More Evidence that the Africa-China Relationship is Increasingly Driven by Politics, Not Commodities

China's President Xi Jinping (front C) walks with South Africa's President Cyril Ramaphosa (front L), Egypt's President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi (middle row 2nd L), Togo's President Faure Gnassingbe (middle row L) and other African leaders after a group photo session during the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Beijing on September 3, 2018. HOW HWEE YOUNG / POOL / AFP

For centuries, many assumed that Africa’s greatest contribution to the global economy was through selling stuff that comes out of the ground. That was certainly what drew the Chinese to Africa back in the early 2000s. Today that’s no longer the case.

The fact is that other than a few strategic resources in the DR Congo, China isn’t dependent on most of the rest of Africa’s oil, minerals, and timber. With the advent of the Belt and Road, Beijing can now source much larger quantities of those resources at often lower prices from here in Southeast Asia, South America, the Persian Gulf, and Russia among other regions.

Chinese customs authorities’ latest oil buying figures show how powerful this trend is. Purchases are down 23% this year alone. China once imported a third of its oil from Africa. Now that figure is just 10% and declining.

Also, don’t be fooled by those big China-Africa trade numbers that everyone likes to throw around. Sure, China is Africa’s largest bilateral trading partner with two-way trade steadily rising from $187 billion in 2020 to $254 billion last year and forecast to top $300 billion this year. 

That sounds impressive, especially when measured against the measly amount of trade that Africa does with the United States. But when you measure Africa’s share of China’s total global trade balance, the figures don’t look as encouraging.

Last year, China did $6.05 trillion in total trade, and this year it may go as high as $7 trillion. But Africa’s share of that total isn’t rising anywhere near as fast. This means that two-way trade between China and Africa has remained largely flat at around a mere 3% of the total.

So, if African resources and trade aren’t that important to China, then what is?

Politics.

Africa, more than any other region, tends to vote as a block in international institutions like the UN. African votes supporting China’s human rights policies in Xinjiang, pushing back on U.S.-led COVID-19 origin investigations, endorsing Chinese notions of sovereignty and development, and embracing Chinese technology are all worth far more to Beijing than African raw materials. Those can easily be sourced elsewhere, frequently with fewer logistical headaches.

The problem is that most African governments are mentally still so deeply embedded in the extraction economy that they can’t see the enormous value their political leverage commands.

What is The China-Global South Project?

Independent

The China-Global South Project is passionately independent, non-partisan and does not advocate for any country, company or culture.

News

A carefully curated selection of the day’s most important China-Global South stories. Updated 24 hours a day by human editors. No bots, no algorithms.

Analysis

Diverse, often unconventional insights from scholars, analysts, journalists and a variety of stakeholders in the China-Global South discourse.

Networking

A unique professional network of China-Africa scholars, analysts, journalists and other practioners from around the world.