China’s ties with Zimbabwe are either going off the rails or are among the strongest most dynamic in Africa depending on who you listen to. Mounting civil society anger towards Chinese companies and their apparent disregard for local labor and environmental standards is becoming a huge problem. But at the same time, Chinese banks and enterprises are making huge investments in Zim’s energy, mining, and telecommunications infrastructure that’s bringing badly needed jobs to this embattled country.
Prolific Mataruse, a political science lecturer at the University of Zimbabwe, closely follows Chinese economic trends in Zimbabwe. He recently contributed two chapters on the subject to a new China-Zim Economic Handbook published by the Zimbabwe Environmental Law Association and joins Eric & Cobus to discuss his findings.
Show Notes:
- Bloomberg: Biggest China Bank Abandons $3 Billion Zimbabwe Coal Plan by Ray Ndlovu and Antony Sguazzin
- The East African: China clashes with Zimbabwean unions over ‘systematic abuse’ by Kitsepile Nyathie
- Quartz: Zimbabwe has okayed a Chinese coal-mining pact at its top game reserve, even as elephants die by Tawanda Karombo
About Prolific Mataruse:
Dr. Prolific Mataruse is an emerging scholar who has been extensively involved in rethinking Zimbabwean politics including the current constitution, civil society, political economy and foreign policy. He is involved with youth organizations and is part of several academic networks. Currently, he is working on understanding Chinese investments in Zimbabwe, bottom-up solutions in Zimbabwe, and the global economic positionality of Zimbabwe.
Transcript:
Intro: The China in Africa podcast is brought to you in partnership with the Africa China Reporting Project at Wits University in Johannesburg. The ACRP aims to improve the quality of reporting on Africa-China relations through reporting grants, workshops, and other opportunities for journalists. More information at africachinareporting.co.za, and our dedicated training website at africachinatraining.com.
Eric Olander: Hello, and welcome to another edition of The China in Africa Podcast, a proud member of the Sinica Network from SupChina. I’m Eric Olander, and as always, I’m joined by Cobus van Staden, the senior China Africa researcher at the South African Institute of International Affairs in Johannesburg, South Africa. A very good morning to you, Cobus.
Cobus van Staden: Good morning.
Eric: Cobus, it has been negligent on our part that we have not talked about Zimbabwe in a very, very long time, and there is just so much that’s going on. In fact, Zimbabwe is one of my go-to countries every day when I’m putting together our daily email newsletter. I can always count on some great news to come out of Zimbabwe. Let me just give you a rundown of some of the things that have been going on that will help set up our discussion today. There was a terrific scandal that happened over the past couple of weeks in Beijing when Vice President Constantino Chiwenga, who is both the vice president and the health minister. Now, mind you, last year, the very vice president who was in Beijing last week made an announcement that said, “No senior Zimbabwean officials will be permitted to leave the country for medical care.”
Well, he and his entourage flew to Beijing, and, lo and behold, somehow they got past the dragnet that the Chinese have for detecting COVID-19. Three members of his security detail tested positive for COVID-19. But once again, it revealed some of the problems that the Zimbabwean government is having in terms of their credibility when they say one thing and they do something else. Chiwenga has been sick for a very long time, and he’s been going to South Africa, to Singapore, to China for medical care, all at great expense, and again, under tremendous secrecy. Zimbabwe has also been the second largest recipient of Chinese-made vaccines for COVID-19. 6.9 million doses have come to Zimbabwe. They’ve been more effective than any other country in sub-Saharan Africa in securing supplies of Chinese vaccines. By the way, they’re second only to Morocco. A very big deal has been underway now also in the steel sector.
Tsingshan Holding Group will build a new billion-dollar steel plant that will be able to produce 1.2 million tons a year and employ between four and 5,000 people. Let’s move to the power sector. Lots of news there. Big power outage last week and when the Hwange Power Station went down for 18 hours. Now that Hwange Power Station is going to get some relief probably towards the end of the year, early next year, when a $1.5 billion expansion that’s being built by Sinohydro is done. Boy, that cannot come fast enough for power consumers in many parts of Zimbabwe as well. Chinese contractors are also building the Kariba South Hydroelectric Power expansion project and the Batoka Gorge Power Station. That’s another hydroelectric station that’s on the Zambezi River. So, lots happening in the energy space. Speaking of energy and coal, Cobus, maybe it was last year or the year before, I don’t remember, we did a show on the Sengwa Power Plant, which is a big coal fire power station, $3 billion project that was going to be backed by the industrial and Commercial Bank of China.
Well, ICBC backed out of that, and this has been part of the massive downturn that we’ve seen in Chinese coal financing overseas, almost to nothing. In fact, the first six or seven months of this year, the Green BRI Institute in Beijing said not a single dollar was sent to finance coal projects anywhere in the world. That’s the first time that has happened. Lots of tension has been happening on the environmental front. So, there was an order that came down from the high court that barred the Chinese mining company, Afrochine, from extracting chrome in the Mavuradonha Wilderness. But despite the court order, environmentalists and journalists have been going out there and saying that Afrochine is actually pursuing and going on with its mining activities.
And this has sparked a row between the company and activists. There was a video that went viral a little bit, semi-viral on Zimbabwe Twitter a few weeks ago, and it was shot by Rumbi Takawira, who’s a broadcast journalist and environmental activist. She published the videos on her Twitter page, and then it got republished on 263chat.com. She was in the Mavuradonha Wilderness, and here’s what she said.
Rumbi Takawira: So, we are here at one of the spots where these guys are mining and already you can see the destruction that they’ve caused to the environment. These are holes that are opened up, and they’re not closing these up anytime soon. And imagine an animal falling into a pit like this, will it survive? I really don’t think so. At the end of the day, we need to find sustainable ways of getting to the resources without jeopardizing other areas or other species that are surrounding the…
Eric: It cut off that way so quickly, but that’s the nature of Twitter videos. But Afrochine, boy, they were just furious about this, and they went on a tear. On July 25th, the company published a statement that singled out 263Chat and the News Zimbabwe website by… they said they were calling allegations of mining activities in the Mavuradonha Wilderness as part of a, and I’m quoting here, “a coordinated media campaign against the company.” Here’s what they said in response to the charge. Number one, “No effort was made to contact us in the production of the reports.” Number two, “The mention of our company is gratuitous, unfair, defamatory just to grab attention.” And Cobus, here’s a very interesting point that they bring up in number three. “There are serious racist, xenophobic, and hateful connotations regarding Chinese nationals, which potentially endangers not just investors, but also individual people of Chinese and Asian extraction.”
Those are quotes from the statement by Afrochine. Cobus, I guess what I just painted here is just from the past four or five months, I mean, there is so much going on here, but it really highlights the mix and the complexity that there’s some great news like four or 5,000 jobs in the Tsingshan steel plant and also some more distressing news related to well, these tensions over environment and mining in the Hwange National Park, as well as in the Mavuradonha Wilderness. So, very, very complex relationship right now, Cobus.
Cobus: Very complex. I think also the China-Zimbabwe relationship, when you go back into history, is one of the most complex ones in Africa, I think. It has very long history of cooperation. China’s added support to Zimbabwe’s anti-colonial struggle. And we’ve seen Chinese companies being extremely involved in Zimbabwe and the Chinese government being extremely involved in Zimbabwe. But we’ve also seen a long history of some of the darker sides of Chinese engagement in Africa, including quite a significant kind of involvement of organized crime elements in diamond dealings in the Marange field, for example. So, it is a very complicated mix of Chinese characters involved. Not least these massive joint operations, because if I’m correct, Afrochine is a joint company. And where there’s very powerful people in the Zimbabwean government frequently also involved in some of these joint operations. So, it’s a really complicated landscape.
Eric: Well, there is a fantastic new resource that is now available. It was published by the Zimbabwe Environmental Law Association. ZELA is a very influential environmental group. We had some of their folks on our show last year to talk about the Sengwa Power Plant. They just published a book called The Handbook of Zimbabwe-China Economic Relations, examining Chinese investments in Zimbabwe financial services, mineral sector, especially gold, chrome and diamonds. One of the contributors to the handbook is Dr. Prolific Mataruse, who is a political science lecture at the University of Zimbabwe in Harare, where he teaches African political economy and international economic relations. Prolific, thank you so much for joining us today. We really appreciate it. It’s an honor to have you on the program.
Prolific Mataruse: I’m also happy to be part of the program.
Eric: You wrote two chapters in the handbook that provided a very broad overview of Chinese economic engagement in Zimbabwe, and then you’ve wrote another one that was focused on the specific role of Chinese companies in the Zimbabwean chrome, gold, and diamond mining sectors. Now, in my introduction, I painted a rather somewhat complex negative picture of the current state of China-Zimbabwe relations. One that’s a little bit tense, but I want to get your perspective. As somebody who studies this up close in detail, you have a much better perspective than I do as to where we are in the current state of the relationship.
Prolific: Thank you. The situation on the ground is really very complex. You are right. Because when you look at like the second chapter that you highlighted, we look at the just investment quantum from China to Zimbabwe, it’s enormous. But then when you get to visit the sites where the Chinese are doing their activities, it’s something else. It’s something else. And the comment from the Chinese company, yeah, about xenophobia, probably it’s something that could be there. And I think in approaching the handbook, it’s something also that we became conscious of that we did not need to stereotype the Chinese. Because there was a lot of high risk for bias and things like that. But the pictures on the ground, the things that we saw, it’s something.
And I think something like a handbook is important. And one of the conclusions we reach in the handbook is that it’s important to track Chinese investments, not just Chinese investments. Because there are also other countries that are investing in Zimbabwe. But I think Chinese investments in Zimbabwe, there is real need to be looking at what they’re doing. And hence, we arrive at some conclusions, like, we need to talk about responsible investment. We need to talk about social inclusion. The stories that are out there, the real stories are so harrowing. Some of them can be easily dismissed, yes. But if you go to the ground, when you see houses that are cracking because of mining that’s happening, when you see mining that’s taking place without the approval of the authorities, the proper authorities in terms of environmental assessment, and other mining regulations that they’re supposed to be following.
When you talk to the employees that have been mistreated in the mines, you get something that’s said. And you get the need to make this known to government and such that government can take control. And also that even the Chinese authorities can also make sure that the Chinese, small Chinese miners that are doing whatever they’re doing in various places are also abiding by human standards.
Cobus: So, Prolific, in the wider discussion of Africa-China relations, Zimbabwe is frequently cited as an example of a country where China managed to find a lot of engagement because Zimbabwe had quite unhappy relationships with traditional Western partners. So I wonder if you would mind updating that. Just as a very basic thumbnail introduction for our listeners, what is Zimbabwe’s wider international position at the moment? Like, is Zimbabwe still facing sanctions, and from where? What are the constraints that limit Zimbabwe’s international cooperation with external actors?
Prolific: Okay, so since 2001, Zimbabwe has been under U.S. sanctions and EU sanctions, 2003. So, it’s real that the country faces a lot of problems. But what’s important attempt to recognize is that Zimbabwe had a look east policy, and some have called look China policy because China has been the sort of the friend that stepped out when the West relished or moved out of the country. It divested. You find these divestment also happened in the mineral sector of [inaudible 0:13:18] companies like Anglo-American [inaudible 0:13:21] etc. You find they pull out and the Chinese almost step out when these ones are pulling out. So, the current position after Mugabe, or maybe I skipped something a bit. In 2016, Mugabe chased out Chinese companies in the [inaudible 0:13:41] areas cause there was some bit of realization.
And also in 2014, they were set up in a sovereign wealth fund because there was a realization that we needed to find a way of benefiting the country rather than pillaging the country and allowing sort of foreign investors to come and just take without something remaining for the country. But you find, in 2017, when Mugabe falls and then there is a new government, the new government begins to talk about re-engagement and also engagement. So, it’s a multi-pronged approach. So, it’s a re-engagement with the West, but also continued engagement or strengthened engagement with the East, in particular with China. So you find the Chinese companies moved back in particular in 2020 during the lockdown. You find they moved back into mining gold, into mining diamonds. And the companies are there. And also, during the lockdown, I liked your presentation of the recipients of vaccines in Africa, but Zimbabwe also received a lot of other things apart from vaccines in terms of PPEs, respirators, ventilators, and things like that that went a long way in assisting during the lockdown.
And by far, the biggest major investment has been in the energy sector. Something totaling over 12 billion in terms of in terms of investments. So, there is something that’s really been happening. But also, as much as the investments have been big, they’ve been concerned raised by Zimbabweans. And people have taken the government and the investors to court in terms of the opacity of the investments. People don’t know the amount, the real term. So, this kind of [inaudible 0:15:26] that we had is not conclusive. I think it’s tentative in many ways because it’s difficult to actually know what’s happening. So, the government was taken to court, African Bank and other investors were taken to court, and the High Court of Zimbabwe judgment was handed that the government needed to disclose the amount of investments, the nature of investments. Because it’s only probably one investment agreement with the Chinese that has been ratified in parliament. That is in 2012 when it appeared like the 2018 elections and they could lose.
So, you could see how the Chinese were also preparing to making sure that they do not lose that. And I think in the long term, the kind of strategy that the Chinese are using is very short-term, shortsighted, where they believe that if they are together with the government, then everything else doesn’t matter. The people don’t matter. We can just run roughshod over the people. But I think it would have been strategic and much more wiser if they cement their investments in trust, in social inclusion, in ethical standards such that some of these xenophobic things that are happening against the Chinese because I think, in many ways, there’s xenophobic. But I’ve also learned something. Some of the perceptions are not just perceptions. They have a real origin.
When you visit places and you actually see things that are happening on the ground, when you talk to the chiefs in the particular areas, you actually see there is a problem. And the Chinese authorities, the Zimbabwe and authorities, they need to confront that kind of thing at this present tense. But I think going forward, because looking at the re-engagement problems with the West, it was assumed that the re-engagement would go well with the West that the USA and Britain would actually show up or would welcome the re-engagement initiatives of the government of Zimbabwe. But it has not been so forthcoming.
So, also one thing that probably will be interesting to watch would be the American initiatives in terms of the Clean Network Program, the Blue Dot Network program as an alternative to the BRI, to the Chinese, in terms of re-engagement, how would that play out? Are the Americans going to change their approach? Because the Americans are shifting in terms of attitudes. So, that’s something to watch and it’s something not clear. But I think in terms of relations, China’s going to remain permanently edged into Zimbabwean foreign policy and their investment. Because already the kind of debt that they’re owed by Zimbabwe and the kind of penetration in terms of supporting the Zimbabwe government and the Zimbabwean economy is so huge. You can’t imagine that breaking and that stopping.
So, I think for the foreseeable future, China’s going to be a key [inaudible 0:18:24]. But if something were to happen locally, like a change of government, yeah, and the Zambian government is removed, I think that could spell some disaster in terms of the financial obligations or the investments that have been made by the Chinese. So, which is why I think it makes a stronger case that is in the interest of China to be strategically invested in engaging a lot of people that are on board on its side other than the government. That it’s important for China and the Chinese investors to be doing the right thing. And most of the time, the right thing is just ethical. Yeah, in terms of how many hours do people work on the mines? Things like that.
Eric: But these are not problems that are unique to Zimbabwe. We’ve been talking about, in our daily coverage that we’ve been reporting on in the Democratic Republic of Congo, there’ve been a lot of problems in the minds of the maltreatment of workers. There have been problems in Nigeria, Zambia. Namibia right now, companies are going on strike. So, this seems to be a regional problem more than just a country-level problem. It’s interesting that you point out about the need to balance out their relations beyond potentially the Mnangagwa government and ZANU-PF. People said that during the Mugabe era, that the Chinese were so tight with President Mugabe. And they said, “Once Mugabe is gone, they’re going to be screwed.” And lo and behold, behind the scenes, they were building up ties with Mnangagwa. And they did the same thing in the Democratic Republic of Congo is that while Kabila was in power, they were building up the ties with Felix Tshisekedi.
And you remember when Constantino Chiwenga, and Mnangagwa himself didn’t go, but Chiwenga went to Beijing prior to the coup. And no one really knows what happened there and what was said, but something was said, and then the coup went forward and Mnangagwa went into power and the Chinese had a seamless transition. So, it does seem like they’ve got some sophistication in how to manage these political power transitions. What do you look back on when you see the transition from the Mugabe era to the Mnangagwa era? They handled that pretty well. Do you think that that was just a one-off, or they can do it again?
Prolific: I think they handled that well, but I think what’s making the difference in terms of global affairs in general and in Africa in relation to the Chinese is their dollars, if they can pump the dollars into whatever project is happening. Because I think that’s the problem. That was happening when Mugabe stepped out. Western dollars, Western countries were prevaricating on who to fund, how to fund. So, you find even civil society was broke in general. Then you find the faction, Mnangagwa’s faction was not even sure of what was going to happen. So, I think as long as there is that kind of hesitation on the part of the West, and the Chinese do not hesitate in terms of partnering and supporting people that are willing to also support their cause, I think they’ll always pump the dollars and always get the kind of support.
I believe there’s need to try to track the investments. This is the role that civil society can play that other actors can play. What is on the ground? What is happening in the back or beyond, it’s a mountain’s deep in Zimbabwe, what’s really happening? Because there are communities that are there that are willing to talk. And I find sometimes when some of these communities have been empowered or have been educated, they have stepped out to report to organizations like the Zimbabwe Environmental Lawyers Association, and they’ve taken the companies to court and they have won in court. Sometimes it’s environmental issues. Sometimes it’s just that regulations were not followed and these communities have won. So, I think the scope really is to not really expose, but to understand, to know where, what is happening, who is doing what and where.
And how are they doing it? Is it being done properly? I think those are some of the probably key ways to move out of the trip of the dollars. Because if dollars are used to capture an elite, then probably if we widen the net to include other people, many people, you cannot capture many people, I think that could be a way out.
Cobus: Can you talk a little bit about the position of civil society in Zimbabwe at the moment? I’ve done, for my own research, I’ve done a lot of reading from Zimbabwean civil society, particularly on environmental issues. And I’m always really surprised and heartened by the level of work that’s done by Zimbabwean civil society organizations. It’s really amazing. How do they manage to get that work done? Where do a lot of their support come from? And what is their relationship with the government at the moment?
Prolific: Okay. So, I have done a bit of work in terms of funding with civil society organizations. So, most of it is from OECD countries. And the relationship with the government for most civil society members is confrontational. And by extension, it’s also confrontational to Chinese investors. But there’s been something that’s been changing. I think we can trace it to 2018 when donors stopped funding civil society the way that they used to fund in the past. There’s been a shift in terms of how civil society is trying to do its work in Zimbabwe, not just environmental activists, but even democracy activists. You find they’re trying to shift away from confrontation to sort of a creative kind of engagement where they’re using a lot of ways.
That’s the current stage. Because for now you find environmental activists, like in the area of mines, they’re trying to approach the ministry of mines. In the areas of work lands, they’re trying to approach, to work with the ministries of local government. So, there is that kind of emphasis currently that probably we have been too confrontational in the past, and also we have been too confrontational. And when the fund has abandoned us for a while, it did not really work out that well. So, we are in this rat in this kind of situation. So, it’s graveling in darkness for now, trying to determine what’s really our position. Should we confront? Should we engage? How do we engage? How do we confront? It’s really a tough situation for Zimbabwean civil society.
And I think something could come out in terms of a new way of thinking and doing activism in general in Zimbabwe from this kind of thinking and processing that’s currently happening. But also, the problems with that kind of processing sometimes is that you don’t really get work done. So, in the end, what you might have is a sporadic case taken to court here and there. But the kind of consistence that will be needed to ensure that good causes eventually triumph is sometimes affected.
Eric: Yeah. You’ve talked about the tension that exists between civil society and the perceptions, the public perceptions of the Chinese. And I’m just wondering, do you have any evidence that Chinese companies, who you mentioned in the handbook, are involved in almost every sector of the economy from agriculture, construction, mining, steel, energy, health, military transport, ICT, tourism, culture? I mean, the list goes on. This is your list. Do you see any indication that those companies, the embassy are doing what you’re talking about in terms of trying to narrow the chasm between the great relations that they have with the government and the tense complex relations that they have with civil society in the public?
Prolific: Yes, yes, yes. And this is why, I think, the Chinese government can do more. So, I’ve participated in some forums where the Chinese embassy and the Chinese ambassador have really tried to explain to stakeholders, and to engage stakeholders from civil society and also from the communities. And also to get back to the Chinese companies themselves. Sometimes you get an impression that some of the investors are out of control. Some of them just rant and not acting really in an official capacity. But I think we can have more being done. And this is not also, it’s not just the duty of the Chinese embassy, but it’s also the duty of the Zimbabwean authorities to actually take the reports where it is happening and to enforce Zimbabwean laws and other environmental laws, international humanitarian laws that needs to be… the protection of citizens that’s at stake.
It’s the protection of a national resource that doesn’t last forever, that’s also very finite. And the communities need to find a way of eventually benefiting. But also, when you get to the ground and you’re doing the fieldwork, you get a feeling that it’s not just with the Chinese. It’s also to do with the French, the Italians, the Russians, what they’re doing as well. For example, when you look at granite mining in the area in Mutoko there, when you are talking to the people, it’s not just the Chinese, but the scale at which the Chinese are present there because of their obviously close relationship with the government, and they are not having broken engagement since 2003. You find it’s so pervasive. Yeah. So, which is why probably we need to focus on the Chinese much more than other investors, but also highlight that the Zimbabwean government has an obligation to enforce laws that are already enshrined in the Constitution and other heads of parliament.
Cobus: Yeah. I mean, that’s a really important point. And I remember SAIIA, my main employer, South African Institute of International Affairs, did research on Russian involvement in Zimbabwe which was published late last year. And there were very similar dynamics involved there. Also, relationships between government officials and Russian business owners or oligarchs being very instrumental in whether a deal goes through or not. To which extent are those dynamics apparent in the case of other investors too, like say OECD investors?
Prolific: I think it’s not that clear. It’s not that clear because our focus was on the Chinese. But in the granite area, when we went to visit the community, people were talking about the construction of a French library with granite from the communities there, and how the French miners, they have also behaved in many ways that are similar to the Chinese in terms of how they treat the workers, employment hours, how they pay. But probably what also stood out is that there was no xenophobic statements in terms of negative perceptions. People seemed to be much more receptive to the French, to the Italians that operated in some of the areas.
So, there’s something also that’s unique, probably it’s not unique, but it’s a pattern that’s unique to the Chinese as well, is that they big companies, but then there are also small investors or sort of breakout. I think it’s a strategy of the big companies to have small-scale investors going out to buy chrome, gold, or diamonds from the communities or to be exploring small mining claims and still bringing this to the major company. So, it’s these smaller entities that are usually out of the radar that tend to perpetrate some of these things. But also complaints have come from established companies like Sinohydro. We find a lot of people that work at Sinohydro, when you interact with them, the employees, they have a lot of stories to tell about skills transfer, about how they would want to operate certain machines, but probably are prohibited sometimes from knowing how those machines function. There are a lot of machines that are coming into the country, big equipment. Sinohydro in Hwange, Sinohydro at also in Kariba.
So, there is supposed to be some skills transferred to the locals, but there are problems that are happening there. Also with COVID-19, you find most of them at both Sinohydro facilities, some of them, actually all of them were prohibited from leaving campsites.
Eric: Yeah, I can imagine what the Chinese embassy might say. Now, I’ll be upfront, I’ve never spoken to anybody in the Chinese embassy there. I’ve never communicated, I don’t know anybody there. So, but I can imagine what they might say. And they might say, “Zimbabwean people are off with us, right?” You talked about the civil society ties, but who else is bringing vaccines into this country? Nobody else was there to bring the vaccines. Who else is bringing in billion-dollar mining investments and steel investments? Nobody else is bringing that in. Who else is bringing in the jobs, the investment, the money? Certainly not the U.S. or the OECD countries because there’s still sanctions and there’s still lots of tensions that are there. And so, I get a sense that they might be very frustrated with this conversation because they say, “Listen, we can’t control private companies anymore than the American embassy can control private companies.”
There’s this perception that the Chinese embassies have a magic wand, and then they can kind of control every Chinese entity in the society that’s behaving or misbehaving badly. I guess I’m trying to get my head around about the frustration that the Chinese might have in terms of hearing all of these tensions with civil society. And at the same time, all of the investments that you’ve talked about in the power sector, in the mining sector, the rebuilding of Robert Mugabe International Airport, the expansion of the Hwange Power Station, all of this is being done by the Chinese. Huge investments. And yet, there is a sense, probably, of a little chip on their shoulder saying, “You know what? People are giving us grief? Really? Really?” I mean, do you see what I’m saying, where I’m coming from, why they might be pissed off?
Prolific: Yeah. But also, it’s not the first time that that kind of thing is happening. Zimbabwe’s history, it’s very long. In 2008, we had did a West crisis in terms of economic relations than we are currently having now, I think. Yeah. And anti-Chinese sentiment back then was so strong. In 2009, we actually had a government of national elites, and part of the people in the government of national elites were anti-Chinese. They did not like the Chinese. And hence you find the Chinese pushing in 2012 that the agreement for Victoria Falls, the loan agreement for Victoria Falls be taken to parliament. Although the agreement itself did not appear in parliament, the minister of finance just presented and said, “There is an agreement that’s been proposed by the Chinese, and as Parliament, we need to ratify it.”
So, I think the Chinese are so clear about the state of affairs in Zimbabwe. But they’re not disillusioned about who loves them and who doesn’t love them, but they are so practical and pragmatic about it. If they can still get the return on their investment, they’re okay with that. In terms of steel, Zimbabwe almost supply China 60% of its demands in steel, and that’s a huge kind of supply. You find also that the U.S. is trying to rethink its approach in terms of chrome and other deposit in Zimbabwe. So, the Chinese know they have a foothold ahead, and I think they’re not worried about malcontents, about discontent, and possible turn of history and turn of events. I think for now, they’re saying if we can get a return on the investment, we’re not going to be emotional about it. And I think they have tried not to be emotional about it, but they are now trying to shift. There are changes, and I think these are the things that are important to note.
Cobus: Just taking on from your last point, you’re seeing this stronger engagement, like them actually sitting in on civil society meetings and engaging more with the community. Just in general, where do you see the relationship between China and Zimbabwe going in the next five to 10 years? And what role do you foresee China playing in Zimbabwe during this coming decade?
Prolific: I think it’s a sad kind of situation that’s going to happen for many people that hope that ZANU-PF is going to go away. I think ZANU-PF is not going to go away looking at internal political dynamics in Zimbabwe currently. I think ZANU-PF is going to be there for some time. They’ve promised to be there until 2030, and this is something that they keep hammering at the opposition, etc., are in disarray. So, I think, as long as ZANU-PF is in power, the Chinese are going to continue to enjoy a big role, a big influence in Zimbabwe, especially when we look at fostering re-engagement agendas with Western countries. If that continues to teeter on the way it is right now, we are going to see them coming closer to Chinese investors.
Eric: Dr. Prolific Mataruse is a political science lecture at the University of Zimbabwe in Harare, where he teaches African political economy and international economic relations. He was the contributor to two chapters in the New Handbook of Zimbabwe, China Economic Relations that was published by the Zimbabwe Environmental Law Association. I’m not entirely sure if the handbook is public. If it is public, I will put a link in the show notes. I will follow up with ZELA on that. Prolific, are you on social media if people want to follow what you’re reading and writing and some of your activities?
Prolific: Yes, I’m on social media. I’m not active for personal security reasons, but yes, I’m on social media. Yeah.
Eric: Are you on Twitter by any chance?
Prolific: Yes, I’m on Twitter.
Eric: What is your Twitter name that people if they want to reach out and connect with you?
Prolific: Prolific Mataru.
Eric: Okay. I’ll put a link to Prolific’s Twitter handle there. And Prolific, thank you so much for taking the time. It’s been so enlightening to hear you give us an insight into this most complex relationship that China has in Africa. It’s absolutely been fascinating. We really appreciate your time.
Prolific: Welcome. Thank you so much.
Eric: Cobus, I love these kinds of conversations because I go into the conversation expecting one thing, and I come out completely my head spinning, turned upside down. Zimbabwe will do that to you. And Prolific is so great at laying out the complexity of this relationship. And it’s really a great example of why it’s so dangerous to boil down Chinese engagement in Africa, or in a particular country like Zimbabwe, to these simple narratives that we hear in Western capitals too often. The Chinese have a terrible reputation in civil society in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwean civil society, as you pointed out in your comments, very lively, very dynamic, very good use of social media. The media there is quite active, so it amplifies quite a bit. But what we don’t see, though, is what prolific talked about is how the embassy and Chinese companies, on the flip side, are also trying to engage.
And again, that’s not said to defend the Chinese companies. The point here is, as Prolific said, is that it’s far more complicated than the media narratives that we pick up on social media and in the Zimbabwe and press, and certainly in the international press.
Cobus: Yeah. Definitely. It’s also clearly changing over time. One of the complications of Zimbabwe is that this… As Prolific pointed out, the re-engagement with Western powers has been quite kind of stop-start. There hasn’t been a very kind of robust re-engagement from both sides. And particularly, there’s been a lot of hesitance from Western actors to kind of step back into Zimbabwe, and that means that things are developing on their own. The relationship between China and Zimbabwe, between Russia and Zimbabwe and other actors, those are all running. These actors keep learning more and more like how to do business in Zimbabwe and the particular kind of issues there. But because there’s so little Western engagement, on the Western side, it seems kind of static. And there’s very little mapping of, of these changes in English, for example. So, it’s really important, I think, to speak with civil society stakeholders in Zimbabwe because they really are the people who are tracking these changes as they’re happening.
Eric: Well, I would not expect much change coming from the United States anytime soon. Zimbabwe is one of the only countries that I’ve seen, and I’m new to Washington, so I don’t know it that well, but that has a genuine anti-ZANU-PF lobby in it. So, there is a lobby in Washington that really works to keep the sanctions up and to keep the distance from Zimbabwe so long as ZANU-PF is still in power. I don’t see that for other countries in Africa. So that is interesting. That leads me to believe that there’s not going to be any change so long as Mnangagwa and ZANU-PF is in power. Should the MDC rise to power one day, well, then let’s see what happens. But for now, that’s not going to happen. So, I think that gives the Chinese some more breathing room.
I still haven’t figured out, for the life of me, why Zimbabwe more than say pretty much any other country in the region was the beneficiary of so many Chinese vaccines. This goes back to what we talked about at the beginning of the program, and I didn’t introduce the concept of all-weather friends. Now that’s a designation that the Chinese assign to their relationships that go deep, deep back into, sometimes into the anti-colonial era. And that was the importance of the Mugabe relationship was that Mugabe had deep ties that went all the way back to the anti-colonial struggles. And the Chinese were there. And it’s these memories that the Chinese have that go back for 30, 40, 50 years that they hold onto and it means something to them. I’m trying to understand the geopolitical strategic interests of investing, say, vaccines into a country like Zimbabwe versus other more strategic countries that are in play with the United States, say like a country like Kenya or something else like that. That’s been a mystery to me. I can’t figure it out. But Zimbabwe does occupy a disproportionate amount of space in the China-Africa relationship, and in part, I think it does tie back to these historical relations.
Cobus: Yeah. Zimbabwe has been known as a very poor, kind of problematic basket-case country for so long. That has been its stereotype so long that people tend to forget that it used to be actually really a powerhouse, an economic powerhouse, and particularly it was an agribusiness powerhouse that outstripped South Africa, for example, in that sense. And so, Zimbabwe remains a really important country in the sub-region. And things being difficult in Zimbabwe means that things are really difficult for the entire sub-Saharan African region because it is so central to so many issues there. And this then raises the urgency of, for example, the lack of engagement from the U.S. and from Europe.
Because it’s not only Zimbabwe being affected, it’s the entire Southern African region being affected. It ranges into all kinds of issues of cooperation, and a lot of planning in relation to kind of concerted development planning for the entire sub-region. So, the net effect of all of this is that China is even more central in these conversations in sub-Saharan Africa because of the reticence from Western countries to engage with Zimbabwe. And that feeds into the centrality of China as a development partner to the entire region. It’s super important to keep tracking these things and to also track how it then affects all of Zimbabwe’s neighbors, particularly because Zimbabwe itself is the kind of gateway between Southern Africa and Central Africa.
Zimbabwe was historically, for example, was involved in issues in the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, during the previous war. It’s one of those countries that link to so many other countries and affect so many other countries in the region that the fact that it keeps being so cut off from key development partners makes everything very difficult.
Eric: Well, we’re tracking this from two different angles. One, we look every day at the Zimbabwean media and what they’re talking about in terms of Chinese engagement, some of the controversies, the advancements in infrastructure development, mining, and things like that. Also, Han Zhong, who is our China editor, is tracking it from the Chinese side, and there are quite a few WeChat groups that are up focused exclusively on Zimbabwe. So, we’re able to translate and to provide you insights into what these WeChat groups and the Weibo groups are talking about related to Zimbabwe, oftentimes very different than what you’re hearing in the English-language media. So, both of those we’re bringing two subscribers of the China Africa Project. It’s one of the benefits of being a subscriber is that you get that inside look from both sides. If you’d like to subscribe, we would be so honored. It helps support the work that we do every single day.
We have a small team in Kenya, in China, and in South Africa, and me here in Southeast Asia that are working very hard to bring this to you. Subscriptions start at $75 a year for students and teachers and $149 for everyone else. We also have monthly options on that. Just go to chinaafricaproject.com/subscribe. So, and if you have any questions, feel free, anytime, whatever, just give me an email, eric@chinaafricaproject.com, and you can hit Cobus up at cobus@chinaafricaproject.com. We love hearing from you for whatever reason, and we’d love for you to subscribe as well. So that’ll do it for this edition of the podcast. Cobus and I will be back again next week with another episode of the China in Africa podcast. Until then, thank you so much for listening.
Outro: The discussion continues online. Head over to facebook.com/chinaafricaproject to share your thoughts on today’s show or follow the guys on Twitter — Eric’s @eolander and you can find Cobus @stadenesque. For more information about the China-Africa Project and to sign up for our free weekly email news brief, go to chinaafricaproject.com.
