In a speech before the United Nations General Assembly in September 2021, President Xi announced the Global Development Initiative (GDI) which outlines China’s vision to be a global leader in developmental affairs. The GDI is a wide umbrella that covers areas such as public health, poverty alleviation and several other issues. However, a year after its launch, many questions still persist about what it entails, how it will be implemented, and whether it complements or differs from the more well-known BRI. Additionally, the GDI has generated interest in the U.S with some circles deliberating on whether it might compete with American aid and development programs.
In the second event under its Interpret China Project, the influential think tank Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) brought together a group of leading U.S. and African analysts and scholars to unpack the GDI and its implications. Jude Blanchette, Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, was joined by Deborah Brautigam, director of China-Africa Research Initiative, and Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy, Johns Hopkins University SAIS, Samantha Custer, director of policy analysis at AidData, College of William & Mary, Joseph Asunka, CEO of Afrobarometer, and Anthea Mulakala, senior director for international development cooperation at The Asia Foundation.
There was consensus among the panel that while the GDI is vague, it is associated with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which have lost momentum in recent years. In particular, Custer noted that both the BRI and GDI have been intentionally written broadly and flexibly so they set out the parameters for China’s future development assistance program but with flexible interpretations. The panel also deliberated on how the BRI compares to the GDI. Mulakala highlighted that they are parallel tracks, BRI is economic growth orientated, whereas GDI is more development orientated. Brautigam also noted that BRI is the much larger of the two initiatives and GDI and falls within the “small and smart budget” initiatives. Asunka argued that if the GDI gains momentum, the West should engage with China to ensure that the good things that are contained in the initiative are implemented into other development programs.
Key Highlights From the CSIS’ Webinar on the GDI:
[11:38] SAMANTHA CUSTER, DIRECTOR OF POLICY ANALYSIS AT AIDDATA: China, I think still today is viewed in the Global South as the financier of first resort for big-ticket infrastructure projects and that’s both a fact and a perception. I mean we’ve seen China continuing to invest in a big way in the revealed priority areas of local politicians. This includes physical structures like roads, ports, airports, electricity, water supply and digital telecoms. Now, there’s been a little bit of fallback of interest in that, mid-covid for sure, but these are still areas of continued interest for politicians and China does this at a scale and speed that’s unmatched by traditional bilateral or multilateral donors…We just closed a survey of African leaders in 55 countries last month and if you ask what leaders think about China as a development partner, nearly half of them said that China was their preferred partner even today when it came to energy, transport and telecommunications infrastructure.
[15.30] JOSEPH ASUNKA, CEO OF AFROBAROMETER: I do see some kind of shift, especially following last year’s FOCAC event in Senegal where China seems to be moving towards what they call small and beautiful or small is beautiful… I do think stepping into the smaller ones, of course, reduces some kind of risk and I can imagine that this shift is going to be amplified going forward as China moves to some of the softer areas. I think that is certainly going to be an area that can begin to even gain more attraction because both politicians and citizens will continue to appreciate some of these projects. The other thing of course [is that] covid-19 and the war in Ukraine may have amplified this because the risk to some of the loans that China has given to Africa becomes more and more risky because its repayment is not likely to come through as easily as they would have expected. And so that shift is certainly going to gain some kind of momentum going forward and of course…China keeps being blamed for debt diplomacy. How do they get out of that? I think if there’s a shift to this small and beautiful or small is beautiful projects, that may be a way to escape some of these blames from the international community.
[31:52] SAMANTHA CUSTER, DIRECTOR OF POLICY ANALYSIS AT AIDDATA: Economics allows you to get other things you want – being political, security, reputational considerations. And if we are being honest here, we should say this is not unique to China. Even U.S foreign assistance is not solely altruistic and is explicitly in U.S congressional documentation. It says that it is to advance U.S interests. So, I do think we need to be careful about painting China as unique in this regard. Economics is probably the most important. China is particularly interested in shoring up future markets for Chinese goods and technologies. That’s partly in response to this Achilles heel that it has from accumulating, it’s gone down a little bit but it’s still rather large, this robust foreign exchange reserve of three trillion dollars. It has more financial capacity than it has absorption capacity for its state-owned firms and financing at home. So, it needs to push that money out to be able to continue to put it to productive use…if you look at where that money is going, Beijing is directing most of its resources to countries and communities that represent attractive market opportunities for Chinese goods or capital, and that have large natural resource endowments and have large stocks of potential energy supplies. So this could be natural gas pipelines or hydropower potential. But…with economics, the more important a country becomes to your country’s economy, that gives you potential geostrategic leverage to advance political and security interests and so that is also in play.
[39:24] DEBORAH BRAUTIGAM, DIRECTOR OF CHINA-AFRICA RESEARCH INITIATIVE: The GDI is actually still very vague. It is a statement of principles. It is a statement of support for the UN’s sustainable development goals and what’s called the 2030 agenda. And it’s what China is going to do in support of those human development goals but it’s even broader than that. It’s what China’s responsibilities are as a developing country. I think that the Chinese themselves have not worked out yet what the GDI is. So, when I started reading about it, it really reminded me of Truman’s point four speech which was part of his inaugural address in 1949 and it really resonated in much the same way…[with the GDI] China is saying that we are a developing country and we are in this as a developing country. We are one of 150 or so developing countries at the United Nations, we are a big group. And so that position was important. And then another aspect of it is that…I do think it’s important to look at the history of the debate at the United Nations on just what rights are and how the US and China have been at opposite sides of that debate. So that’s going to continue to be an issue.
[41:39] ANTHEA MULAKALA, SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AT THE ASIA FOUNDATION: It [GDI] is vague…however, Chinese development cooperation as I said earlier, is not something that is new. So the GDI, somewhat like the BRI, attempts to connect the dots of the various things that China has been doing in development cooperation over decades…It is linked to the SDGs, it has a vision…it presents a normative framework more than the white papers have. So it is more forward-looking and it also advocates China’s vision with the principles, priorities, and governance arrangements and action…There are some clear distinctions between it and the BRI…BRI/GDI, they are parallel tracks. BRI is economic growth orientated, whereas GDI is more development orientated as a result of covid and also as a result of China’s belief in the fact that the agenda 2030 has gone off track. So BRI delivers hardware and economic corridors. GDI focuses on software, livelihoods, knowledge transfer, capacity building. BRI is more market-oriented and hence, enterprises play a key role, whereas GDI is more public-oriented, about grants and development assistance. The pathways for BRI are more bilateral and regional. There are MOUs and the agency responsible in China is the national development and reform commission. It plays a very leading role. Whereas GDI is more about multilateral and diverse partnerships that includes the private sector, NGOs and the ministry of foreign affairs. And the highest development agency SIDCA plays a leading role. So I would say those are the major distinctions.
[47:03] SAMANTHA CUSTER, DIRECTOR OF POLICY ANALYSIS AT AIDDATA: I think it [GDI] is part animating vision, kind of a rallying cry of how the world can achieve the world that the UN member nations set out in the sustainable development goals agenda that has kind of lost steam and traction over the years. And so you see in a lot of the coverage of this, almost a problem diagnosis of why we haven’t achieved these things and then China offering a proposed solution, a set of principles and narratives to guide us. I think it’s also partly a campaign speech, a kind of leadership bid for China as a global leader at the forefront of the SDGs, a responsible partner in helping countries learn from and emulate its success story. In a way, it’s a good way to inoculate itself against some of the negative criticism that BRI has received over the years. And then it’s a big tent umbrella…similar to the way BRI was pitched. This very inclusive club, anyone can join, you pool resources, you pool risk, you pool knowledge and lessons learned…But I also think it’s an interesting question of reframing narratives around governance and human rights to make a more conducive environment for China’s views on these things.
[49:46] DEBORAH BRAUTIGAM, DIRECTOR OF CHINA-AFRICA RESEARCH INITIATIVE: So the BRI is really a rebranding of China’s outward-oriented globalization. It doesn’t have a secretariat, it doesn’t have a budget, there’s no implementation plan that’s clear. Whereas the GDI is going to be coordinated by SIDCA, which is China’s international development agency…we have to remember that China’s foreign aid budget is tiny. It’s $3 billion dollars a year and so we are not talking about a huge effort. This is not a lot of money here and as Joseph said, these are going to be small and beautiful. They’re calling them a small and smart budget. So [if] it’s a Venn diagram, it would be a huge BRI and then a tiny GDI with a lot of rhetoric positionality.
[1:03:57] JOSEPH ASUNKA, CEO OF AFROBAROMETER: I do think that the West needs to be careful. How do you respond to this [GDI]? Because if there is a lot of momentum on the ground in support of the GDI, the way the west can respond to this, I would hope we don’t throw the baby out with the bath water because there’s certainly something relevant about the GDI. And the question is how does the West play with China and engage with China to ensure that the good things that are contained in the GDI actually get their way into other development programs. And I hope that would be the case.
