As per usual, the articles published by the wider Mediterranean region’s media offer interesting insights into how China is perceived. Among the most valuable ones, we found commentaries published in Iran that further shed light on the local perception of the much-discussed new cooperation agreement between Beijing and Tehran. China’s role in Gulf and eastern Mediterranean security, the fate of the China-Iraq “oil-for-investment” deal, and Chinese investments in Israel are also among the topics that we cover in this issue of the ChinaMed Observer.
Iran
In Iran, the newspapers Etemad and Donya-e-Eqtesad published a number of articles that reveal how Iran understands China’s goals in their relationship, and how past interactions with China have shaped today’s cautious approach of the Iranian government. According to Etemad, Iran made three mistakes in its past dealings with China that should not be repeated again:
- The first was a lack of understanding of Chinese business practices and goals. In particular, Iranian companies and institutions often signed agreements with their Chinese counterparts that forced them to rely on their Chinese partners without the possibility of holding competitive bids. This is why they often had to pay unreasonably high prices. Moreover, they did not notice that many contracts allowed the Chinese companies to renegotiate the terms of the agreement in more favorable ways if they wanted to.
- The second problem is that the interests on loans provided by Chinese financial institutions were not low. Moreover, much of the capital raised in that way had to be spent on Chinese equipment and material. The result was that local Iranian companies ended up buying Chinese products for prices that were not justified by their quality. While the previous issue was caused by the lack of preparation by Iranians, this second problem is described as the result of the Chinese leveraging their position as the only ones willing to work with Iran.
- Finally, the contracts and agreements contained no instruments that allowed Iranian companies and institutions to monitor and, if necessary, punish Chinese contractors when they could not complete their projects on time. On the contrary, China could easily withdraw money from an account of the Iranian government in China whenever Iranian companies failed to pay back the loans. The author of the article argues that the Iranian government is now trying to solve these issues, and this explains why Iranian policymakers have not given much detail about the negotiations with China.
However, an energy market analyst argued in Donya-e-Eqtesad that Iran cannot do much to improve its position vis-à-vis China. Two key elements contribute to this difficult situation. On the one hand, China’s diplomatic priority is to avoid a further deterioration of relations with the United States. On the other hand, the idea that many have in Iran–that their country is at the center of the world energy market–is wrong. Iran has significant energy resources, but its long-standing marginalization in global energy trade and the availability of large quantities of oil and natural gas on the market make Iran a relatively unimportant partner for China. In fact, China can choose to buy from others without paying more and without adding pressure to its relations with the United States. Iran’s hope is that China and the United States could stabilize their relations but, wrote the analyst, this seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. Somehow in a similar way, Behzad Shahande, Professor of East Asia at the University of Tehran, made the same argument, inviting Iranian leaders to keep these elements in mind when they assess China’s strength and interests.
Greece
We found a similar call to not exaggerate China’s will and resources to play a more active role also in the context of regional security. In a rare article on this topic published by the Qatari al-Sharq, a local analyst argues that regional policymakers should not think that China will substitute the United States and become the leading security provider in the Gulf. Simply put, the United States is not going to scale back its military presence and diplomatic involvement in any significant way, regardless of the decreasing depending on Middle Eastern oil. Moreover, even if the Americans did so, China has repeatedly shown that it is not interested in getting involved in regional security issues or claiming regional hegemony. Instead, the author argues, China might be interested in becoming the leader of Asia but it also seems quite comfortable to rely on the United States for providing stability in the Middle East. Nonetheless, policymakers in the wider Mediterranean region might still try to win China’s support against their rivals. For example, the Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis seemed to be asking for Chinese support in the dispute with Turkey when he emphasized that the visit of Yang Jiechi is deemed of great importance in Athens. According to Mitsotakis, China’s permanent seat in the Security Council of the United Nations and its respect of international law make Beijing an important partner as Greece faces “Turkish aggression”.It is unlikely, however, that the Greeks expect any concrete action from China on this issue.
Israel
In Israel, the situation does not differ much from that in Iran as the debate on China is highly polarized and, in any case, the relations with Beijing are experiencing a significant downturn because of American pressure. Indeed, speakers at the Israeli Go Global Forum remarked how difficult it has become for Israeli companies to conduct business with and in China. However, it seems that only four of the thirty most successful Israeli start-ups have relations with Chinese investors or the Chinese market. Moreover, others also pointed out that other Asian countries might fill the gap of investments created by the cooling down of economic cooperation with China. Investors that wanted to enter the Chinese market before, might currently also consider the Israeli one as an alternative.
Iraq
At the same time, the prospects of cooperation with China also look bleak in Iraq. As we reported in the past issue of the ChinaMed Observer, the so-called “oil-for-investment” deal between the two countries seems dead. A recent article published by al-Zaman describes a complex situation where many members of the Iraqi Parliament continue to support the agreement with China while the government denies that there is any relationship between it and other agreements signed with the United States. However, the journalist believes that it is likely that the Iraqi government will officially terminate the agreement with China. The risk of the government refusing to clarify its position is that of further damaging the relations with Beijing. Interestingly, an Iraqi MP was quoted saying that the deal with China was undermined by some in Iraq that were paid for by Kuwait, which hopes to prevent Iraq from linking with China via the Umm Qasr Port.
China Looks at the Mediterranean Region
The commentaries published by Chinese media in September were not particularly insightful as they mostly repeated themes in the Chinese narrative about the region that we have already identified in the past. Most of them focused on the impact of the normalization of relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain in the Middle East–especially on the future of the Palestinian issue and Iran. The flow of refugees toward Europe and the future of Lebanon, too, were among the topics of discussion of Chinese commentators.
Israel, UAE Diplomatic Ties
The key argument that emerges from Chinese media is that the normalization of Israel’s ties with the UAE, Bahrain, and possibly more Arab countries in the future is not necessarily a positive development for regional peace. In contrast to August, no one seems to be thinking that this development is still better than no development at all. Chinese commentators point to several interconnected reasons for that. Firstly, the United States is not interested anymore in supporting peace in the region. As Ding Long emphasizes, one cannot deny that the United States made an essential contribution to regional stability. Although they did not do so selflessly and they were not always successful, American policymakers spared no effort in mediating between rivals and tried to find solutions that could satisfy everyone. Sticking to a two-state solution for the Israeli–Palestinian conflict was a clear example of this.
However, this is not the case anymore and, therefore, American actions are mostly meant to help Donald Trump in his bid for reelection at every cost. Secondly, the normalization of Israel’s ties with Arab countries is taking place at the expense of the Palestinians, and this is made possible by the fact that Arab rulers themselves are less interested in that issue than they had been in the past. The marginalization of the Palestinian issue has been denounced by Chinese scholars for a long time. Yet, it is interesting to read Fan Hongda’s suggestion that it might be better to give up trying to find a solution for the moment and focus on other issues. Of course, this might well be his personal opinion, and China, in any case, has always played a marginal role in this issue. However, this might also signal an important change in China’s narrative about Palestine and, perhaps, its diplomatic priorities in the region.
Arab-Israeli Relations
Finally, the improvement of the relations between Israel and Arab countries is not seen as something that they are pursuing in the name of regional peace but, rather, as part of the intensification of the struggle between Arab countries and Israel, on one side, and Iran and Turkey, on the other. As confirmed by an article written by Gu Zhenglong, the opinion of Chinese scholars regarding Turkish foreign policy is hardly a positive one. Although the writings of Chinese analysts do not give any insight into Chinese preferences, it is clear that Turkey’s activism in the eastern Mediterranean is seen as an important source of instability. In comparison, it is clear in their words that regional balancing against Iran is seen as something that goes against Chinese interests and, consequently, China’s understanding of regional peace.
While Turkish foreign policy is perceived as a new element in the equation of Mediterranean politics, the United States remains as the main culprit for numerous problems in the region. In particular, Dong Yifan, a scholar at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, argues that European countries are under significant pressure due to the second wave of COVID-19 and the flow of refugees from North Africa and the Middle East that has been caused by American interventionism in the region. In the future, he argues, the development of the European Union might be seriously undermined by this crisis. While such an argument is not original, it is interesting to notice that it does not mention the fact that various European countries played an active role in supporting American foreign policy. This omission may be due to the general tendency in Chinese media, especially today, to portray European countries in a relatively favorable way as, somehow, like China, victims of American unilateralism. This might also explain why Chinese analysts remain relatively neutral in describing France’s role in Lebanon, without overplaying the colonial past that links them. Although some of them pointed out that France might not be capable of solving Lebanon’s problems, they argue that Lebanon alone is unlikely to find a solution to its profound social and economic crisis.
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