Editor’s Note: A number of current and former United States government officials took issue with many of the points that I raised in my recent column on U.S. foreign policy towards Africa (“China’s role in Washington’s divided, confusing foreign policy towards Africa“) and disagreed vehemently both with my assessment and conclusion. Understandably, those officials currently working in the government are not permitted to share their comments publicly, but Colonel Chris Wyatt (ret), CEO of the strategic consultancy Indaba Africa Group and former Director of African Studies at the United States Army War College, agreed to share his views on some of the key issues that were addressed in the column. His rebuttal and answers to a few follow-up questions have been reprinted here in full with his consent. — Eric Olander
Eric, thank you kindly for the opportunity to respond to your questions. Understandably there is a lot of confusion or anger at what is widely and inaccurately portrayed and misrepresented in media and by politicians, including senior U.S. Government officials. Consequently, what has transpired is a lot of people who incorrectly presume the U.S. Government has something against Africans. That is very unfortunate and demands the facts be pointed out.
First, the news release from the Department of Homeland Security is freely available. Anyone in the Central African Republic can open their mobile and read for themselves what the truth is (presuming they read English that is). I find it very distrusting that the world over folks listen to Fox News or the BBC and form opinions on important issues that conform to their world view without thinking critically. Now to address your questions specifically:
1) The imposition of certain travel sanctions against Nigeria has been described as a “travel ban.” You say that’s not correct. What is it then?
The term ban is misleading. Washington did not “ban” any of these six nations. What it did was to impose restrictions on certain types of visas until the country (in this case Nigeria) remedied the shortcomings of its documentation process. This is not semantics. It is an important point. When people hear “ban” they think they can no longer visit the USA. That is not the case.
What follows from that misuse borders on the ludicrous. Rather than complain about the fairness of travel restrictions that affect a few tens of thousands of people, even the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives makes patently false statements over the non-existing ban:
“The Trump Administration’s expansion of its outrageous, un-American travel ban threatens our security, our values and the rule of law. The sweeping rule, barring more than 350 million individuals from predominantly African nations from traveling to the United States, is discrimination disguised as policy.”
If in fact, the Trump administration had imposed a “travel ban,” then, yes, the nationals of all those countries would not be able to enter the USA. But that is simply not the case. This is the travel restriction now in place:
“Nigeria does not comply with the established identity-management and information-sharing criteria assessed by the performance metrics. Suspension of entry for Immigrants, except as Special Immigrants whose eligibility is based on having provided assistance to the U.S. Government.”
Nigerians can and will still come to the USA, provided they obtain a visa at a US Consulate (as they always have had to do). So, there is no “ban.” However, until Abuja remedies its deficiencies, Nigerians desiring to immigrate to the USA, not visit, cannot enter. Arguably Nigeria is the largest and most important country of the six in this situation. So how many of the 192,000,000 Nigerians cannot come to the USA now? We do not know. But a review of 2018 would clearly indicate that the number is tiny (8,000 in 2018).
“In 2018 the US issued more than 8,000 immigration visas to citizens of Nigeria. That same year, just over 2,000 were issued to Sudanese nationals, 290 to Tanzanians, and just 31 to Eritreans.”
While the imposition of travel restrictions does not send a sign of confidence to our partners, it also does not ban their nationals from coming to the USA. Aside from the embarrassment, the only folks affected in Nigeria are those Nigerians who want to abandon Nigeria to immigrate to the USA.
2) As a former career military officer who’s spent considerable time in Africa working closely with governments there and U.S. forces. What is your assessment of the debate over the Pentagon’s proposal to redeploy troops from Africa to other theaters of operation?
This question is one that disturbs me in that so many in government are demanding that the USA not remove troops from West Africa. Yet I seriously doubt many of them even have any idea how many “troops” are there in the first place or what it is that they actually do. We have very few U.S. troops in West Africa. We can continue to support the French coalition in Mali but do not need 700-800 US troops in Agadez to do so. The focus of U.S. effort should not be combat troops in the Sahel. We can accomplish all the security force assistance necessary with less than 200 US troops or contractors in the entire region. The focus must be long term. Security assistance and coalition support should be short term efforts with long term objectives that compliment non-kinetic efforts.
At the same time endless, distorted news stories misrepresent how many soldiers are there and give the impression that the USA has sent countless troops to Africa. This is not the case. Neither side does the situation any good. The U.S. government effort in West Africa and in the Sahel specifically, is primarily a diplomatic one. True, we provided logistical support to the French-led coalition in Mali, intelligence support to Niger, Nigeria, and others and have provided hundreds of millions of bilateral security assistance in the region. Nonetheless, diplomacy has the lead in the region.
The key to this diplomatic effort is the Trans Sahel Counter-Terrorism Program, created in 2005 as a successor to the Pan-Sahel Initiative.
“the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is a multifaceted, multi-year strategy implemented jointly by the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Department of Defense to assist partners in West and North Africa increase their immediate and long-term capabilities to address terrorist threats and prevent the spread of violent extremism.”
The TSCTP is the appropriate focus, not simply arming and fighting alongside Sahelian forces. TSCTP is a holistic effort that deals with multiple aspects of security, not just the military. Unstable governments, trafficking (including arms), coups d’etat, insurgents and conflict have long been a part of the Sahel region. The argument that if the U.S. removes a few dozen special operations soldiers and withdrawals its 800 troops (who support and operate drones, not march in combat) from an airbase in Agadez will somehow change the equation is simply not true.
3) There appears to a disconnect between the various branches of the U.S. government when it comes to American foreign policy towards Africa. Is this a new phenomenon or something that’s been present for years?
For this response I cannot provide any data to substantiate anything, only my opinion informed by decades of experience in the inter-agency arena. That means what follows is opinion. Folks can disagree, as either side may be correct.
First, throughout my experience with the Clinton, Bush, Obama and Trump administrations, I have always seen disconnects. In the past, a frequent obvious one was between the Department of State and the Department of Defense. That one vacillates and depends very much on the level we are talking about (in an embassy vice in DC). After I began working in DC many years ago, I noticed yet another disconnect when I saw government bureaucrats who actively fostered this disconnect. There are always civilians and soldiers who disagree with the party in power. But I saw far more open and consistent behavior when Bush and Trump were in office, from an embassy to a Combatant Command to national-level intelligence agencies to the national security council itself. The danger is when opinions and views affect government and policy. This happens. Do not misunderstand. The vast majority can work objectively regardless of their view of government action or policy.
What I have noticed with the Trump Administration is an unprecedented openness and willingness for far more people who regularly allow their personal views to (pardon the use of the verb here) trump their oath and obligation to the constitution. And the media eat this up like it is filet mignon. Sadly, I have also seen folks whom I respected and who are dedicated allow their emotions to control their actions when it comes to President Trump.
From my perspective what we see is a manifestation of the polity at large playing out in government itself. People are less constrained by duty and good manners, too often within the government itself many break the law and disclose classified information (with no consequences, it seems) and we have a media that is dedicated to misrepresenting things so long as it comports with their desires. All three have existed in the past. But the frequency, the brazenness, and the daily misrepresentations have combined to give the impression that the government is disconnected. From my vantage point, it always has been. It’s just that before Trump (or perhaps before Clinton would be more accurate) folks behaved much better (in the aggregate).
About Colonel Chris Wyatt (retired):
Colonel William M. (Chris) Wyatt (ret) is the CEO of the strategic consultancy Indaba Africa Group and the former Director of African Studies at the United States Army War College. Colonel Wyatt served as a professional military officer with more than 36 years of experience in security, international development, and education in Africa, Europe, Southwest Asia, and North America. He received his commission as a Military Intelligence Officer from Ohio University in 1989. He is a graduate of the Military Intelligence Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the Counterintelligence course, the Signals Intelligence course, Combined Arms Services and Staff School, Air Assault School, Command and General Staff College, and the United States Army War College. Prior to his arrival at Carlisle Barracks, he was assigned to the U.S. Mission to the African Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, where he was the Senior Military Advisor to the mission and the U.S. Africa Command Liaison Officer to the African Union.
