Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono (AHY), Indonesia’s coordinating minister for infrastructure, traveled to Beijing in late August to meet President Xi Jinping and senior Chinese officials. The visit, carried out on behalf of President Prabowo Subianto, was focused on sustaining Indonesia–China dialogue on strategic infrastructure.
While it kept bilateral cooperation on track, the outcomes were modest and stopped short of new commitments. Prabowo attended the 80th anniversary military parade in Beijing but returned home the same day to address unrest at home, leaving AHY to lead the talks.
The discussions revolved around two long-standing projects: the extension of the Jakarta–Bandung high-speed rail line to Surabaya and the Giant Sea Wall intended to protect Java’s northern coast from rising seas and land subsidence.
AHY conveyed Jakarta’s continued interest in pursuing both initiatives with Chinese participation. Xi responded with an affirmation of China’s willingness to cooperate. The visit thus confirmed that these projects remain at the center of bilateral engagement.
But beyond affirmations, little was decided. No new memoranda of understanding were signed, no financing arrangements unveiled, and no project timelines set.
The high-speed rail extension remains at the conceptual stage, while the sea wall is still subject to debate over feasibility and environmental consequences. The visit reinforced priorities but did not advance them toward implementation.
Financing was the most evident gap. AHY underscored Indonesia’s preference for “blended financing,” combining state funds, private investment, and contributions from multiple foreign partners.
While China indicated readiness to remain involved, the details of cost-sharing and investment structure were left unresolved. By highlighting the role of Japan, South Korea, and European partners, AHY also signaled Indonesia’s intent to diversify and avoid excessive dependence on Beijing.
This careful positioning reflects Jakarta’s broader approach. On one hand, China remains an indispensable partner, with proven capacity in large-scale rail and coastal engineering.
On the other, Indonesia is wary of the financial risks and political sensitivities that come with relying too heavily on a single source of capital. The Beijing meetings confirmed both the opportunities and the constraints of this balancing act.
Politically, the visit ensured continuity at a moment when Prabowo chose not to engage directly on bilateral issues. He skipped the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit and limited his role in Beijing to attending China’s Victory Day military parade, leaving AHY to conduct substantive talks. This arrangement preserved the bilateral dialogue without requiring Prabowo to commit personally while managing unrest at home.
In the end, the outcomes of AHY’s visit can be stated plainly. China reiterated its interest in partnering on Indonesia’s largest infrastructure ambitions. Indonesia reaffirmed its intent to work with China but stressed the importance of diversified financing.
Both sides kept political trust intact. What they did not produce were binding agreements, new funding pledges, or detailed project plans.
That limited result is not insignificant. In large-scale infrastructure diplomacy, maintaining dialogue and reaffirming priorities are necessary steps, even if they fall short of breakthroughs.
AHY’s visit served that function: sustaining momentum, clarifying financing preferences, and keeping the door open for cooperation while postponing decisions that remain too costly or contentious to finalize.
This article was co-authored by Yeta Purnama, a researcher at the Center of Economic and Law Studies (CELIOS), and Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat, Director of the China-Indonesia Desk at CELIOS.
