The U.S. military intervention in Venezuela and the capture of President Nicolás Maduro on Friday prompted a lively discussion online among many of the leading China analysts in the U.S. and Europe over how Beijing might respond.
Below are highlights from selected commentaries from various analysts. Click on the X link to read the full post:
“Beijing and Moscow left Tehran out to dry last summer when B-2s and bunker busters hit Iran’s nuclear facilities. They did the same with Venezuela. Talks and meetings and signed pieces of paper are no match for overwhelming power projection” — Michael Sobolik, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute (@MICHAELSOBOLIK)
“This U.S. action seems to be registering in a big way, and will resonate with Xi’s well-known suspicion of Western-backed “color revolutions” around the world, feeding into his heightened national security focus” — Neil Thomas, Fellow on Chinese Politics at the Asia Society Policy Institute (@NEILTHOMAS123)
“4% of China’s oil imports come from Venezuela. Today’s events in no way increase risks for the PRC if they decide to move against Taiwan. And the PRC is massively expanding its strategic petroleum reserves, so if the changes in Venezuela lead to lower oil prices they may fill those reserves even faster” — Bill Bishop, Editor of the Sinocism Substack Newsletter (@NIUBI)
“China might also seek to do further down the line is to air skepticism about any U.S. attempt to condemn China’s activities in disputed maritime spaces in the Indo-Pacific region as a violation of international law by citing the way Maduro’s capture was executed” — William Yang, Senior Analyst at the International Crisis Group (@WILLIAMYANG120)
“China is likely to thread this needle effectively. Beijing will condemn U.S. actions, but I doubt that China will do much more than that. Venezuela isn’t among China’s core interests, and there is more downside than upside to taking actions that would complicate Trump’s ability to achieve a win” — Bonnie Glaser, Vice President of the German Marshall Fund of the United States (SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST)
“For all those now arguing after the Venezuela operation that we’re “back in a world of spheres of influence,” color me deeply skeptical. The fact is, the United States is NOT going to “consent” to a Chinese sphere of influence in Asia. Instead, I suspect it will attempt to insist on an American sphere of influence in its own Hemisphere while trying to deny one to China in Asia” — Evan Feigenbaum, Vice President at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (@EVANFEIGNBAUM)
“Trump isn’t predictable or consistent, but this particular action *would* be consistent with the emergence of a G2+1 order where Washington and Beijing, with Moscow as a junior partner, give each other free rein in their purported spheres of influence” — Jeremy Cliffe, Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (@JEREMYCLIFFE)
“This is not sending a powerful message to China, which is what I’m seeing some hot takers think. The pattern here is Trump making hits on countries where U.S. military superiority is clear (Venezuela, Iran, Nigeria). The PLA is America’s most formidable military challenger” — Melissa Chan, Foreign Affairs Reporter (@MELISSAKCHAN)
