By Francesco Scala and Viola Rubeca
On May 30, 2024, China welcomed representatives from across the Arab world to Beijing for the 10th Ministerial Conference of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF). Two documents were adopted: the “Beijing Declaration” and the Action Implementation Plan for 2024-2026. A Joint Statement on the Palestinian Issue, condemning “Israel’s continued aggression,” was also issued.
In the previous edition of the ChinaMed Observer, we explored how the Egyptian and Tunisian media covered the CASCF. The event attracted substantial press attention in these countries due to the presence of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi and Tunisian President Kais Saied. However, they were not the sole Arab heads of state in Beijing, as Bahrain’s King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa and United Arab Emirates President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan were also in attendance.
In this edition of the ChinaMed Observer, we revisit the CASCF to analyze how this latest conference and its outcomes were discussed in the Gulf states, particularly in Bahrain and the UAE. Additionally, we explore perspectives from Syria and Lebanon, where officials and local media have been closely monitoring China’s stance on and proposals to end to the Gaza War, which threatens to escalate and spill over into their countries.
Overall, officials and commentators from the Gulf primarily emphasized the need to bolster economic and cultural cooperation, particularly in tourism, education, and emerging technologies, sectors in which they hope to leverage China for their own benefit. Beijing’s role in the region and its stance on Palestine, while acknowledged, was not covered much in the Emirati and Bahraini press despite the newly established Sino-Bahraini comprehensive strategic partnership.
Conversely, while there was some interest in economic issues, Lebanese and Syrian officials and media showed considerably more interest in China’s position on Palestine and regional politics, likely due to these countries being on the frontline of any potential escalation of the Gaza War.
This interest in both the economic opportunities offered by China and Beijing’s pro-Arab stance on Palestine may explain Arab officials and media’s acceptance of not only projecting a positive view of China but also embracing and spreading Chinese narratives, including on Taiwan and Xinjiang. Another possible reason are the emerging partnerships between Arab and Chinese news and media outlets.
Sharing Narratives and Celebrating Anniversaries
Much like the press in Tunisia and Egypt, Gulf media outlets echoed the narratives promoted at the ministerial conference of the China-Arab Forum, emphasizing the purported historical, cultural, and “civilizational” bond between China and the Arab world. For example, the Bahraini newspaper Al Ayam published the full, unedited speech of the Secretary General of the League of Arab States, Ahmed Aboul Gheit, who told the Forum:
In line with promoting this positive view of Sino-Arab ties, the Gulf press did not fail to remark upon this year’s diplomatic milestones, as the UAE and Bahrain celebrate 40 and 35 years, respectively, of official relations with the People’s Republic of China. Notably, the UAE ambassador to China, Hussain bin Ibrahim Al Hammadi, commented on the 40-year anniversary in his op-ed for the Chinese press and the Emirates News Agency (WAM). In this piece, the ambassador lauded the long-standing relations and partnership between the “two friendly nations,” emphasizing that Sino-Emirati collaboration has resulted in over “130 agreements and MoUs, which have significantly boosted economic growth and diversification beyond oil-based trade.”
Ambassador Al Hammadi also paid tribute to the UAE’s late Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, the first Gulf Cooperation Council head of state to undertake a state visit to China, a move that laid the groundwork for “a multifaceted relationship based on shared interests and aims.” This visit’s historical significance was also underscored in the joint statement issued after the CASCF conference by UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed and Chinese President Xi Jinping.
Bahrain’s King Hamad bin ‘Isa al-Khalifa also attended the Forum, marking his first state visit to China since 2019. Coinciding with the 35th anniversary of official Sino-Bahraini relations, the visit did not go unnoticed by Bahraini commentators, who underscored its potential to strengthen the Kingdom’s position amid the ongoing tensions in the Middle East. Khaled Hussein Al-Masqati, a member of Bahrain’s Shura Council, emphasized the significance of the king’s trip to Beijing in an interview for Al Ayam, stating:
In addition to this diplomatic axis, Al-Masqati noted that King Hamad’s visit encompasses two other dimensions. The first regards technological innovation, with an emphasis on benefiting from China’s advancements in digital technology, artificial intelligence, and environmentally friendly projects. The second is economic; Al-Masqati envisions a “new phase of cooperation” that could significantly boost bilateral trade, given China’s prominent role in the global economy and Bahrain’s “open economic vision,” as well as the “compatibility between China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ and Bahrain’s ‘Economic Vision 2030’.”
Khalid Mohammed Najibi, First Vice President of the Bahrain Chamber of Commerce and Industry, was similarly enthusiastic about the future of the economic partnership with China. In comments reported by Al Ayam, Najibi stated the strength of Sino-Bahrain relations is reflected in the growing volume of bilateral trade, which is “experiencing steady growth.” Dr. Ali al-Mawlani, an economics expert also quoted by Al Ayam, echoed this sentiment, noting that the agreements signed during the CASCF “will contribute to strengthening the economic relationship between the two friendly countries in a time marked by a decline in global trade”.
However, this emphasis by Bahraini officials on the importance of Sino-Bahraini trade relations is curious, given their relative insignificance. Indeed, the Kingdom has so far lagged behind its fellow GCC member states in strengthening trade and investment ties with China. In 2022, Bahraini exports to China were valued at only US$192 million, a stark contrast when compared to the value of exports from other GCC states: Kuwait (US$17.2 billion), Oman (US$31.3 billion), Qatar (US$20.9 billion), Saudi Arabia (US$64.3 billion), and the UAE (US$39.3 billion). Similarly, Chinese FDI stock in Bahrain was the lowest in the GCC at US$131 million, compared to Kuwait (US$1 billion), Oman (US$268 million), Qatar (US$944 million), Saudi Arabia (US$3 billion), and the UAE (US$11.9 billion).
Source: ICT Trade Map
Source: ICT Trade Map
Nevertheless, Al-Masqati hope for a “new phase of cooperation” seemingly came true on May 31, when Bahrain and China announced the establishment of a “comprehensive strategic partnership,” one of Beijing’s highest levels of diplomatic relations. This announcement caught most international commentators off guard, as China has only five other such partnerships in the region—with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iraq, Algeria, and Iran. Bahrain stands out among these regional powers with its relatively modest size (786.5 km²) and population (~1.5 million), as well as its limited strategic and economic significance for China.
Analysts have speculated that Bahrain’s role as the base of the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet or the recent MoU between Bahrain’s sovereign wealth fund and the China Investment Corporation may have influenced this development. However, those hoping for a clarification from Manama, or even a Bahraini perspective on the reasons behind this diplomatic development, are out of luck. The press in Bahrain has been rather tight-lipped on the matter, with the exception of the aforementioned articles on the potential economic benefits and the official joint statement by King Hamad and President Xi, which simply stated that Bahrain and China will work together to “expand the scope of cooperation between them in the fields of infrastructure, economy, trade, investment, finance, new energy, advanced technology, agriculture, fishing, education, culture, tourism, health, and others.”
Strong Alignment, from Palestine to Taiwan
The Joint Statement of China and Arab Countries on the Palestine Issue, which strongly condemned “Israel’s continued aggression against the Palestinian people” and “the United States for using its veto to prevent Palestine from becoming a full member of the United Nations,” attracted considerable attention from the Arab press. This is particularly true for media outlets in Syria and Lebanon, where the Gaza War threatens to escalate and spill over into their countries. Their keen interest in China’s position on Palestine and Israel is evident from the detailed coverage of the joint statement’s wording and every comment by President Xi on the conflict.
For instance, the official Lebanese news agency, the National News Agency (NNA), reported on Xi Jinping’s expression of “’deep pain’ over the ‘extremely serious’ humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip.” The Lebanese French-language newspaper L’Orient-Le Jour, with reporting from AFP, also highlighted these comments and noted the Chinese President’s statement on how “The absolute priority now is to establish an immediate ceasefire, to prevent the conflict from spreading, impacting regional peace and stability and to prevent an even more serious humanitarian crisis.” The paper further reflected on the “Asian giant’s growing influence” in the region, citing Beijing hosting talks between Hamas and Fatah as “proof of its growing commitment to the [Palestinian] issue.” In a subsequent article, L’Orient-Le Jour reported on China’s call for an “expanded” peace conference and a Sino-Arab “common voice.”
This “Sino-Arab common voice” extends beyond Middle Eastern issues, as the Forum also saw Arab countries re-affirm their support of the One-China principle. This principle, championed by Beijing, asserts that there is only one China, that the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of all China, and that the island of Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory. This differs from the “One China” policies of many Western countries, which, while acknowledging Beijing’s position, often leave Taiwan’s legal status and political future ambiguous.
Many Arab states went beyond merely endorsing the One-China principle in their joint statements, with some explicitly expressing support for “Chinese reunification.” A notable example is the joint statement signed by the UAE, which states:
“The UAE side stressed that it continues to firmly adhere to the One-China Principle and that Taiwan is an integral part of China, supports the Chinese side’s position on issues related to China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, supports the achievement of Chinese reunification, and rejects external interference in internal Chinese affairs.”
Similarly, the first point of the joint statement signed by Bahrain and China affirmed:
“For its part, the Bahraini side affirms its firm commitment to the One-China principle and its support for China’s efforts to preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity. It also affirms its continued commitment to supporting China’s position on issues related to its core interests.”
Even more interestingly, Secretary General of the League of Arab States Ahmad Aboul Gheit, in his statement at the Forum, mentioned the Palestinian and Taiwanese issues together, as if the two are somewhat equivalent:
“China supports the Arab countries in their just and legitimate causes, and the protection of their national interests, and the Arab countries affirm their position in support of the One-China Principle.”
On Xinjiang, where China’s policies toward its Turkic minorities, such as the Uyghurs, have led to Western condemnation, the UAE’s joint statement also adopted the Chinese narrative. It states that the UAE “commends China’s efforts in caring for its Chinese Muslim citizens, including in the Xinjiang region… supports all precautionary measures to combat terrorism, violence and deradicalization taken by China to maintain the protection and stability of its territory.”
Syria and Lebanon
Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad was also in Beijing for the China-Arab States Forum, where he had a private meeting with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi. This meeting has come at a crucial time for Syria as it seeks to normalize relations with its northern neighbor, Türkiye, potentially paving the way for a resolution to the protracted Syrian Civil War. However, Damascus is facing not only the threat of renewed American pressure through the Assad Regime Anti-Normalization Act, which has recently passed both houses of the US Congress but also ongoing Israeli attacks on its territory (for more, see our analysis of the Chinese perspective on the Israeli bombing of the Iranian embassy complex in Damascus).
Interestingly, the readout from the Wang-Mekdad meeting provided by the Syrian state-controlled Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) differs significantly from that of the Chinese state broadcaster CGTN. CGTN focused on China and Syria’s reciprocal support, particularly in “safeguarding [their] national independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity,” while also celebrating Syria’s recent readmission to the Arab League. The Chinese account also underscored the strategic partnership established between China and Syria in September 2023 during Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s state visit to China (for more see our analysis of how this visit was covered by the Chinese media).
In contrast, SANA’s report prioritized the issue of Palestine, which was not mentioned by CGTN. SANA also emphasized the issue of territorial integrity, explicitly mentioning not only “Taiwan, Hong Kong and Xinjiang,” but also stating that:
While the Syrian readout and Foreign Minister Mekdad’s speech at the Forum focused on political and diplomatic issues, Damascus’ interest in enhancing its economic relationship with Beijing was more explicitly articulated by Bouthaina Shaaban, the political and media adviser to the Syrian President. In an interview with CGTN, Shaaban affirmed Syria’s desire to collaborate with China, expressing its willingness to “putting its hands in the hands of China” on economic, trade, and financial matters. Similarly, Syrian Electricity Minister Ghassan al-Zamel told Xinhua about Syria’s interest in working with “friendly countries” like China on developing wind and solar projects and rebuilding its energy grid.
However, it is important to note the severe imbalance in Sino-Syrian relations. According to a 2019 report for the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, China’s assistance to Syria, although multifaceted, falls short of meeting Syria’s expectations and needs. Indeed, China appears far less interested in Syria than Syria is in China, a disparity exacerbated by Damascus’ reliance on aid in the wake of its years of devastating civil war. Moreover, despite Syrian rhetoric on attracting Chinese investment, the scale of China’s economic engagement with Syria has not met Syrian hopes, with the partnership remaining primarily political.
Turning to Lebanon, it is noteworthy that Lebanese Foreign Affairs and Emigrants Minister Abdallah Bou Habib was absent in Beijing. To clarify that his absence was not a sign of disrespect toward China, the Lebanese Foreign Ministry issued an explanatory statement.
The statement cited a scheduling conflict between the China-Arab Forum and the 8th Conference on Displaced Persons in Brussels, where Bou Habib was representing Lebanon on behalf of Prime Minister Najib Mikati. Given Lebanon’s urgent need to address displacement and refugee issues—especially pressing for a country with one of the highest per capita refugee populations —attending the Brussels conference was deemed more crucial for Beirut.
China acknowledged and accepted Lebanon’s explanation, and both nations plan to coordinate the dates for Bou Habib’s upcoming official visit to China.
Tourism as a Driver of Enhanced Economic Ties
Naturally, alongside high-level political discussions, the Forum also witnessed numerous talks and deals on enhancing economic cooperation, as many of the participating Arab governments seek to diversify their oil-centric economies. Tourism emerged as a key focus, with Gulf officials noting the substantial number of outbound Chinese tourists and the urgent need to enhance travel routes between the Middle East and China.
One notable outcome was the MoU between Etihad Airways and Beijing Daxing International Airport aimed at increasing the frequency of UAE-Beijing flights and promoting travel between the two countries. This agreement received considerable interest in the Emirati press and was described by WAM as a “landmark deal” that strengthens bilateral economic, trade, and cultural ties.
Additionally, a joint venture between Etihad and China Eastern Airlines, set to launch in early 2025, was also met with media enthusiasm. This collaboration will expand travel options and streamline connections for passengers traveling between major Chinese cities such as Shanghai, Beijing, Xi’an, and Kunming, as well as key destinations in the UAE and across the Middle East and Africa.
Bahrain is also prioritizing the tourism sector in its economic relations with China. Bahraini Minister of Tourism Fatima bint Jaafar Al-Sirafi emphasized that “the Chinese market is one of the most prominent target markets within the Tourism Strategy 2022-2026, because it contains promising tourism opportunities for the Kingdom of Bahrain and the region as a whole.” Recognizing the importance of easier travel connections, Gulf Air has strengthened ties with airports in Shanghai and Guangzhou, facilitated by Bahrain’s membership in the “China Ready” program, which has allowed for direct flights to China from Manama Airport.
Alongside enhancing commercial connections (Chinese aviation company COMAC has expressed interest in launching commercial flights between Saudi Arabia and Beijing as part of its development strategy), Gulf states, noting how tourism has seemingly become more multifaceted, have been looking beyond just flights to attract Chinese visitors. Qatar, for instance, has signed an MoU with Huawei “aimed at improving tourism experiences for Chinese visitors” by “integrating Huawei products such as «SkyTone» for roaming data, «Huawei Wallet» for payments, and «Petal Maps» for promotion,” as well as “tourist attractions and travel assistance aids supported by AI.”
Cultural Cooperation
Cultural cooperation received significant attention at the Forum, with it being framed as a reflection of the “historical closeness” between the Chinese and Arab people. The UAE expressed particular interest in expanding academic exchanges with China, focusing on projects that could benefit Emirati students. This was exemplified by Sheikh Mohammad bin Zayed visiting Emirati students in Beijing during his stay. During this visit, the UAE President commented on the importance of “persevering and making the utmost effort to acquire sciences”, indicating that “after their return to the [UAE], they will represent a cultural bridge between the Emirati and Chinese peoples, which will enhance bilateral relations, since culture is an important element of these relationships.”
The importance of strengthening cultural ties, also praised by President Xi Jinping, was reaffirmed in the joint statement issued at the end of Mohammad bin Zayed’s trip to China. The 10th point of the statement reads as follows:
“The two sides have signed a number of agreements and memorandums of understanding aimed at strengthening bilateral relations in the fields of the Belt and Road Initiative, investment and trade, science and technology, tourism, health, culture, statistics, higher education as well as Chinese language teaching, intellectual property, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, tolerance and coexistence.”
Its 45th point also states:
“The two sides fully stressed the important role of educational communication in enhancing acquaintance and friendship between the two countries, and the two sides will continue to enhance communication and mutual visits between students, teachers, and researchers at all levels, encourage educational institutions of the two countries to conduct joint scientific research, qualify the competent, promote Chinese language teaching in Emirati schools, and conduct practical cooperation in the fields of Basic Education, Higher Education, Vocational Education, Digital Education, and others.”
A MoU was also signed between Bahrain Polytechnic and Peking University to “expand the horizons of cooperation in various fields, especially in the higher education and scientific research sector.” Sheikh Abdullah bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Political Affairs, affirmed that this MoU demonstrates:
The growth cultural cooperation between China and Arab states also extends to the media sector, where as a result of the Forum, several deals have been signed between Chinese news outlets, press agencies and media conglomerates and their Gulf counterparts.
These developments extend beyond mere technical collaboration; they signal a growing potential for closer policy and political alignment between China and Arab states.
Conclusion
The statements and agreements that emerged from the 10th Ministerial Conference of the CASCF underscore Arab states’ strong interest in deepening ties with China. While exploring opportunities for cooperation in trade, investment, tourism, and emerging technologies remain high priorities, expanding cultural and media collaboration has also become a significant aspect of Sino-Arab relations. This alignment could bolster the ability of China and Arab states to “speak with one voice” on international issues, from Gaza to Taiwan and Xinjiang.
While it appears that China and the Arab states are aligned on economic relations and global affairs, it is essential to acknowledge that the perspectives presented in this analysis predominantly originate from sources affiliated with national governments, which may not fully reflect local public or expert opinion. Additionally, one should not interpret these developments and rhetoric as a zero-sum game. The favorable coverage of China in the Arab press and increasing cooperation with Beijing do not mean Arab states are unequivocally siding with China over the West. This is evident from Bahraini media’s low-key response to establishing a strategic comprehensive relationship with China and the UAE’s less celebratory outlook on China’s condemnation of Israel. Indeed, as articulated by the Emirates Policy Centre, Arab countries are adopting a nuanced approach—a pivot towards the East without intending to form an adversarial axis against the West.
The extent of commitment and collaboration between China and Arab states will be revealed in the coming months, with media coverage in the Arab world likely shifting toward how these discussions translate into tangible results.
Francesco SCALA is Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. He holds a bachelor’s degree in Linguistic and Cultural Mediation from the University of Naples “L’Orientale”. His research focuses on the media coverage of China in the Gulf countries, including Iraq.
Viola RUBECA is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She is a graduate of the LUISS Guido Carli-China Foreign Affairs University Double Master’s Degree in International Relations, majoring in Security, and holds a B.A. in International Relations and Diplomatic Affairs from the University of Bologna. She is also a Teaching Assistant at LUISS University, contributing to courses on the MENA region, its social and economic developments, and its relations with Europe concerning immigration, security, and integration. Her research interests include security and strategic studies, as well as European, Italian, and Chinese diplomacy in the region, with a particular focus on Lebanon and Syria.
