Driven by the accelerating global energy transition, resource-rich countries are actively asserting greater control over their critical minerals—lithium, cobalt, nickel, graphite, and rare earths—through a policy shift known as resource nationalism. While the framing of resource nationalism came from global north countries that dislike policies by governments in the global south to move up the value chain, this movement is reshaping global supply chains and creating new geopolitical dynamics, particularly in relation to China, which dominates much of the critical minerals value chain.
Tanzania’s Ministry of Minerals announced sweeping reforms covering 40 critical minerals this month. Central to the new policy is a strict beneficiation requirement: no medium or large-scale mining project will receive a license without a local value addition plan.
“All raw materials must be processed on Tanzanian soil,” said Minerals Minister Anthony Mavunde, underscoring a broader trend among resource-rich countries aiming to capture more value domestically.
China’s Paradox: Dominator and Target
While China controls a significant share of global mineral processing and refining, it also faces tightening restrictions abroad. While these policies target all multinationals, ironically, China seems to have benefited more from them than other countries that resist them.
However, it must now navigate increasingly protectionist policies in countries where it has invested heavily.
Indonesia: The Blueprint for Critical Mineral Export Bans
Indonesia was the first to assert more control by banning exports of unprocessed nickel in 2020. Foreign firms were required to build smelters and processing plants locally. Chinese companies, notably Tsingshan Holding Group, responded by investing billions into Indonesian industrial parks such as Morowali and Weda Bay.
Rather than resist, China aligned itself with Indonesia’s development goals to secure access and remain in control of the nickel value chain. Although the nickel is further processed in China, the restrictions brought some economic benefits, and its export revenue soared from $2.9 billion in 2014 to $34.4 billion in 2023.
The Indonesian model has since inspired other countries to follow suit.
Zimbabwe and Namibia: Taking the Hardline
In 2022, Zimbabwe banned raw lithium exports, pushing for local processing and battery precursor production. Chinese lithium mining giants —including Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt, state-owned Sinomine Resources Group, and Chengdu-based Sichuan Yahua, which together dominate the market, were not deterred.
These companies responded by investing in facilities to produce lithium concentrate. Huayou and Sinomine, for instance, are now advancing with developing local factories that turn lithium sulphate into lithium carbonate, a key ingredient used to make batteries.
Zimbabwe’s upcoming Minerals Amendment Bill proposes that the government take a stake in major mineral projects. It has also introduced a 5% royalty on lithium exports—half of which must be paid in the form of lithium ore rather than cash.
In 2023, Namibia imposed its own ban on the export of unprocessed lithium, graphite, cobalt, manganese, and rare earth elements. In response, Chinese-owned lithium mining giant Xinfeng Investments, which operates in the western Erongo region, quickly adapted by producing lithium spodumene concentrate. However, the company has not yet begun fully processing lithium carbonate.
Notably, Namibia is the only African country with a ban on unprocessed critical mineral exports that has also joined the Mineral Security Partnership (MSP)—a U.S. and EU-led initiative aimed at building secure and responsible critical mineral supply chains.
Ghana has also introduced export restrictions, signaling its commitment to processing more minerals locally, even though its lithium industry is still in the early stages of development.
DRC and Others: Signaling Control Without Bans
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the world’s largest cobalt producer, has not implemented an outright ban but temporarily suspended cobalt exports in early 2025 to stabilize prices. In 2022, the DRC banned the export of raw copper.
Currently, the government is working to promote regional processing hubs and contract renegotiations to increase local value capture.
Other African countries—including Nigeria, Uganda, Cameroon, and Senegal are exploring stricter export controls, state equity participation, or state-led mining models. Though not all have formalized these policies, the direction is clear: more control, more value retention.
In South America, state control in resource nationalism has also emerged with strong state ownership.
In 2023, Chile—home to the world’s largest lithium reserves—launched its National Lithium Strategy, requiring government participation in all new lithium projects. This policy discouraged some foreign investors, including China’s Tianqi Lithium, which owns a 24% stake in Chile’s state-owned mining company Sociedad Química y Minera de Chile (SQM), the world’s second-largest lithium producer. Despite the shift toward greater state control and ongoing domestic challenges, Tianqi and others have chosen to stay engaged and are adjusting to the new rules.
Mexico nationalized its lithium industry in 2022, establishing LitioMX, a state-owned company to maintain government control over lithium extraction. While the exact operations are still taking shape, Mexico has indicated a willingness to partner with Chinese firms.
In Bolivia, despite its strong state control over minerals, Chinese companies like CMOC Group and battery giant CATL have secured agreements with the government for lithium extraction. Meanwhile, U.S.-backed firms such as EnergyX and Lilac Solutions—supported by Breakthrough Energy Ventures (founded by Bill Gates) and BMW—submitted bids but were not awarded contracts.
Instead, Bolivia selected Chinese, Russian, and European firms whose proposals aligned with its state-led development approach.
Strategic Blind Spots in the Global South
While many countries are embracing resource nationalism—policies aimed at keeping more benefits from their natural resources—most are not fully prepared to make these strategies work. Many lack the expertise and institutional capacity to negotiate strong deals or manage complex projects.
Even in places where China is the main investor, it’s rare to find governments with dedicated “China desks” or officials trained in Chinese law, language, or business practices. Without this kind of internal capability, resource nationalism risks becoming more symbolic than effective—changing the language of control, but not the reality of foreign dominance.
As global demand for critical minerals continues to grow through 2050, more countries will likely impose export bans, require local processing, and demand joint ventures with the state. But unless producer countries build the right institutions and skills, China—and others—will likely keep adapting and thriving, while the hoped-for shift in power and profit never truly materializes.
