This Summer the United States updated its foreign policy for Africa when it shifted the focus from competing with China to improving governance and bolstering trade ties with the region. Now, three months later, the State Department’s top diplomat for Africa, Assistant Secretary of State Molly Phee, joins Eric & Cobus for an in-depth discussion on the new strategy and how it’s being received by stakeholders across the continent.
Also, three prominent African scholars were invited to submit questions on any topic to the Assistant Secretary:
- Dr. Tobi Oshodi, lecturer in the department of political science at Lagos State University: @tobioshodi
- Dr. Dr Folashadé Soulé, senior research associate at the Global Economic Governance program (Blavatnik School of Government) at Oxford University: @folasoule
- Dr. Bob Wekesa, acting director of the U.S.-Africa Centre at Wits University: @bobwekesa
Show Notes:
- The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: The New U.S. Africa Strategy Breaks From the Status Quo—With Some Perplexing Stumbles by Zainab Usman
- The Center for Strategic and International Studies: The Potential and Limits of the New U.S. Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa by Mvemba Phezo Dizolele and Catherine Nzuki
- United States Institute of Peace: The New U.S. Africa Strategy Is a Moment We Must Seize by Joseph Sany
About Molly Phee:
Molly Phee, a career member of the Senior Foreign Service with the rank of Minister-Counselor, was sworn in as the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs on September 30, 2021. She most recently served as the Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation. She was U.S. Ambassador to South Sudan from 2015-2017. She previously served as Deputy Chief of Mission of the U.S. Embassy in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and as Chief of Staff in the Office of the Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan. Additionally she was the Acting Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, as well as Deputy Security Council Coordinator at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, handling UN engagement in Africa and the Middle East for both portfolios. Earlier in her career, Phee served on the National Security Council as Director for Iraq and as the Senior Civilian Representative of the Coalition Provisional Authority to Maysan Province, Iraq. She began her career at the U.S. Embassy in Amman, Jordan, and worked at U.S. Embassies in Cairo, Egypt and Kuwait City, Kuwait.
Transcript:
Eric: Hello, and welcome to another edition of the China in Africa Podcast, a proud member of the Sinica Podcast Network. I’m Eric Olander. And as always, I’m joined by China Global South’s Managing Editor, Cobus van Staden, in Johannesburg, South Africa. A very good afternoon to you, Cobus.
Cobus: Good afternoon.
Eric: Cobus, I can see some of our audience just rolling their eyes because here we are, yet again, talking about U.S., China, Africa relations. But the fact is, this year, with all that’s going on, we just can’t avoid it. It is such a multifaceted issue. It is so big right now with everything that’s going on that we keep coming back to it just because that’s where the news is driving us. And now, this year it’s been very important in a number of different reasons, and particularly over the past, say six to eight weeks, there have been three critical documents that have come out of the U.S. government that really speak to the issues that we’re going to talk about today.
The first two came out in October. One was the National Security Strategy that came out on October 12th, and then there was the National Defence Strategy that was released on October 27th. Both name China as the, and I’m going to quote here, “Most consequential strategic competitor for the coming decades.” Both of these documents also make the case for why the U.S. thinks that China is using, and again, I’m going to quote here, I want to quote as much as possible from these documents so that it’s not my words that you think I’m saying it. This is from them. And here’s what they said, “Coercive actions to reshape the international system to fit China’s authoritarian preferences.”
That’s some pretty heavy language there. In both of the documents, the authors in the U.S. National Security Community make specific references to China’s impact on the Indo-Pacific region, which is out here in Asia, but they don’t necessarily specify other regions. So, it’s interesting Cobus that when it comes to Africa, the Biden administration appears to be taking an entirely different approach. Last August, the National Security Council published an updated strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa. Now, this was the first time that U.S. foreign policy had been updated for the continent since 2019.
And you’ll remember that’s when the Trump administration launched its Prosper Africa Strategy. If you recall back then, former U.S. National Security Advisor, John Bolton, he gave this memorable speech at the Heritage Foundation, where he mentioned China 14 times. A lot of the criticism was that, was this a speech about Africa or is this a speech about China and, to some extent, Russia? This time, Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken, unveiled the new policy, and he didn’t mention China once by name, and that was by design. The new strategy really downplays China. But you could definitely see that it was on his mind during his address in August at the University of Pretoria.
Anthony Blinken: It was a conviction born of the struggle of generations of Africans whose destiny had been determined by colonial powers. This inalienable right depends on a system of rules and principles, which Africans have helped forge over decades through their leadership and institutions like the United Nations and the African Union. And yet, too often, African nations have been treated as instruments of other nations’ progress rather than the authors of their own. Time and again, they have been told to pick aside in great power contests that feel far removed from daily struggles of their people. The United States will not dictate Africa’s choices, neither should anyone else. The right to make these choices belongs to Africans, and Africans alone.
Eric: And the only other indirect reference to China in that speech was when he talked about how infrastructure is built in Africa. And he brought up a number of the longstanding critiques of the Chinese.
Anthony Blinken: The way this infrastructure is built will reverberate for decades. After all, we’ve seen the consequences when international infrastructure deals are corrupt and coercive, when they’re poorly built or environmentally destructive, when they import, or abuse workers, or burden countries with crushing debts. That’s why it’s so important for countries to have choices to be able to weigh them transparently with the input of local communities without pressure or coercion.
Eric: So, a very different tone, Cobus, coming out of Secretary Blinken than from his predecessor, Secretary Pompeo. This time the administration says the new US strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa is about Africa and not about China.
Cobus: Yeah, I mean this clearly reflects political pressures, I assume, mostly also from African side. I think there’s been a lot of resentment in Africa about this idea that it’s only seen as an arena for great power competition. And obviously this is a gesture to correct that. I think the optics of the Bolton era speech was damaging to U.S.-Africa relations, on top of other damaging dynamics, and during the Trump era. So, this is clearly a course correction. I think that the big question is how the reverification of the relationship will actually happen on the ground.
As we’ve seen, U.S. trade with Africa is very flat. And in many of the other areas where Africa would like more engagement, for example, in infrastructure provision or in boosting agricultural trade, there are certain kind of structural barriers for the U.S. in fully moving into those spaces. And those are already spaces where China is very active. So, it’s one thing to obey the optics of the situation and to leave China out of the document. It’s another thing to actually supplant China on the ground. And there, I think it’ll be very interesting to see what kind of new initiatives will emerge.
Eric: Now, normally when we talk about foreign policy towards Africa, whether it’s China’s, the American’s, the European’s, or anybody else, we usually speak with analysts or scholars or other stakeholders who are far outside of the policy process. But from time to time, we get the chance to speak with those folks who are actually implementing these policies, where you get a very different perspective. Last year, some of you may recall that we had the privilege to speak with Wu Peng, who is China’s top diplomat for Sub-Saharan Africa. And today, we’re going to bring you a conversation with his counterpart in Washington, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee, who is the U.S.’s top diplomat for Africa.
Now, I just want to put a little bit of a disclaimer out there. The point of these discussions is not for us to do the kind of confrontational interview where we’re fact checking every point that they make. There’s a time and place for that kind of interview. And many of you who know our show know that we have no problem doing those kinds of interviews. But that’s not what we want to do here today. Just as we did back when we spoke with Wu. We really want to give these folks a chance to lay out their ideas. And when you think about it, it’s not very often that we have the chance to hear active practicing diplomats speak publicly in a long form format.
Oftentimes we’ll hear them in 20 second soundbites or we’ll hear them at speeches in pre-prepared comments, but we don’t get to hear them unscripted in a long form conversational format. Plus, just as we did with Director General Wu, we’ve invited a group of prominent African scholars to present questions to the assistant secretary. As we did with Director General Wu, all of those questions are completely unvetted. We said, “You can ask them anything you want,” and that’s what they’ve done. So, it makes it very, very interesting. Before we get to our interview, I also want to give a very big thank you to Jakkie Cilliers and his amazing team at the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria, who was kind enough to let us use their space for our discussion with Molly Phee.
Assistant Secretary Molly Phee, welcome to the program. It’s wonderful to have you on the show.
Molly Phee: Hi Eric, thanks so much for including me. I’m delighted to have the opportunity to talk to you and Cobus.
Eric: It’s really an honor for us. We’re at a fascinating time now in U.S.-Africa relations. Together with your colleagues on the National Security Council in the White House, you launched a new foreign policy strategy for the continent back in August. In fact, you guys did it right down the street from where we are sitting right now over at the University of Pretoria. Some of the key themes in the new strategy were the focus on African agency; not forcing African countries to choose partners among the major powers; a lot of emphasis on democracy promotion and governance; and that the approach of this administration would be a break from the past by putting what you called ‘Africa first’.
Since the launch, you’ve now had a few months to road test the new strategy and to get feedback from stakeholders across the continent. What are they telling you?
Molly Phee: Well, first of all, we were delighted to have the opportunity to launch the strategy in Pretoria at the university, right? Where there was such a great audience, really excited about partnership with the United States. In fact, that’s the overwhelming sense of the input that we’ve received. People in Africa want the United States to be engaged. And that’s really a great place to be, Eric, right? It’s really exciting to be working in a space where people want to be working with the Americans. I think the sharp edge of that will be, can we deliver? Can we actually implement what we’ve outlined? That’s what folks, friends, partners, colleagues, competitors, if you will, will be looking for in the near term, in the next months, and over the life of this administration.
Cobus: In discussing all of this cooperation, when we speak with African stakeholders, they frequently say that their number one preference is for the United States and China to find ways of working together, particularly to find ways to cooperate on African development. The Biden administration recently unveiled its new security strategy in which it names China as a strategic competitor. Do you see any kind of middle ground between that strategic competitor status and this kind of call from Africa for cooperation? Is there any space on cooperation with China in Africa?
Molly Phee: Well, certainly, but first I would like to say, if we did a thought experiment, if China didn’t exist, would the United States be engaged in Africa? And the answer is absolutely, because we’re engaged in Africa because of our own interests and African interest and our belief that a stronge, more rewarding partnership will benefit both partners. I’m like an African, I don’t like to see our relationship in Africa defined by the geopolitical issues between the United States and China. I think it’s important to recall what Secretary Blinken said in November last year when he traveled to Dakar and spoke directly about this, as well as in his speech at the ECOWAS headquarters in Abuja.
And he talked about a cooperate, compete, or contest formula. We recognize that much of China’s engagement in Africa has been positive for Africa, and that’s an area where we can be cooperative, particularly in supporting the development of infrastructure. But we do things very differently from China, as you know. We have different values, different interests, we’re looking for different outcomes. So, we are going to, in effect at times, compete in Africa. And where we see China undertaking harmful behavior, we’ll contest.
Eric: You mentioned that people really want to see if the United States is going to deliver. And again, you’re behind the eight ball a little bit here because B3W was announced, not much came of that. PGII and other infrastructure initiative was announced. We’re still waiting to see if there’s some results. The key right now in Africa is that people are suffering from the harmful effects of the war in Ukraine. They’re suffering from the harmful effects of global climate change. There are so many issues right now that are bearing down on so many countries here. So, the pressure’s on to deliver. Next year, at this time when we talk to you, what are some of the things that we should look for that you’re going to point to as proof points that this new policy and what you talked about, are you going to fulfill those promises? What should we look for?
Molly Phee: Well, Eric, I would say that we don’t have to wait for next year. We, the United States, have mobilized, along with our partners in the West, to provide substantial increase in support for Africans reeling from the consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, right? So, we’ve all seen the challenges, and I don’t think it’s fair to say that anybody anticipated quite how dramatic the global impact would be, particularly in Africa with the shortages of commodities, the shortages of fuel, the increase in pricing, and shortages of fertilizer, the inflationary impact. Well, we’ve stepped into that space. We have more than doubled our traditional investment in food assistance and food security in Africa.
We went from about 400 million to more than 800 million this year alone to help our African partners deal with this challenge because we recognize they’re skating off the dramatic impact of COVID on the economies. That’s another area where we invested already. We sent nearly 200 million vaccine doses to about 44 African countries since President Biden took office. And we’ve increased our spending also to help African health systems deal with that crisis. Again, we’re already responding in the ways that are traditional for the United States where we’re trying to help systems, institutions, and people. Some of that isn’t as visible as other types of engagement, but I think it’s really important for outcomes for people on the continent.
On the issue of investment, the thing is, as you know this well, Eric, we have a very different model than China, right? I think it’s demonstrable that private sector investment is the best way to grow an economy. So, we don’t have a top-heavy government investment model. That said, I think we can do better in helping our private sector do more in Africa. That’s a process that’s underway and that’s why you see these new programs being announced because that’s a mark we’ve set for ourselves that we’re going to try and reach.
Cobus: Staying on that issue, what we’ve seen over the last few years is that private investors based in the U.S., for example, BlackRock, has been quite intractable in debt renegotiation processes in places like Zambia. And part of the reason is because of fiduciary law within the U.S. I was wondering, in relation to PGII, where private investment is such an important part of the package, what kind of measures are there to have these private entities work more closely with African governments in the moments where these kind of problems come up, as we’ve seen in Zambia, for example?
Molly Phee: Cobus, I’m really glad you raised that example. First of all, I think everyone admires the choices the Zambian people made last year to change their leadership and to really solidify democracy in the country. And everyone wants to be part of the effort to help Zambia succeed. And that includes, of course, helping stabilize the economy, deal with debt, and improve investment so that there are more resources for the development of the country. We can do more, as I said earlier, to mobilize private sector in the United States to engage in Africa. But Africans also have a responsibility to create, to use that jargon, an enabling environment that attracts American and other foreign investments.
That means looking at issues like corruption, it means looking at issues like protections for investment, all the things you know so well. So, we’re going to be working with the Zambian government to try and help them address that underbelly of their regulatory environment that would help make it safer, it easier for American investment to come in. And we think we offer a model that is appealing to governments and societies, right? So, we want to be engaged in a way that’s respectful of the environment, that’s respectful of local communities, including labor standards, and that helps make sure the resources come back to the country for its own development, and not siphoned offshore.
Eric: But that’s a tough sell to a lot of American businesses. It’s been a difficult thing that you and your colleagues, both in the embassies across Africa, and then also in Washington, in the U.S., to try and persuade U.S. businesses that Africa is a worthwhile investment. It’s not been easy. And it’s not been easy this year or for many years prior. Talk to us a little bit about those conversations that you and your team are having with American businesses to fulfill some of those promises.
Molly Phee: Well, I think, Eric, you pointed out, first of all, it’s got to be a conversation we have internally as a government. And certainly, there’s a recognition, given the challenges we’re facing globally that, particularly the critical mineral resources that are available in Africa and the environmental resources, generally speaking, which contribute to the challenge of managing climate change. I think those issues are rising in prominence in policy discussions. That will make it easier for us to engage across the board with American investors and the private sector. Secondly, I believe American investors and the private sector are awakening to the dynamism in Africa, right? To the population, to the opportunities in the markets. So, we are a little bit slow, I think it’s fair to say, but I see a new consciousness that we’re going to work very hard to capitalize on and to engage. But again, it’s got to be a partnership.
We need the Africans to pull. Let me jump to a related topic. AGOA, the trade preferences program established by the United States to help bring African trade into the United States is set to expire in 2025. So, we need to look at how we handle that program going forward. That’s a dynamic discussion that’s underway. I want to hear from Africans about how they can use a program like that better to develop their economies and how we can have a win-win situation for Americans and Africans. In that space, I’m looking at the efforts to develop the free-trade area, right? What sort of deals can be constructed across those two types of programming?
Eric: Okay. Well, let’s shift gears here a little bit. When the opportunity presented itself for us to speak with you, we thought it would be more interesting if we then invited different voices to participate in the conversation. So, we reached out to three prominent African scholars to ask Molly any question you want. We didn’t set any ground rules whatsoever. And our first question is coming from Dr. Tobi Oshodi, who’s a lecturer in the Department of Political Science at Lego State University in Nigeria,
Dr. Tobi Oshodi: Assistant Secretary Phee, thank you for the chance to ask you a question. One element of the U.S. strategy towards Africa relates to the support for conservation, climate adaptation, and just energy. In fact, the document talks about the centrality of Africa to tackling global climate crisis or net zero by extension. But given that the proposed U.S. support will be coming at a particularly difficult time for many African economies, for reasons ranging from COVID-19 to armed conflict, among other issues, challenges, to what extent do you think the United States will be willing, or if you like, able to support the proposed debt for climate swap deal that is gaining traction in some African countries? In which case, bilateral or multilateral debt is forgiven by creditors in exchange for the commitment by the debtor to use the outstanding debt service payment for climate change action programs. Thank you.
Eric: Molly, debt for climate swaps, what do you think?
Molly Phee: I think it’s a great idea and it’s indicative of the creativity and urgency that characterizes this field, right? How can we do better? I think we’re doing this discussion, Eric, just in advance of the COP that will be held in Sharm el-Sheikh in Egypt. You’ve seen that, not only Secretary Kerry and Secretary Blinken, but President Biden will be there. And that is because we want to be able to do more in this space in partnership with Africans and others globally. There are two aspects of this challenge. As you know, there’s the mitigation aspect, where Secretary Kerry has really been a leader, but there’s also the issue of adaptation, which I see as related to the challenge of African economies, right? How can we do more to help with African-led initiatives to foster climate resilient food systems, improve soil and water management, and a clean energy transition? We’re going to push in both big channels, mitigation and adaptation. I understand the debt for climate swap really to be in the mitigation pot, if you will, and it’s one of the ideas under active discussion. And I expect we’ll see more outcomes from this upcoming meeting Sharm.
Cobus: There’s been pressure on African countries not to factor natural gas in as part of their climate transition plans. At the same time, we’ve also seen, due to the crisis in Ukraine, Secretary Blinken, for example, doing work to facilitate gas connections from Africa to Europe. Do you see a contradiction there? And I was wondering how you see the role of natural gas in Africa’s energy future?
Molly Phee: Yeah. No, definitely, I think, we all see a contradiction, correct? The challenges posed by the Russian War in Ukraine have really undermined, I think our shared goals globally to address climate change because it’s forcing countries to make very difficult short-term decisions. I think, while recognizing that immediate challenge, we can’t lose sight of the big goal. We recognize as well in countries like Nigeria and South Africa in particular, that the challenge of a clean energy transition is real. We face that challenge in our own country. And our own view is that we can’t give up. We have to continue to work it. We’d like to look, and particularly the U.S. has really interesting technology as you know. How can we do more to mobilize that technology to help people leapfrog, help countries, governments, societies, businesses leapfrog in the future? I think we need to be realistic about the challenges we’re facing, but not give up, and keep pushing at it.
Eric: Well, I’m glad you brought up the issue of technology because that segues nicely to our next question from Dr. Folashadé Soulé, who is a Senior Research Associate at the Global Economic Governance Program at Oxford University. And she has a question again about technology
Dr. Folashadé Soulé: Secretary Molly Phee, the U.S. is recalibrating its Africa strategy to build a stronger relationship and establish itself as a key partner of choice and not as a competing power with China and Russia in Africa. Yet, several initiatives like the draft bill named the Countering Malign Russian Activities in Africa Act, or the restrictions faced by several African governments that cannot apply to specific U.S. grants in the digital sector if they plan to use Chinese technology, are perceived by African governments as moves by the U.S. administration to counter China and Russia in Africa, and as barriers to African governments’ partners diversification objectives. Beyond the current narrative of we are focusing on the USA in Africa, not on China, how do you think the U.S. strategy in Africa can be best carried out in Africa’s interests without hindering its strategic priority to diversify partners? Thank you.
Molly Phee: Well, thank you for such a thoughtful question. I want to pull back away from Africa and look globally for a moment. The United States worked very hard to see that the new leader of a specialized un body that not many people have ever heard of, the International Telecommunications Union, would be headed by an American leader, a woman named Doreen Bogdan-Martin, who has worked for years to promote access to the internet for Africans as a civil servant, as a part of that body. And why did we care so much about that election? It’s why we care so much about what’s happening globally in terms of refitting the international architecture to meet the demands of the current moment. That’s where we’re looking at what China or Russia or others are doing that’s positive and what’s negative.
I think we all wanna see an internet space, a technology space that allows freedom of access and also responsible conduct. That overall picture drives what we’re doing in Africa. And where we, I think, can bring a comparative advantage is not in the hardware, a lot of the hardware is already in place, but if you will, in the software, and how Africans are connected, how they are able to utilize the internet to develop their economies, and to in fact, for example, for civil society to be able to use that space well. I think that’s how we’re looking at that issue. So, it’s more of an openness than the very narrow circumstances of a limit.
We’re also trying, in the State Department, to build our capacity to be more effective in this space where we’ve established a new bureau to work on cyber issues and to sort of grow expertise in the traditional foreign ministry space. Finally, I would say that I think this is a challenge we all share. We see in the United States irresponsible use of social media space, of the internet highway, and I think that’s a challenge that many Africans are facing as well. That’s something we all need to figure out how to do better together.
Cobus: Staying on the global level, President Biden’s National Security Strategy characterized China as a particular challenge to the United States, it’s capability to reshape the international order. But what we frequently see in Africa is that African countries and other parts of the global south frequently find themselves excluded from the international order in key ways. And so, China’s calls for reform of the international order frequently have quite a sympathetic audience in Africa. I was wondering what United States’ plans are for making a more inclusive national order. Or is it a situation, as Chinese actors frequently say, that this is actually a coded way of trying to maintain hegemony?
Molly Phee: No, I disagree with that characterization. I think you saw this fall, during the high-level meetings at the United Nations, President Biden talk about the need for an African voice on the Security Council, and in general, reform of the Security Council because it’s clearly not working in current circumstances. There’s an active discussion led by our Secretary of the Treasury to look at the multinational institution such as the IMF, the World Bank and others, and to reform them to make sure African voices are stronger and present. There’s an active discussion right now underway that I expect will be advanced in the next two weeks about the G20. South Africa, of course, is present in the G20. Is there an opportunity for the African Union to be present?
We are looking very carefully, again, at the global architecture, and looking at how we can update it in partnership with our friends and allies across the globe to make sure that it works for this current moment. And Africa absolutely has to have a seat at the table and be part of that discussion.
Eric: You’ve said many times, and Secretary Blinken has said it as well, your colleague at the National Security Council, Judd Devermont, has said it too, that you don’t want African countries to have to choose. It’s interesting, though, that in the questions that we got today and in a lot of the discourse in Africa about the new U.S. strategy comes back to this question of the choice, and are we being pushed from one side or the other? I think it probably is rooted in the trauma of the Cold War, which you and I were both alive for. So, these are recent memories. And so, our third question on that front comes from Dr. Bob Wekesa, who’s the Acting Director of the African Center for the Study of the United States at Wits University in Johannesburg.
Dr. Bob Wekesa: In his statement to the press in August, during the launch of the U.S. Strategy to Africa in South Africa in August, Secretary Anthony Blinken said, and I quote, “Our purpose is not to say who you have to choose, it is to, in effect, offer a choice.” This was with regards to African countries impress of China and Russia. Yet, various sections of the 17-paged strategy talk of countering Russia and China in Africa. How does one reconcile these contradictory positions?
Eric: Can you speak to that anxiety that is very much present today in many of the conversations here in Africa?
Molly Phee: Yes. Well, I regret that anxiety because I know Secretary Blinken strongly believes, as do I, as I said at the top that, and I think it’s worth repeating that we want to be engaged in Africa for the sake of Africans and the sake of Americans. And because we believe that if we don’t work together, we’re not going to be able to successfully manage the challenges that we all face, whether it’s climate change, whether it’s health security, whether it’s terrorism, whether it’s a global architecture that serves everybody’s interest. We genuinely believe it’s better for both sides if we’re working in partnership. And that partnership is not defined by Russia or China.
I would say that what we’re looking at in the continent, with regard to Russia or China, are actions that we believe harm Africans, right? That’s a different way of defining the problem than as a sort of a Cold War construct, Eric, of like checking each other in a third space, right? This is about, what does Russia do in Africa and is it helpful to Africans? What does China do in Africa, or globally, and is it helpful to Africans? I think, for example, it’s clear to most observers that engaging the Wagner Group is not helpful. They’re just stripping resources out of the country and sending them back to Moscow, and they’re reckless with civilian lives. We don’t think that’s positive for Africans, and I assume most Africans don’t as well.
Of course, the Chinese picture is much more complex, as we’ve discussed. Much of the Chinese investment in infrastructure has been helpful to African development. But there are also real questionable practices about Chinese investment, for example, in critical minerals and other practices. I think, globally, we would like to see, again, the international architecture be amended and adjusted and updated to serve everybody’s purposes, to have open, free, prosperous, secure society. We’re not confident that China is always using the international architecture to achieve those goals. So, that’s how I would address that anxiety, Eric.
Cobus: So far we’ve spoken a lot about how external actors will act in Africa and with Africa, but I would like to flip the question a little bit and ask you, from your perspective, if you could step into a position where you could give advice to the African Union, for example, how would you advise them to act differently with external actors? What could Africa do to strengthen its own position in relation to external actors?
Molly Phee: Well, I’m not sure that I would feel comfortable giving advice because I really do believe, as we talked about at the outset, in African agency and African capability and making decisions for Africans. But I would note, in the National Security Strategy that was recently released, the first third of the strategy focuses on investment in the United States. The recognition that we cannot project the way we want to project if we don’t repair our own fissures and don’t address our own internal challenges. So, when we are as stronger as a nation, we’ll be more effective globally. And so, that would be a good analogy for African governments and societies that they should tackle their own governance challenges.
Are they doing the best they can to make sure their resources are developing their own societies? Are there security services predatory against their own people? I think that’s a good model for us that we need to be humble about our own challenges and do the work we need to do to improve our position. And that’s probably good advice for anybody, whether a country, a government, or a person.
Eric: Okay. Well, Molly, just very quickly before we go, because I know your time is very limited with us, I just wanted to close our discussion with a little bit about your own personal story and your journey as a diplomat in the State Department. Today, you’re one of the highest-ranking female diplomats in the world. The State Department historically has struggled in promoting women and people of color and underrepresented communities. They’re working to try and change that from what I understand, but it’s still very much a work in progress. Can you tell us a little bit about what your pathway has been and the challenges you’ve faced as a woman in diplomacy, and maybe a little bit about what the State Department is doing to make it easier for younger women to come up in the ranks?
Molly Phee: Well, I really appreciate that question, and I don’t view it as a negative. I’m really delighted to be a woman and I’m really fortunate and very conscious how fortunate I am that I was born in the 20th century in the United States and had the opportunity to grow up and have both educational and social circumstances that allowed me to develop my capabilities to the degree that I’ve been able to do that. And of course, I haven’t done that on my own. I was supported by my family, by my community, and again, by the position in which American society was when I was growing up.
I recognize every day my good fortune, and I feel a responsibility to sort of share what I’m able to with other girls and women who aren’t in such a fortunate position. With regard, specifically to the State Department, Secretary Blinken is passionately committed to doing more on diversity, equity, and inclusion. He really wants all of us to move beyond sort of stated commitments to these principles, to concrete action that makes a difference. And so, we’re all challenged in every way, whether it’s informal encounters or systematic change to create opportunities for people who don’t look like the traditional, as they say, pale male and Yale leader that was historically dominating our foreign policy establishment.
I’m also from the Midwest. And my undergraduate degree was from a great public university, a land-grant college, Indiana University at Bloomington. That’s a big difference. I’m proud to be like President Biden, who’s not a graduate of the Ivy League, with no disrespect to the Ivy League. One of the great things about America is the proliferation of educational opportunities in universities all over the country. So, I represent that “minority” as well. I honestly, Eric, have found in my experience as a diplomat that people view me primarily as an American, not a woman.
They see me as an American, and I represent the power and privilege of the United States, our constitution, our example, our leadership. That has been helpful in circumstances and societies where people are less used to dealing with a woman in the public space.
Eric: Molly Phee is the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, the top United States diplomat for Africa. Molly, thank you so much for taking time out of your busy schedule to talk to us. We really appreciate it.
Molly Phee: Well, Eric and Cobus, thank you so much for taking the time to share your ideas with me. I also welcomed the really interesting questions from the university professors. And thank you for what you do in responsible, and informed, and constructive journalism. It’s really helpful for all of us to be educated, and I value your role in teaching me and others through your podcasts.
Eric: Cobus, how cool was it that we got to speak with a diplomat of Molly’s rank? And you got to think, this is one of the most senior American diplomats, I mean an Assistant Secretary of State, and one of the most senior diplomats in the world really. And she’s like, “Call me Molly”, and proud of the fact that she didn’t go to one of the top American universities. And Indiana’s a fantastic university, as she pointed out, but I think it’s really instructive to some of the things that really makes the United States an amazing place. I say that, and people may even be surprised that they don’t hear me complimenting the U.S. very often. I think I’m known as more of a critic than you are these days. But to me, I love the fact that it is so accessible and that…
Can you imagine talking to her equivalent in France? I mean, like, no way would the French foreign ministry allow you to call her by their first name, and would they be proud that they didn’t go to one of the concejal. I mean, it’s just, this is not something that you see very often in diplomacy and in high-ranking government officials.
Cobus: Yes. I mean, it was a massive, massive honor to speak with her, and fascinating on many different levels. And I agree with you that it is really notable, I think, that the current administration is taking this kind of anti-elitist direction. And it’s very encouraging, I think, particularly in an African context because Africa is so excluded from these circles of power. I think it’s really refreshing and important.
Eric: But this elitism that we’ve talked about is not a western thing. It’s very much an African thing. And we’ve talked about it in the context of your foreign ministry at DIRCO, where if you are not from the right political party, if you’re not part of the ANC, if you didn’t go to the right schools, you don’t have the right connections, you don’t get into the foreign ministry. And this elitism is not, again, something that’s unique to wealthy governments.
Cobus: Yes, I mean, I’m sure DIRCO people if they ever listen to our podcast, which I don’t think they do.
Eric: They don’t. They don’t listen to it. I have no worry whatsoever about anybody from DIRCO listening to our show.
Cobus: I think that objects extraneously, but from what I’ve heard, that is how it works that one does need connections in order to move into that space. And I think that’s also true for many other African countries. And it ends up really diminishing their capacity, particularly because, as we’ve discussed many times, people who have China capacity tend not to make it into those circles. So, it ends up being bad for these countries at the negotiating table. I mean, most of the times, what’s at stake is domestic issues and domestic pecking orders and so on.
Eric: Yale, male and pale. I’m going to use that one. I thought that was very creative. Listen, the State Department still has a problem with being too Yale, male and pale, but at the same time, people like Molly are evidence that it is at least trying and there is some progress. So, I think that’s good. Let’s now shift to the policy. Let’s talk about the substance of what she said. Again, I am a little bit dubious in the sense that I think, as she mentioned, as Molly mentioned, it’s really going to come down to whether or not the United States delivers. All of Secretary Blinken’s fancy words, all of the talk about this is for Africa, that’s all great, it’s wonderful.
But at the end of the day, they’re going to have to come through with facts on the ground. This means that PGII, which was the successor to B3W, which is these big infrastructure projects, they’re going to have to come through. They’re gonna have to show some results. The policy simply cannot be, we are the country of PEPFAR, a policy of 15 years ago. New ideas, new initiatives, and more than just we’re competing with the Chinese has to come forward from the United States in order for the policy to live up to its potential.
Cobus: I agree. But I think there’s this even a broader challenge, which is that China didn’t arrive in Africa in a vacuum. Chinese engagement with Africa happened against the context of Africa’s early engagement with other partners, and particularly the limits in that engagement. So, in that context, even though a lot of African governments have strong reservations about certain aspects of doing business with China, they frequently have no other choice because China does offer radically new development options and partnership for particularly infrastructure. That reflects the kind of plateauing and I think atrophying, I think, of the traditional relationship between Africa and its traditional development partners like the United States. So, what is really important is not only for PGII itself to deliver, which is very important, but more specifically for these countries to start, I think, thinking about new development paradigms.
The development space itself needs to be shaken up, particularly in relation to the challenge posed by climate change. So, one needs new thinking and new forms of engagement rather than just re-energizing old forms of engagement. And there, I think, the real challenge lies.
Eric: Well, there’s going to be a number of big challenges ahead for Molly and her team at the State Department in order to implement this policy. First and foremost, we’ve been talking to a lot of people, and there’s been a lot of coverage about the fact that the State Department in Africa remains understaffed. So, it is a very big agenda. And this is one of the challenges for the United States is that unlike the Chinese who don’t want to be all things to all people, the United States still insists on covering everything, on being the leader, or at least driving the conversation in human rights, in health and security, in military, in culture, in norms and standards. I mean, so many different things.
And again, when you are understaffed, and I say understaffed is all relative of course, but the budgets have not increased for the State Department in many years. It’s not a priority for the U.S. government or certainly for Congress to keep putting money into the State Department like it does with the military. Another challenge, and this is a new challenge, is that at the time of this recording, the United States House of Representatives looks like it’s going to shift to the Republican party. And so, the domestic politics in the United States are going to become far more contentious. And then, this looks like it’s going to be the official kickoff into the 2023 presidential campaign. Well, I say 2023, only because that’s the year the campaign is going to happen. 2024 is, of course, the election.
But we’re going to see all next year going to be this massive campaign likely with Donald Trump. The reason I say this is a challenge is because Africa is not going to be a priority in the campaign. China will be, but I don’t get the sense that there is the same motivation now to confront China in every part of the world. People like U.S. Senator Marco Rubio from Florida are going to be very keen to make sure that China and the Americas stays on the agenda, but I don’t see anybody in Washington really putting Africa high on the agenda. I think those are gonna be the two main challenges for Molly Phee and her team to execute this strategy in such a way that it really breaks out from the past.
Cobus: I agree. Traditionally, there’s been bipartisan support for African initiatives in the U.S. Now I think things are so inflamed that we’ll have to see whether that’s still true. If it’s not, then I can imagine that domestic concerns might end up obstructing whatever initiatives that they’re trying to do in relation to Africa, which then would push the impact back to traditional areas of strength, which in the case of the U.S. in Africa happens to be military strength.
Eric: And let’s not forget aid. Aid is a very important area of strength. That the United States donates and gives more than any other country. I think, even though they’re stale old programs that have not really evolved in many respects, I think they deserve a lot of credit for what they do.
Cobus: Yeah, of course. And they may be old, but they’re certainly helpful. That’s true. But aid is, of course, a very important tool, but it’s a kind of impersonal tool. It’s something that is administered from beyond and doesn’t really necessarily have a lot of human faces to it on the ground.
Eric: I think the people at USAID would disagree with you strenuously on that, that there are literally people on the ground providing aid. And you see the rice bags that says, “From the USAID.” I mean, it’s highly personal in many respects.
Cobus: Yeah. No, absolutely. Great point. What I mean more is that there is the danger that the bias towards military engagement that we’ve seen from the U.S. will dovetail maybe too comfortably with an increasing bias towards the militarization of EU presence in Africa, particularly around anxieties about migrants. What I’m worried about is that there is a lot of creep that can happen in that direction. Aid is not a paradigm changer, right? Aid doesn’t fundamentally change the way that the U.S. and Europe engages with Africa. It’s an old-established way of engaging with Africa with certain kind of assumptions and certain parameters. And so, I’m worried that, in lieu of rethinking of what aid could be, that will end up just simply like leaning into a continued foregrounding of military engagement with the continent, which I don’t think is necessarily helpful.
Eric: Do you remember that event that French President Emmanuel Macron had in Montpellier, I think it was last year or the year before, when he brought those youth activists up on stage, and they just lit into him?
Cobus: Yes.
Eric: And they just said, “We are tired of the aid, we are tired of the paternalism. We want to be treated as equals, we want to do business, we want opportunities with you.” I think that everybody on the sixth floor of the State Department should go back and listen to that. And again, always align your policy with young people. You will never go wrong in Africa if you align your policy with young people. It’s notable that this week, the same week as the U.S. Congressional elections, Twitter closed its office in Accra. Now, it wasn’t a very big office, I think it had only 11 or 12 people, but in many ways it was a symbol.
I remember when Twitter opened its office, some of the talking points coming out of the United States was, “Look, America’s here to challenge the Chinese tech dominance in Africa.” So, the optics of it that Twitter is now no more in Africa is, I think, again, it just shows a lack of innovation on the U.S. side. And it’s one of those things where I think about, in our newsletter, where we’re writing about all these tiny little initiatives that the Chinese are doing. And it’s the things like the airbridge between Addis Ababa and Changsha, and Hunan Province of bringing tea and bringing coffee. And it’s the avocado deals, and it’s the tech deals.
It’s these small things. It’s not necessarily the big giant initiatives, but you add up every single day, these tiny things, and that amounts to a lot of dynamism and momentum in the policy beyond just traditional aid initiatives. That’s what I think is missing from the U.S. policy. I think if the U.S. can mobilize its private sector, if the U.S. can start to focus on what it actually does well; tech, finance, education services, things like that. Stop talking about infrastructure. The U.S. can’t build a road in Washington. It’s not going to build roads in Nigeria. I mean, I don’t know when people are going to accept that, but that is the reality. But we do things exceptionally well in some areas, and for some bizarre reason, we don’t lean into those areas that we do well. I don’t understand that, but that’s where I think that they should lean into.
Cobus: Yeah, I agree. But we’ve been saying that for a long time. We’ve been saying for a long time that the U.S. was strong in services and education and media. But these are all run by private sector companies with very tight, very BDI on their shareholders. The problem is that Africa’s still largely framed in relation to, again, aid, in relation to charity, right? When Silicon Valley comes to Africa, it’s always in the form of some kind of aid initiative or some kind of help initiative. It’s always going to be like saving poor people rather than finding markets. Whereas the Chinese don’t have that bias.
They do see Africa frequently as a market. I mean, an underdeveloped one, albeit, but still, particularly they have this kind of future-oriented view of future African markets, which we don’t see in the U.S. There isn’t much interest in future African markets in the U.S. Again, yeah, that would be great. Am I optimistic that it’s happening? No, frankly.
Eric: It is cool though that again, they dialed down the China rhetoric in the policy. That to me was a smart move. I think the authors of the strategy do deserve from credit from that. But at the end of the day, writing a policy, like what they did, and executing it are two radically different things. Here we are in November, the policy was unveiled in August. So, you and I follow this as close as anybody else. I haven’t seen any brand-new big innovation. I think, again, the clock is ticking down for this administration.
They’re about to enter into lame duck status next year. And so, again, they’re not going to get much through Congress. They’re certainly not going to get any new funding. So, if they’re going to do some big things, and if they’re going to change the narrative, this is the time to do it. This is it. I think once you get into next spring or into the summer, forget it. It’s never going to happen. Just again, the nature of American politics being what it is.
Cobus: Yeah. No, that’s 100% true. Obviously, politics is the art of the possible. If something is feasible and you can make it happen, then it becomes politics. That’s all understandable. I think what the bigger question, though, is that beyond the particular kind of election cycle, what do these countries, and this is true for the United States because the United States is this kind of leader of this group of countries, but it’s also true for Europe and some of the other Western countries, is what do they actually want to be in the world, in the 21st century? What role do they want to play beyond just being increasingly small little islands of wealth surrounded by moats and a sea of poverty? What does their global vision look like beyond their own hegemony?
Eric: But this is the problem, Cobus, they don’t have one. This is fundamentally the problem. Because the MAGA view of that, the Democratic Party view of that, the kind of body politic view of that in the United States are all different. We can’t agree on what that is. I think it’s very similar in Europe. Again, the only thing in Europe that they agree on, and we heard this with the jungle and the garden reference that was made by the top European Union foreign policy official a few weeks ago, is make sure that the brown and black people stay on their side of the Mediterranean. Immigration is the driving thing that unifies Europe in terms of Africa and the Middle East. Keep them over there. Beyond that, I don’t think there is consensus, and I don’t think there’s consensus in the United States, and that makes it very, very difficult.
Cobus: But then it’s not very interesting, right? So, why-
Eric: No one said it has to be interesting.
Cobus: Why does the rest of the world then have to care? Why do they have to listen?
Eric: Do they care? You were in South Africa after the speech, this is a legitimate question, I’m not… Do you think that people are now waiting with bated breath for what the United States is going to do to follow through with this new strategy? Or do you think it’s going to be business as usual as it was for the past 5, 10, 15 years?
Cobus: That is the big question. We’ll have to see, I think, what comes through.
Eric: I mean, I can tell you from here in Southeast Asia, people are not looking to every move that Washington makes in order for their own foreign policy here, or cultural clues, or any number of different things. The world has moved on from a unipolar world where the United States got to drive the agenda. The United States now has to compete, like everybody else, for attention, and idea space, and it’s got to get in there. And we will see if they’re capable of doing that. Who knows? But I don’t know if it has to be interesting. Let’s leave the conversation there. First, a very big thank you to Molly and her team at the State Department for arranging the interview. We really enjoyed the discussion. Also, once again, to the folks at the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria. It was lovely to see all of you.
We’re going to have a show coming up in the next week or two about my time in South Africa and some of the things that have been going on. So much news going on right now in Kenya, also in Nigeria. We’ve got a lot to talk about. So, we’re going to get Geraud to come back on the show and do one of our Week-In-Reviews just to kind of hash everything out. Again, the folks at the State Department, the folks in a number of international organizations, they subscribe to our daily brief newsletter at chinaglobalsouth.com.
So, if you’d like to see what Molly and her team are reading every day, we hope that you will go to chinaglobalsouth.com/subscribe. You get 30 days for free. Every day, we’re basically trying to save you the time for us to go out and do all the heavy lifting for the research. What are the latest academic papers? What are the latest policy briefs? What’s the latest news? And then we try to string it all together to give you some idea on how to frame it. It is a fantastic way to spend about 10 minutes of your day just scanning through lots of bullet points, short sentences. It’s not meant to be a heavy read, but it’s meant to really just jumpstart your day on the latest of what China is doing in the global south.
We’ve got a fantastic team of editors in Egypt; in Mauritius; in South Africa, with Cobus; also in China; and myself out here in Southeast Asia, really bringing you a global south point of view. Once again, chinaafricaproject.com/subscribe. And we will be back again next week with another episode of the China in Africa Podcast. For Cobus van Staden, I’m Eric Olander, thank you so much for listening.
Outro: The discussion continues online. Tag us on Twitter @ChinaGSProject, and visit us at chinaglobalsouth.com. If you speak French, check out our full coverage at projetafriquechine.com and AfrikChine on Twitter. That’s Afrik with a K. And you’ll also find links to our sites and social media channels in Arabic.
