In December 2021, the U.S. confirmed that President Joe Biden will boycott the 2022 Winter Olympic Games in Beijing in February. But already before the end of November, China had signaled it was working towards lessening the public diplomacy fallout of such gestures. As part of the November 2021 three-yearly Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) agreement, a 36-partner collaboration was announced between the state-owned China Media Group (CMG) – responsible for CCTV and the international broadcaster CGTN – and African press and television organizations. The result could be that China will succeed in shaping considerable TV and newspaper Olympic coverage in Africa. China will use this fresh public diplomacy leverage in African broadcasting and online news to narrate the message that China’s international status continues to rise.
Signed up for this mammoth partnership were state broadcasters and companies from South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, and Senegal, amongst others. Details thus far are scant, but according to Dr. Ayub Rioba, the Director-General of the Tanzania Broadcasting Corporation, the alliance will involve “exchange of content, exchange of staff, and co-production.” The relationship-building forum was led by African Union of Broadcasting CEO Gregoire Ndjaka, Huang Kunming, head of China’s CPC Central Committee Publicity Department, and CMG president Shen Haixiong, the latter of who linked China-Africa relations to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
The difference between an African state broadcaster and a Chinese one is the foundation of democratic principles. For China and African news outlets to be in dialogue means common ground in media values. Certainly, consensus building will not be based on the news value assumptions which underpin the likes of the BBC, CNN, Deutsche Welles, and FRANCE 24, even though most Africans are in favor of democracy. Continued – perhaps expanded – African media training by the Chinese side means continued exposure to a pro-state control approach to newsgathering, with the aim of normalizing and socializing Africans to alternatives to free speech reporting. And content exchange means that Africa will broadcast more China-friendly news, giving access to international ears and eyes that it dearly craves for its public diplomacy agenda.
There was little evidence until recently that China’s CGTN Africa was popular with Africans. However, as it is freely available rather than on pricier StarTimes TV packages where the BBC and CNN can be accessed, it might have found an audience with low-income rural viewers
A question, therefore, is what motivated the decision by so many African broadcasters to be included in this joint venture. It could be that there is data available that proves that on a grassroots level, Chinese involvement in African media has been popular. And quite likely Chinese pay-TV broadcaster StarTimes has played a role in this development. The expansion of provision in rural regions through the Access to Satellite TV for 10,000 African Villages Project, new channels in African languages, and the increased viewers of dubbed Chinese content – all StarTimes initiatives – almost certainly contributed to data intelligence on African tastes and preferences which spurred on the choice to push ahead with the partnership with CMG.
There was little evidence until recently that China’s CGTN Africa was popular with Africans. However, as it is freely available rather than on pricier StarTimes TV packages where the BBC and CNN can be accessed, it might have found an audience with low-income rural viewers: beneficiaries of the 10,000 Villages Project who also watch free-to-air African channels. It is estimated that a million people across the countryside of Uganda alone have benefited from the project, and the same scenario has been repeated across around 20 African countries, with satellite and digital links for schools, clinics, community centers as well as private homes. Those watching premium StarTimes channels might have also been watching new StarTimes platforms in Swahili, Hausa, Yoruba, and Twi, such as Adepa TV in Ghana or Rembo TV in Kenya; more support for indigenous African language content is part of the new collaboration. These activities must have bought intense goodwill for China. There is also the popularity of Chinese dramas and kung-fu action, generating much-desired soft power.
Pragmatism now seems to have led leading players of the African media ecosystem to enter China’s sphere of influence. The BBC, CNN, Deutsche Welles, and FRANCE 24 represent former colonialist powers which, despite their democratic credentials, Africans are less interested in emulating: Afrobarometer polling of African nationals over the last five years reveals high opinions of the China model of development. China provided solutions to populations failed by the neoliberal economic policies of the U.S. and former European colonial powers and did so through bypassing democratic standards.
And while Chinese companies need good headlines to counter claims of abuse against PRC firms in Africa, for China, foreign aid is more than about protecting its economic interests: investment in Africa is tiny in comparison to the U.S. or Europe. More importantly, Africa provides vital diplomatic protection. It is the support of African countries at the United Nations that provides the bulwark against claims in human rights abuses in Xinjiang. This collaboration may provide added support. And non-democratic tendencies in African media find synergy in the norms of China’s tightly regulated cyberspace. The ‘digital sovereignty’ framework, recently endorsed by Senegal (13) provides a rationale for crackdowns on civilian protests in countries like Ethiopia.
Washington and Europe may weaponize their boycotts of the Olympic Games by fueling headlines in the media catering to western audiences. A problem is that winning over African hearts and minds – especially viewers outside metropolitan areas who are less versed in discourses of ‘new colonialism’ and ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ – will be increasingly difficult. The 36 broadcasters and news media that are aligned with China are more easily able to reach rural regions assisted by China’s development aid. Influence cultivation on behalf of democracy will lessen. As the tables turn, increasingly it will be the western voices that are marginalized.
Angela Lewis is a PhD candidate at Nottingham University in Ningbo, China, focused on China-Africa media relations. She is co-editor of a forthcoming edition of the Journal of Public Diplomacy on African diplomacy http://kapdnet.org/index.php/html/225
