By Lukas Fiala
With Panama’s proclaimed exit from the BRI and the likelihood of hardline ambassadorial appointments to BRICS countries such as South Africa, we’ve been thinking about Washington’s ability to make countries choose sides between China and the U.S..
Among many observers, including myself, it has long seemed to be a truism that forcing governments into a binary choice between Washington and Beijing doesn’t make strategic sense. One of the main reasons behind this argument are differing comparative advantages of both countries when it comes to encouraging cooperation across the Global South.
China, for instance, is, without a doubt, the most important trading partner of many developing countries. Due to its status as a surplus economy with the need to recycle capital abroad, Beijing has also been capable of running the world’s largest government-driven development finance program – starting as the Going Out period and eventually transforming into the BRI and, more recently, the Global Development Initiative.
Paradoxically, then, forcing countries to – symbolically – weaken their relationships with China may, in fact, provide them with more leverage to negotiate with Beijing, especially if cooperation with China comes with trade-offs in their relationship with Washington down the line.
Meanwhile, the U.S. has certainly long been the security partner of choice for a host of countries across the Global South. From alliance partnerships to capacity building and joint exercises, Chinese engagement often pales in comparison to the deep, institutionalized, and routinized security engagements of the U.S. armed forces. Far from only focusing on security, the now rapidly dismantled USAID has also been the world’s largest single donor-funded humanitarian aid program.
These examples are of course not the only domains of U.S. and Chinese engagement across the Global South. And all this is not to say there hasn’t been growing competition across economic and security issues between Beijing and Washington. After all, the U.S. has attempted to play a more active role in financing structural development programs such as the Lobito Corridor crossing Angola. China, at the same time, has become a more active security and military partner for some governments.
But we have often seen these elements of competition more as an opportunity for Global South governments than a threat. By presenting new sources of financing and capacity building, U.S.-China competition was premised on increasing developing countries’ policy spaces, even if cooperation with either side had become more polarised. Fast-forward to 2025, and it seems this balancing act has admittedly become harder.
Nevertheless, I would caution to judge the effects of recent weeks too quickly. Given the lack of a regulatory framework, leaving the BRI is really more about symbolism, perhaps best interpreted as an easy move to satisfy Washington in the short term. Going forward, we’ll have to create more comprehensive measurements of alignment with great powers on specific issues.
And while symbolism of course matters for Chinese diplomacy, it probably won’t affect economic cooperation with China much. In fact, one implication of a more assertive U.S. could very well be a China that is keen to demonstrate tangible benefits from participating in the BRI or GDI, GSI, GCI.
Paradoxically, then, forcing countries to – symbolically – weaken their relationships with China may, in fact, provide them with more leverage to negotiate with Beijing, especially if cooperation with China comes with trade-offs in their relationship with Washington down the line.
With all this, there is, of course, a bigger question the Trump administration may need to answer: once a figurative country has chosen Washington over Beijing, then what?
Sticks may have effects in the short term on certain issues, but what carrots could Trump offer to countries to maintain important relationships? At least from my perspective, America First doesn’t necessarily sound too appealing a vision for governments trying to realize ambitious and longer-term development programs.
Lukas Fiala is the project head of China Foresight at LSEIDEAS.
