By Saniya Kulkarni
One of the more prominent stories coming out of the BRICS summit last week is the formal bilateral meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping, the first one of its kind since 2019. The Galwan Valley clashes of 2020 and the resulting standoff at various points along the disputed border led to a freezing of relations between the two neighbors.
Several attempts had been made to normalize the relationship in the last four years, including an unofficial meeting between Modi and Xi on the sidelines of a BRICS summit in 2023; however, no substantive change had been enacted until October 21 of this year, when officials from both sides announced that an agreement on disengagement had been reached.
The new pact dictates border patrols shall be restored to pre-2020 status, with coordinated efforts towards regular monitoring and timetabling to ensure no violation is committed on either side. Quick action followed, and as of Thursday this week, both sides have moved most troops away from the disputed border, including the removal of Chinese structures in Depsang and Demchok plains, the last remaining border points with “eyeball to eyeball” standoffs along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
What Explains This Tentative Rapprochement?
First, it is likely that business interests in India nudged New Delhi to seek normalization and invite Chinese investments to balance economic ties between the two. Following the military standoff in 2020, India introduced stricter vetting on Chinese investments, including banning access to several Chinese apps such as TikTok.
Regardless, trade between the two remained largely unaffected; in fact, India’s imports from China surged around 2020, leading to an even further ballooning of its trade deficit, now standing upwards of a cumulative $334 billion. Nevertheless, it is unclear what the short-term effects of easing restrictions on Chinese investment would be, as attempting to reduce the trade deficit would warrant a deeper inspection of India’s manufacturing capabilities, amongst other factors.
Second, the neck-on-neck U.S. election could have potentially prompted the two neighbors to seek stability on multiple fronts. The American appetite for a ‘trade war’ with China depends largely on who wins, and while both candidates are hawkish on the issue, the eventuality of a second Trump presidency is something Beijing might have to prepare for. Steadfast security over Indian markets is in the interest of the Chinese economy regardless of who wins, however. From a security perspective, it also makes sense to redirect attention towards Beijing’s more pressing interests, such as Taiwan, should the election’s fallout lead to a greater need for deterrence across the Strait.
Last, China’s desire to project “multipolarity” – as has been evident across several geopolitical conflicts in the past years – may also have contributed towards the normalization. While India has not expressly flouted the US-led world order, and maintains its presence in “both camps”, so to speak, it has exhibited the desire to be seen as a non-western actor (rather than anti-western), and to retain its autonomy within a rapidly changing world order.
The alignment of both these goals is likely to have encouraged more concrete action on normalizing relations between New Delhi and Beijing. And BRICS was simply a useful opportunity and venue to convey this stance.
Finally, despite a sweetening of bilateral ties, since exchanging sweets for Diwali is a concern, the domestic view in India remains divided. There is a distinct trust deficit on both sides and while the dovish view in India is optimistic, it is likely instinctive rather than informed. Until regular agreed-upon patrols resume after the winter, it remains to be seen whether this coordination will be as effective as one might hope.
Saniya Kulkarni is a Programme Manager at LSE IDEAS.
