By Lukas Fiala and Felix Brender 王哲謙
Earlier this week, the sacking of Li Shangfu — China’s now erstwhile Minister of National Defense and State Councilor — made the headlines around the world. Li had been MIA for weeks, and was the second minister booted out after Minister of Foreign Affairs Qin Gang had had to clear out his desk in July.
With PRC government outlets sticking to a brief, matter-of-fact announcement of Li’s dismissal and remaining mum about potential reasons, overseas media appear to zoom in on factionalism and corruption allegations as most plausible explanations, indicative of the “opacity and unpredictability of Xi Jinping’s government” as a challenge to working with Xi’s black box China.
But besides China watchers who enjoy tealeaf-reading Beijing’s secretive world of elite politics, why should foreign governments care about Li’s successor?
At first the answer seems clear: the appointment of the defense minister of a major power should surely be an important event to watch. Digging deeper, however, the picture become more complex as Chinese Ministerial postings can hardly be compared to their Western counterparts.
This is because, in China, Party rank always outperforms governmental rank. The defense minister is thus not necessarily the key figure in China’s party-centric military system. Instead, the key institution to watch is the Central Military Commission (CMC) – the country’s top body overseeing civil-military relations. The CMC’s leadership includes Xi Jinping as chair, and Zhang Youxia and He Weidong as two vice-chairs.
This has several implications for our understanding of how Li’s departure matters for China’s defense diplomacy. On the one hand, Li’s purge will not have a direct impact on the PLA’s operations or readiness in the short term, because Li neither occupied a strategic position in the PLA’s Theatre Commands that plan and coordinate operations, nor was he responsible for decision making as the defense minister is tasked with implementation rather than formulation of policy.
On the other hand, however, Li’s departure could bring about more meaningful dialogue with Washington, which could help alleviate risks of escalations across obvious flash points in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.
U.S. sanctions on Li and the fact that CMC Vice-Chairs outrank U.S. Secretaries of Defense according to Chinese practice has made high-level engagement on the top command-level between military officials in Washington and Beijing difficult. With (near) clashes among China, the U.S. and regional countries intensifying recently in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, a new Defense Minister in Beijing could create opportunities for engagement at a critical point in time.
Furthermore, if Zhang Youxia – as the current vice-chair – took on the role, the Defense Minister’s importance in China’s overall defense diplomacy could be elevated. Given his rank, role within the CMC and close relationship to Xi, Zhang would make defense ministerial visits even more authoritative representations of Xi’s personal agenda.
Understanding emerging trends in China’s defense diplomacy has long been fraught with difficulties inherent in China’s opaque political system. But with only a couple days left before China’s Xiangshang security forum kicks off, we should closely watch for the tealeaves that provide signposts for this future.
Lukas Fiala is the project coordinator for the China Foresight initiative at LSE IDEAS. Felix Brender 王哲謙 is a PhD candidate at the London School of Economics & a Project Associate at LSE Ideas.
