Having reshaped Central Asia’s oil and gas infrastructure and challenged Russia’s long-standing dominance of the region’s traditional energy sector, China is now setting its sights on nuclear power as the next frontier.
This next step is not just about energy diversification. It’s about locking in long-term influence. Unlike oil or gas deals, nuclear power projects tie countries together for decades through fuel supply, technology transfer, and operational oversight. For Beijing, that means a chance to deepen its strategic foothold in Central Asia for generations.
The planned construction of Kazakhstan’s nuclear power plant has become a key arena in this strategic contest. While Russian state corporation Rosatom has been selected to lead the consortium for the country’s first nuclear power plant, China’s China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) has emerged as a formidable contender for the second.
With the war in Ukraine redrawing geopolitical lines, China is seizing the moment to strengthen its presence. Kazakhstan will have a major decision to make as it weighs its options for developing its nascent nuclear power industry.
China’s Competitive Advantage
One of CNNC’s greatest advantages is its ability to deliver nuclear power at a lower cost—a critical factor for Kazakhstan. While typical overall project estimates for a 2 GW plant range between $10 billion and $15 billion, CNNC has proposed building a 1 GW reactor for around $2.8 billion. This means a two-unit plant would cost almost half the price projected by many competitors.
This dramatic cost differential gives China a clear edge in the bidding process. Given that Kazakhstan wants to transition from fossil fuel dependency toward a diversified and modern energy system, affordability becomes crucial to ensure financial sustainability without overburdening public finances.
Speed of delivery is another key consideration for this bid. Chinese firms complete nuclear projects in 5 to 7 years on average — a faster pace than many global peers. In comparison, Rosatom generally completes reactors within 6 to 9 years. Since Kazakhstani officials are striving to address the country’s growing domestic energy demands, CNNC’s relatively short construction timeline holds extra appeal.
Finally, CNNC’s most strategic offer lies in its willingness to share nuclear technology and allow Kazakhstan greater control over the entire nuclear fuel cycle. This stands in stark contrast to Rosatom’s “turnkey” model in non-nuclear states, which maintains control over fuel supply and repatriation of spent fuel for the duration of the plant’s operation.
For Kazakhstan, CNNC’s offer to transfer nuclear technology and enable domestic control of the fuel cycle aligns with Kazakhstan’s long-term goals of strengthening national sovereignty, developing local expertise, and reducing dependence on foreign powers—particularly important in a region where energy is often used as a tool of geopolitical influence.
The Downsides of China’s Nuclear Offer
Despite China’s growing edge in nuclear technology, several critical disadvantages could influence Kazakhstan’s ultimate decision on foreign partnerships for nuclear power development. One major concern is China’s comparatively lax safety standards for nuclear power plants.
For Kazakhstan, safety and regulatory robustness are top priorities in selecting a partner, particularly given the legacy of nuclear testing in Semipalatinsk and public sensitivity toward nuclear issues.
Furthermore, China has not yet signed the IAEA’s Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, a key legal instrument that establishes international norms for liability and compensation in the event of a nuclear accident.
For Kazakhstan and many other potential nuclear clients, adherence to this convention is an important marker of reliability, legal accountability, and international trust. Russia, in contrast, is a signatory and has long used this as a diplomatic asset in its nuclear engagements.
Finally, China does not currently offer a spent fuel take-back program, whereas it’s an essential feature in Russia’s turnkey export model. For newcomer nuclear states like Kazakhstan, long-term waste management is a major technical and environmental challenge.
Without a clear solution or partner-supported take-back system, the burden of radioactive waste could become a political and logistical liability. In this regard, China’s offer can appear incomplete and could undermine its broader appeal despite its cost and speed advantages.
These risks may help explain why Kazakhstan ultimately selected Rosatom for its first nuclear power plant, despite CNNC’s competitive bid. China’s offer provides affordability, speed, and technological partnership, but safety concerns, legal ambiguity, and the absence of a waste solution may have outweighed the positives. These issues remain significant hurdles to Beijing’s nuclear ambitions in Central Asia.
What This Means for China’s Strategic Position
Despite the associated risks, Kazakhstan’s evident consideration of CNNC for its second nuclear power plant reflects Astana’s intent to deepen cooperation with China as part of its aspirations for a balanced and multi-vector foreign policy.
But China’s involvement in the construction of Kazakhstan’s nuclear power plant doesn’t just impact its relationship with Kazakhstan. It also matters for regional great power dynamics between China and Russia.
If China is selected as a key contractor for the second nuclear power plant, this would mark a significant deepening of Sino-Kazakh energy ties. A nuclear power plant is not a one-time project; it forges a long-term strategic relationship lasting 60 to 80 years, encompassing fuel supply, technical maintenance, periodic upgrades, safety checks, and eventual decommissioning.
That kind of long-term technical engagement would reinforce China’s already strong presence in Kazakhstan’s energy landscape, complementing its role in traditional fossil fuel infrastructure and its expanding renewable energy projects. This could gradually tilt Kazakhstan into greater economic and technological dependence on China.
China’s entry into Kazakhstan’s nuclear sector as a primary contractor would further erode Russia’s traditional dominance in Central Asia. With its influence already weakened due to the war in Ukraine, Russia risks losing one of its few remaining leverage points in the region: nuclear cooperation.
China’s participation in the nuclear power plant project would build on its previous successes in redirecting oil and gas pipelines, expanding solar and wind infrastructure, and offering alternative financial and technical models. Over time, this could encourage Central Asian states to reduce imports of Russian electricity and fossil fuels, shifting their energy dependency from Russia to technological dependency on China.
At the global level, involvement in Kazakhstan’s second nuclear power plant would serve as a high-profile showcase for China’s nuclear export capabilities. Success in a geopolitically sensitive country like Kazakhstan would boost the credibility of CNNC and solidify China’s reputation as a serious player in the global nuclear market.
This would enhance China’s standing among Global South nations, many of which are exploring nuclear energy options but remain cautious about Western or Russian offerings. In this way, nuclear exports could become an increasingly effective instrument of China’s geopolitical influence—complementing its Belt and Road Initiative and expanding its soft power through long-term technological dependency.
Yunis Sharifli is CGSP’s Non-Resident Fellow for Central Asia.
