends adding copper, potash, and silicon to the list of strategic inputs. The draft is meant to help steer federal priorities and, ultimately, downstream economies.
Why This Matters
Adding mainstream metals like potash, silicon, and copper into the “critical” basket raises their strategic profile and opens the way to U.S. financing, loan guarantees, and fast-track permits. For mining companies and project developers, that could translate to better bankability and enhanced project valuations. However, it also further extends geopolitical pressure into larger parts of the mineral economy.
TechMet launches the “TechMet SCM” trading business
TechMet, which has the backing of the U.S., introduced TechMet SCM, a trading unit created to bring specialty metals into non-China channels. The company is backed by the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and global commodity trader Mercuria, and will offer offtake security for TechMet’s portfolio projects
Why This Matters
A DFC-anchored platform also offers real infrastructure for “friend-shoring.” In reducing reliance on Chinese buyers and trade flows, it de-risks new projects and delivers confidence to investors in long-term sales.
Ucore / Critical Metals (Tanbreez) 10 years offtake of REE → U.S. processing
The Australia-based mining development firm Critical Metals Corp has agreed to supply Ucore Rare Earth Metals Inc. under a 10-year agreement to support Ucore’s Department of Defense-funded processing plant in Louisiana. Pursuant to the deal, Critical Metals will deliver as much as 10,000 tonnes per annum of rare earth concentrates from its Tanbreez project in Greenland, one of the largest rare earth projects in the world
Why This Matters
Long-term supply agreements to United States processing plants demonstrate how Western governments are weaving together upstream and midstream assets that do not belong to China. For Beijing, this will complicate its rare-earth hegemony.
Lynas flags uncertainty over Texas REE facility
Lynas Rare Earths cautioned that its planned Seadrift, Texas plant is still commercially untenable without offtake agreements in place, even with U.S. strategic support.
Why This Matters
The warning underscores the divide between strategic intent and commercial reality. Even cornerstone suppliers are financing risks without state-backed purchase guarantees, suggesting governments may need to fund demand if they want supply-chain independence.
Prices for rare earths peak after MP Materials halts China shipments
That has helped push prices of two of the key rare earths used in high-strength permanent magnets, neodymium and praseodymium, to their highest level in over two years. The jump followed reports that the U.S. miner MP Materials has ceased exporting raw materials to Chinese magnet makers.
Why This Matters:
This supports the drive to onshore refining and manufacturing into magnets with the help of the state. The EU, Japan, South Korea, and other major producers face higher prices, and failing significant investment in refining and magnet capacity, even bigger exposure to Chinese bottlenecks. However, for rare earth producers like Malawi and Tanzania, the price surge strengthens the case for developing local beneficiation strategies and clear, consistent policies that will bring Western offtake deals.
Indonesia’s Danantara + GEM Nickel Processing Hub
Indonesia’s sovereign wealth fund Danantara and the Chinese recycler/processor Gem outlined plans for a green nickel processing hub, with an $8.3bn investment envelope. This is in line with Indonesia’s ongoing push downstream.
Why This Matters
Indonesia remains among the most forward-leaning battery-metals powers and the GEM link indicates China is very much present in the race to build out midstream, as other actors work to diversify supply chains. Large sovereign-backed projects can unlock economies of scale, to help attract private buyers, but partnering with Chinese processors can muddy “friend-shoring” narratives
Codelco-SQM lithium pact to close before Boric’s 2026 departure
Chile’s new Economy Minister Alvaro Garcia said in an interview he expects state copper producer Codelco and local miner SQM to ink a far-reaching lithium partnership deal before the current administration leaves office in 2026. Several presidential candidates have promised to revisit or discard the deal altogether if it doesn’t get done before President Gabriel Boric leaves office.
Why This Matters
By going forward with the Codelco–SQM joint venture, Santiago is effectively closing the window on a state-led lithium governance model when that model is becoming increasingly attractive to consuming countries (US, EU, China) scrambling to lock down safe supplies. If opposing parties revisit or challenge the deal, it might result in uncertainty affecting one of the most strategic lithium supplies in the world. Should the next government change the deal or reverse it, it could hurt Chile’s reputation as a reliable partner and slow the rate of supply scaling.
Bolivia opposition candidate pledges to scrap China, Russia contracts for lithium
The right-wing presidential candidate, Jorge Quiroga, said he would scrap multi-billion-dollar lithium contracts that the outgoing President Luis Arce inked with Russian and Chinese companies. The contracts are for Bolivia’s vast Uyuni salt flats and other lithium brine resources in the country, among the world’s largest untapped lithium reserves.
Why This Matters
Ditching China and Russia-associated contracts would amount to a strategic pivot toward the U.S. and ultimately, a transfer of power in South America’s lithium sector. Western firms may perceive an opportunity to break into Bolivia’s lithium space, but will have to factor in governance risks, resource nationalism, and obstacles to project finance. It also demonstrates how elections can redraw resource alliances, injecting political volatility into global mineral supply chains, and billions of dollars in Russian and Chinese projects face uncertainty, which could offset new capital inflows until election results are known.
In context
The week’s events underscore two pragmatic lessons: (1) demand from “friend-shoring” efforts and new trading/processing anchors could offer a shot at capturing more upstream value — but only if host governments couple licensing with clear strategies for domestic beneficiation and transparent contract terms; (2) producer country moves elsewhere (Chile, Indonesia) mean host governments will grapple with tough choices between immediate export revenues and longer-term value capture via downstreaming. Each choice is fraught with social, environmental, and governance trade-offs.
