China’s footprint in Central Asia’s mineral wealth is deepening, with gold emerging as a strategic priority alongside critical minerals.
While Beijing’s investments in copper, lithium, and rare earths are widely viewed as essential to sustaining its industrial base, its push into the region’s gold sector reflects a parallel ambition to secure its long-term financial sovereignty. Gold serves Beijing not only as a hedge against global uncertainty but also as a tool to diversify reserves and reduce reliance on the U.S. dollar.
In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Chinese firms—led by Zijin Mining Group—already dominate, controlling flagship projects such as the Taldybulak Levoberezhny Gold Mine in Kyrgyzstan and high-profile joint ventures like Zarafshon, which is responsible for more than three-quarters of Tajikistan’s gold output.
Now, momentum is shifting toward Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, where China is following a similar model of major acquisitions and joint ventures.
Zijin’s $1.2 billion purchase of Kazakhstan’s Raygorodok gold mine stands out as a landmark deal. Raygorodok is a high-value acquisition, since the site is fully operational with advanced processing capacity and substantial reserves.
In Uzbekistan, however, Beijing is pursuing a more diversified approach. Engagement is advancing on two parallel tracks—government-to-government cooperation and private-sector participation in mineral auctions.
At the state level, China National Gold Group signed a memorandum of understanding with Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Geology and Mining Industry, pledging collaboration on geological exploration and the transfer of advanced technologies for gold and critical mineral extraction. At the same time, private Chinese investors have been increasingly active in open tenders.
In one case, a company with a 40 percent stake owned by a Chinese citizen emerged as the winning bidder. In another, Xinlong Mining Drilling—a firm 70 percent owned by Uzbekistan but with Chinese capital participation—secured a plot in the Nurota district, a mineral-rich area in Uzbekistan’s Navoi region, with a record bid of 3.6 billion soms—more than 110 times the starting price.
This intensifying activity is not incidental. It reflects both regional opportunities and global pressures, as Beijing seeks to secure strategic resources critical to its financial resilience.
Regional Drivers
Beijing’s entry into the Central Asia gold market has two key drivers.
The first is regional diversification. Although China already maintains a strong presence in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the growing willingness of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to leverage their gold and metal resources is introducing fresh opportunities for China. Both countries offer a comparatively stable business environment, particularly when measured against Kyrgyzstan, where political volatility and resource nationalism remain significant risks.
The high-profile Kumtor case—in which the Kyrgyz government seized control of one of the country’s largest gold mines—continues to deter large-scale foreign investors wary of nationalization disputes. In contrast, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan present more predictable regulatory frameworks and stronger state capacity, making them attractive destinations for Chinese capital.
By expanding into these two markets, Beijing not only diversifies its regional portfolio but also enhances the resilience and profitability of its investments, reducing vulnerability to political shocks in any single country.
The second important driver is the ambitious gold production targets set by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Both governments view gold as central to their economic development strategies and are prioritizing policies to boost annual output.
Kazakhstan aims to position itself among the world’s top ten gold producers, while Uzbekistan, already home to the giant Muruntau mine, seeks to consolidate its status as one of the world’s largest gold producers within the next decade. This involves developing new deposits, modernizing extraction technology, and encouraging foreign participation through competitive auctions and partnerships.
These government-led initiatives create strong openings for Chinese firms to step in as both investors and technology providers. In this regard, Beijing’s mining companies are well-positioned to support geological exploration, bring in advanced processing expertise, and mobilize large-scale capital, while gaining long-term access to the region’s gold resources.
Global Dynamics
Beyond regional factors, global dynamics also play a decisive role in shaping China’s strategy in Central Asia’s gold sector. The intensifying trade rivalry between the United States and China has strengthened Beijing’s determination to secure alternative assets that can protect its economy from external shocks.
Gold, unlike dollar-denominated reserves, provides a tangible store of value that is less vulnerable to political leverage from Washington.
In this sense, the Russia–Ukraine war was a turning point. When Western nations froze hundreds of billions of Russia’s dollar and euro reserves, Beijing recognized the vulnerability of holding too much wealth in foreign currencies controlled by potential rivals.
This experience reinforced the importance of gold in China’s de-dollarization strategy, since it offers both a safe asset and a tool to diversify away from reliance on the US dollar.
Historical trends confirm this logic: a one percent increase in the share of gold in global reserves has been linked with an approximate 0.3 percent decline in the US Dollar Index, underlining gold’s role in shifting currency balances.
China’s actions reflect this strategic adjustment. Between 2013 and 2023, Beijing increased its official gold reserves by about one thousand tonnes while reducing its holdings of US Treasury securities by nearly sixty percent since 2015.
Securing Resources, Shaping Influence
China’s pursuit of Central Asia’s gold is more than a series of investments. It is a calculated strategy to secure economic resilience, financial sovereignty, and geopolitical leverage. Gold is no longer simply a commodity. It has become a tool of power, a hedge against the dollar, and a safeguard against global shocks.
For Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Chinese capital brings opportunity in the form of technology transfer, capital inflows, and accelerated production—but the scale of investment also calls for the Central Asian countries to engage in careful negotiation for deals that align with their own development goals.
The stakes are clear. Central Asia’s gold reserves will shape China’s financial resilience and determine the strategic trajectory of the region. As such, Central Asian countries have key leverage here. The decisions made today by governments in Astana and Tashkent will decide whether they emerge as architects of their own prosperity or as passive participants in Beijing’s golden strategy.
Yunis Sharifli is CGSP’s Non-Resident Fellow for Central Asia.
