Final preparations are underway for the upcoming Forum on China-Africa Cooperation summit, which begins on September 4th in Beijing. This year’s event comes at a particularly fraught time amid wars in Europe, the Middle East and the simmering Great Power rivalry between the United States and China.
David Monyae, director of the Centre for Africa-China Studies at the University of Johannesburg, joins Eric & Cobus to discuss the politics framing the summit and why a growing number of African leaders increasingly see their interests aligned with China rather than the West.
FOCAC Briefing Reports:
- The China-Global South Project: China’s Agenda at FOCAC 2024 by Cobus van Staden
- The China-Global South Project: Africa’s Priorities at FOCAC 2024 by Cobus van Staden
Show Notes:
- Boston University Global Development Policy Center: GDP Center Round-up: The 2024 Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation by Akanksha Goyal and Angie Ye
- South African Institute of International Affairs: China-Africa Energy and Climate Cooperation: Prospects for FOCAC 2024 by Cobus van Staden, Xiang Chen, and Alex Benkenstein
- African Center for Strategic Studies: FOCAC 2024: Elevating African Interests Beyond the Africa-China Summit by Paul Nantulya
About David Monyae:
David Monyae is an Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Johannesburg and Director of the Centre for Africa-China Studies. Prof Monyae is an international relations and foreign policy expert with a PhD in International Relations from the University of the Witwatersrand. He previously served as Section Manager of international Relations Policy Analysis at the South African Parliament, providing strategic management, parliamentary foreign policy formulation, and monitoring and analysis services. He has published widely and is a respected political analyst, featuring in national and international media.
Transcript:
Eric Olander: Hello, and welcome to another edition of the China in Africa Podcast, a proud member of the Sinica Podcast Network. I’m Eric Olander, and, as always, I’m joined by CGSP’s Managing Editor, Cobus van Staden, in Cape Town, South Africa. A very good afternoon to you, Cobus.
Cobus van Staden: Good afternoon.
Eric: Cobus, we are at the end of our long-month journey of talking to scholars and experts and analysts about what to expect at next week’s FOCAC Summit. That’s the Forum on China Africa Cooperation gathering that takes place every three years. Folks have been arriving in Beijing for the past few weeks. Ministers will be there early next week and then the heads of state, we still don’t know how many, are going to arrive later in the week for the summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping. We’ve heard a lot this month about the need for African agency and strategy, and you’ve written extensively on what the Chinese are looking for. We’ve talked about energy and trade and investment. Now that we’re at the end of this discussion, again, for the past month, what’s your takeaway of what to expect for next week?
Cobus: Well, what I’ll really be looking for is what kind of funding commitments, like real, concrete funding commitments there’ll be, and then also what kinds of shared positions they’ll be developing. In the previous FOCAC, it was, for the first time, that a shared statement on Africa-China work on climate change, for example. So, it’ll be very interesting to see whether there’s additional areas that are getting this kind of special treatment in terms of shared declarations, for example.
Eric: Interesting that you brought up the big number question. Of course, that’s on everybody’s mind. Last time we didn’t really get a definitive big number, but previously, it was 60 billion in 2018. In 2015 I think it was 60 billion as well. 2015 it was somewhere around 20 or 30 billion. And I wrote a column earlier this month, saying, don’t pay too much attention to the big number in part because the big numbers are very difficult to track. We heard this from our conversation with Ovigwe Eguegu from Development Reimagined, lamenting the lack of visibility into the accounting of the FOCAC numbers that come back. And can we go back and see how much was given from the Dakar Summit? We don’t really know. And so what I was counseling in my column was focus on the substance of what’s discussed, focus on some of the hard deals of investment and whatnot, but those big numbers can be somewhat misleading.
Well, let’s now conclude, again, our month-long journey of talking to leading China-Africa scholars and experts. And in many ways we saved the best for last. Our good friend, David Monyae, who’s an associate professor of political science and international relations at the University of Johannesburg and director of the Center for Africa-China Studies. He’s been covering this topic a lot longer and studying it than you and I together, Cobus. And so we’re thrilled to have David back on the show again and to have the chance to hear his insights about what to expect next week. A very good morning to you, David.
David Monyae: Good morning to you and Cobus. It’s a pleasure being with you.
Eric: It’s wonderful to have the chance to speak with you. Again, we’re coming to you with our heads filled with different ideas from all the different folks we’ve spoken to. Let me just put the question to you very simply. Next week is the big week, everybody is getting together, what are you expecting will come out of FOCAC in Beijing?
David: This FOCAC is slightly different from most that we are familiar with. And I say this for a number of reasons. Firstly, if you look at China’s domestic, regional, and global politics, you see major shifts. And I think those shifts will have a direct bury on its relationship with Africa, both in the positive as well as negative. But what are those issues? I think the most important major shift, it has to do with the geopolitics. The tensions between China, United States, and the western world has intensified. And Africa is also becoming that ground center of this geopolitics political as well as economic. The last three, four, five years, we also have seen another major shift within China itself that its trade, its shifting from the western world, more into the global south. And within global south, Africa constitute a large group of countries, and therefore I think you’ll see a serious commitment on the part of the Chinese to really solidify, consolidate the relationship with Africa, more in the economy issues and here and there in the politics.
So, you’re going to see, on part of Africans, I think it’s much more taking advantage. I think China, throughout, since year 2000, has been using the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation as a trigger for relationship, even with others. So, it’s like an exemplary relationship with outside world. The Japanese, they copy and they see what the Chinese are doing, the Americans and the European Union and everyone else. And therefore I think this forum is very important for the African Union. And therefore I think you’re going to see all those issues coming out in the communique, in the wedding, and a shift in the sense of areas of emphasis. For the lack of a better word, I think I’ll round up by saying, for me, I would say it’s new forms of solidarity. I think that’s the term I would like to use.
Cobus: Do you have any sense of where some of these new forms of solidarity, what they will focus on and what some of these emerging fields might be?
David: These are a shift to technology based. I think within China you see the talk of a new quality productive forces — a new term. I think we have seen President Xi Jinping talking about the GDI, Global Development Initiative, global civilization, as well as global security. I think those elements, a new language within international relation, which is, I think for the Chinese, is to filter it into the UN, and Africa is important in that agenda. And for Africans, I’ll expect them to really bring in new language as well in this relationship. So, technology is key. You have already mentioned climate change. These are new areas which hasn’t been explored deeply as well as others. I think others we talk in terms of the opening up of Chinese agricultural market to Africans and opportunities that are there as well as challenges. I think we can talk about challenges as well.
Eric: Yes, I’d like to talk about the challenges. One of the challenges that comes up is the demand from the Chinese side for more bankable projects from African stakeholders and a better understanding of the changes that have been taking place in China. You’ve talked about the timing of the summit coming at a period of great geopolitical change, but it’s also coming at a period of great change within China itself. It doesn’t have the money that it had in 2012, 2015. It’s a very different China than it was 10 years ago. One of the complaints that we’ve heard from a number of African scholars is that African governments have not updated their China literacy to reflect these changes. You have the opportunity to speak with a lot of African stakeholders who are going to be participating in FOCAC and who are personally involved in managing the China-Africa relationship. How well do you think that they’ve kept up with the changes that have taken place in China?
David: A little, but I think out of all African countries, I mean they’re not all the same, even though we have this tendency of seeing them as monolithic. Some are better organized, others in the middle, others are worse off — just follow the crowd. But I think I’m impressed with Ethiopians in particular. I think they took advantage if… I don’t know if you’ve been to Addis Ababa lately. The last time I’ve been there like three, four months ago, you already see those changes way ahead of the forum, where its taking advantage of what President Xi spoke about. That there’s just a general shift from megaprojects and big money that we’re talking about, which came with a lot of criticism in certain quarters of so-called debt trap. I think there’s been a thinking with the COVID-19 crisis and element of adjustment, I mean reflecting issues that you have already alluded to in terms of the changing landscape of the economy within China itself.
And I think the Chinese are looking for much more smaller, greener beautifying projects that I tend to get. And if you go to Addis Ababa at night, you see how beautiful Addis is turning with the help of Chinese, just lightning streets. Basic stuff that you go in, you see a city that was one of most depressing look at night becoming one of the most as if you are in China, if you are in Addis at the moment. And therefore I think we’re going to see more of that in a number of areas — smaller, manageable, easy project that do not raise eyebrows in terms of the scale of finance as well as issues at the global level. I’m expecting those kind of issues to feature prominently on this summit.
Cobus: To which extent do you feel those would comport with the ambitions of African leaders? On the one hand, as you say, the debt implications of some of the mega projects were controversial and difficult for some African countries, but at the same time, there is still a very strong demand among African leaders for very large infrastructure projects. So, China stepping away from that, do you expect that to introduce a little bit of tension into the relationship?
David: I do not think so. I think what we’re going to see are those who were able to absorb that. Countries such as South Africa, I think Cobus you’ll understand, our president made it quite clear that he wants to turn the country into a workplace with cranes all over the place. We still need train from Musina, Johannesburg to Durban. We still need to speed train to Cape Town and a number of new city that was mentioned. We need to open up on our nuclear energy element within Government of National Unity. SI think at the South Africa level, there might be some issues.
And South Africa is a country that will be able to manage. But I’m also expecting other countries where the Chinese, instead of giving loans, they’ll come in and take the risk themselves. They absorb that risk that we’re going to build this rail and we’re going to charge for certain years. I think in Kenya there’s that element with some of the road, the one that runs in Nairobi.
Eric: Yeah, the Nairobi Expressway is a public-private partnership.
David: Exactly, I think we’re going to see that shift and adjustment in those kind of elements that in itself will bring a win-win sense of avoiding getting into issues given internal politics in Africa itself, I mean, uprise on the ground. This is not just a concern for the Chinese. I think Westerners are also facing the same issue. If we had time, we could have spoken about Zambia, the so-called debt trap. In the end we realized that the Westerners are the ones who are a problem, I mean than the Chinese. So, a number of lessons, I think they’re going to adjust and move and avoid risk on their part is really at risk for Africans themselves.
Eric: On the issue of public-private partnerships, one project to keep an eye on is the extension of the Kenyan standard gauge railway from the Rift Valley Station in Naivasha, all the way to Kisumu, on the border with Uganda. And the Kenyan government is going to FOCAC with a public-private partnership in hand to try and get the Chinese, as David pointed out, in a non-debt environment to be able to fund this extension of the railway. So that’s something to keep an eye on next week as well if the Kenyans emerge successful with an extension of the SGR.
Now you talked about some of the challenges, and this is the complex relationship, and so it has positives and it has some negatives. And one of the negatives right now is the enormous trade imbalance between most African countries and China. Kenya’s a good example — $3.7 billion of Chinese imports, less than $150 million of Kenyan exports. This has been a demand from African governments, including President Yoweri Museveni in Uganda to do more to expand the Chinese market for African products in order to narrow that gap. What can be done, do you think, to narrow the trade imbalance between many African countries and China that exist today?
David: I think we’re going to hear more from Africans in terms of talk more of beneficiation. I think the question of beneficiation is going to come quite high on the agenda. That we’re not going to just sell the tomatoes. We want to have a light industry, ensure that these tomatoes can be put in a can, I mean in a much more preserved, avoid… It’s a question here in South Africa that South Africa has an advantage. I mean, it’s relatively developed in that area. The rest of the continent does not have the capacity or even the ability to do that. And therefore, I think, for the Chinese, they see an opportunity. Other than the Chinese, we also have seen Ghana recently entering an agreement with the Indians on beneficiaries of their gold, for instance. I think that language is setting in on the African continent.
The younger generation is also demanding that kind of less exploitative of African raw materials by external actors, and therefore whether the Chinese or Westerners. I think you’re going to see some head of states raising those kind of areas. To what extent can we work together to ensure that we create more jobs, we do it in a much more clean environment and more sensitive to climate change, and all those issues? So, I’m expecting the fine-tuning, it might take time, but I think African head of states are going there with serious thinking given the pressure coming from the ground, less so from Western world as was the case in the past.
Cobus: Recently, people have been making the point that the political relationship between Africa and China is increasingly becoming the most prominent part, more than say natural resources or trade. I was wondering, from your perspective, how you see that political relationship shifting. Are they finding more concrete ways of working together, for example on reforming the international system?
David: Well, indeed. I think you are seeing common, I think Eric in the beginning mentioned that the number of areas where leaders agree, both the Chinese and Africans, common position, whether it’s the Israeli-Palestinian question hotspots, whether the Ukraine crisis, and the entire, the demand for the transformation of the United nation. And therefore I think the Chinese will indeed come up with plans and find ways of meeting Africans halfway. I think they agree with them on so many areas. We are also going to G20 in Brazil. And next year, Brazil, it’ll be here in South Africa. And therefore I think it’ll be in China’s interest to also work as part of the global south. The global south concept, I think is now gaining momentum in Beijing. I think that you are going to see more and more of that. But I think, for me, I would like to see African leaders to think more serious and reaching out to the Chinese to deal with certain issues.
If China was able to deal with a crisis between Iran and Saudi Arabia and bring peace in that area, I don’t see any reason why Africans shouldn’t ask the Chinese to do the same when it comes to Egypt and Ethiopia over the Renaissance dam. China is the common denominator, it’s very close to Egypt, very close to Ethiopia. As well as the question, outstanding question of Western Sahara. China is quite close to Morocco and Algeria. I think those are some of areas where China is increasing its peacekeeping, peace mediation role, and I think to draw them instead of just going on bigger issues at global level, forgetting what’s happening on the African continent, including the great lake region, Sudan crisis. I think there is a need to come back to the continent and pay more great attention to these issues.
Eric: David, at the beginning of the show, I mentioned that you have been studying this issue for a long time. We’ve all been doing this for a very long time, going on two decades now. I’d be interested to get your reflection as you look back on the China-Africa relationship, but we can start in 2000 at the first FOCAC and use that as our guide to where we are now, nine FOCAs later, almost a quarter of a century later, and where we are in the relationship. It has changed a lot from the beginning. The Chinese have become a lot smarter about Africa. Africans have become a lot more savvy about the Chinese. There was a period of huge financial engagement which has fallen off. Now we’re into a more political phase. But maybe a few reflections on the China-Africa relationship over the past 24 years since the last FOCAC or the first FOCAC.
David: I think there’s been great milestones actually in terms of what China-Africa relation has brought, not just to Chinese and Africans, but for the whole world as well, it has set the pace on how to do the summitries. It has set the pace in terms of countries “in the global south,” how they’re able to do international relation independent of the Western world. And we have seen how that in itself is influenced other actors. But when it comes to the relationship, you see shifts, much more moving away from your hearty politics, CPC, ZANU-PF, MPLA in Zambia, and across, including South Africa, the ANC party to party relation where the personality, they know each other from the struggle. I think that generation is, because of age, dying. We are now seeing much more business-related relation. China is taking in more than the Western world when it comes to student intake.
You see this new rejuvenated kind of relationship, lower levels than high-level politics personnel, people to people with a bit of tension, not knowing each other, cultural difference, language. And it’s an ongoing kind of relation whether in agriculture or shops as a case in Kenya, even here in South Africa. However, this hasn’t reached a point where Africans and Chinese can say we fully know each other. It’s work in progress. I think the forum itself, it’s a classical example in which the AU play a critical role and the entire continent somehow come up with a clear position. However, these relationships are not happening in vacuum, in evolving geopolitics, and therefore they’re constantly shaped, influenced by these other issues far beyond the Africans and Chinese.
Cobus: Over the years, we’ve seen many announcements made at different FOCAC summits, and it’s much easier to see what has been announced than to see what has actually been implemented. Frequently, the announcements are quite vague, and it’s very difficult to actually see, “Oh yes, okay, this project X was directly a result of a FOCAC announcement.” Do you think there’s a way of making FOCAC more trackable? That it’s easier for us to actually say, “Yes, this is exactly what was implemented from what was announced in 2024?”
David: I think at this stage, Cobus, I would argue that a lot of visible results. I think in the post COVID-19, you have the African CDC up and running, it’s tangible. We mentioned Ethiopia, Djibouti, I mean the rail, and quite a number, and Nigerians have come in as well. Their metro is transformed, more projects, dams, roads. And the DRC now reviving your batter trade agreement with the Chinese, which is now being revived. And we also have seen some of understanding when it comes to the Western dimension of Belt and Road, the Angola, DRC in Zambia, the Lobito. When piggybacking on the Chinese Lobito rail, so I think we can measure in certain areas. In others, it’s so hard, especially when it comes to climate change-related project. It’s so hard to measure smaller projects, small dams and electricity. Airports are much smaller in certain areas.
It’s a really hard to measure. But on the whole, I would say there number of big project in East Africa as well as West Africa, less so in Southern Africa. And therefore I think we might see more tangible zone of development when it comes to Africa-China relation in the next decade or so.
Eric: David, that’s a wonderful place for us to leave our conversation. Thank you so much for your insights today and all of your perspectives. It’s really wonderful to have you back on the program to hear what you think about FOCAC that’s going to get underway next week. David Monyae is an associate professor of political science and international relations at the University of Johannesburg and Director of the Center for Africa-China Studies there as well. David, thank you again, and we really appreciate it.
David: Pleasure, thank you.
Eric: Cobus, a rather upbeat prognosis and forecast and a look back on the China-Africa relationship that’s more optimistic than I think we hear from other quarters. Very encouraging again to hear that. Again, all the different references that he talked about how places in Ethiopia where we’re seeing the small is beautiful mantra start to take shape. I guess what I was thinking during our conversation was this FOCAC, for some reason, unlike previous ones, has not generated anywhere near the level of interest that it has in the past. And all month we’ve been talking about this, but yet normally, in previous FOCACs, there was a lot of anticipation. Think tanks would be writing reports. There would be a lot more op-eds and editorials. There would be a lot of buzz on social media about what was being planned and prepared. Even the Chinese media would be ramping up by this time.
And throughout the month of August, we didn’t see very much at all. And I wonder if there’s just a little bit of fatigue in these Africa+1 summits that took place over the past 18 months in the U.S., in Russia, in South Korea, in Turkey, in India. They just went on and on and on. And even though FOCAC and the China-Africa summit is the granddaddy of the mall, it just feels to me there’s a little bit of fatigue of nothing really has come out of these other summits. There’s a lot of hype. And people are just tired. That’s the sense that I get. And that’s been the biggest thing that I’ve noticed in this past month of looking at FOCAC, how there really isn’t much interest or excitement going on, on either side, by the way.
Cobus: Well, not in the press anyway. I think-
Eric: Or academia. I mean, the academics were very active in the past in writing about this. Think tanks as well.
Cobus: I think, as you say, there’s been many of these summits, they don’t necessarily always have very concrete results. There’s a lot of recycled numbers and a lot of vague commitments. It’ll be interesting to see whether that’s different. I think maybe it’s also that maybe there’s a certain kind of… over the last few years, there’s been a lot of discussion that the China-Africa relationship has plateaued and that China’s engagement in the global south is shrinking a little bit because of its domestic economic problems. So I think that’s probably part of it that’s making for a bit of more of a muted response. I think we’ll have to see whether it moves back up or whether this is the new normal.
Either way, I think what will be important to track is the ongoing actual engagement between Africa and China. Because in some ways, it still is the world’s emerging superpower meeting the future demographic powerhouse. In 25 years, a significant proportion of the world will be African. And by the end of the century, I think something like one in every four people will be African. So, how this is going to go is going is how the planet is going to go. I think there’s a lot of track there, but as a relationship also grows, it becomes more diffuse, and then a single summit becomes maybe less important.
Eric: Next week we’re going to be back with you all to talk about the summit and the conclusion of the summit. And it’ll be interesting to think about what David was talking about, how some African countries are going to be more effective than other African countries. Once again, as David pointed out, and we have to always repeat, Africa is not a monolith. Africa’s not a country. Africa’s not a homogenous entity. Even within countries, you’re going to see some regions more effective than others. And that’s what we’ve heard from scholars like Folashade Soule over the years, how the negotiating capacity varies dramatically even within a single country. So, it’ll be interesting to look at who emerged from FOCAC with more of their accomplishments. And not all of it is measured in terms of money. It might be in terms of security or energy or public-private partnerships or trade.
It’s not always about a loan deal or that big dollar sign at the end of the communique. So, that’s, again, and I’d be curious, again, do you think this is the big question? Do you think they’re going to put a big number on? Remember in the last FOCAC, they really didn’t. they did not announce 40 billion. All of us had to add up all the numbers and get to some kind of fuzzy number. But at the Belt and Road Forum last year, they did announce a big number, $100 billion, much of that being spent domestically. But nonetheless, it was a big number in the announcement. What’s your forecast as to whether or not they’re going to announce a big number?
Cobus: I think there’ll probably be a diffuse number. I don’t think it’ll probably be a single figure. I think it’ll be a lot of different commitments.
Eric: So like they did last time.
Cobus: Yeah, I think so.
Eric: Okay, interesting. Well, we will be back next week and we’ll give you a full update. We want to thank everybody for joining us on this journey this past month. It was fantastic to reconnect with so many of our old friends in this scholarly and academic community, to come back and talk to us about the current state of China-Africa relations — Sanusha Naidu from the Institute for Global Dialogue, David Monyae, Paul Nantulya from the Africa Center for Strategic Studies. We’ve had some fantastic guests, and we want to thank everybody. And if you haven’t heard all those previous shows, I highly recommend that you check them out in the archive because it’s more than just FOCAC. It’s about the broader Africa-China relationship and really doing this pulse check of where we are today in 2024.
Again, this relationship that has evolved considerably from the first FOCAC in 2000. Let’s leave the conversation there. Cobus and I will be back again next week with another episode of the China in Africa podcast. For Cobus van Staden in Cape Town, I’m Eric Olander, thank you so much for listening.
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