The race for artificial intelligence supremacy is now global. As the United States and China compete to define the future of AI, their rivalry increasingly shapes how they engage with the rest of the world.
Washington leans on alliances and export controls to restrict Beijing’s access to advanced chips and components, while China responds by deepening partnerships across the Global South, exporting not just technology, but also its vision of digital governance.
Beijing’s Global AI Governance Initiative and AI Capacity Building Action Plan illustrate this strategy clearly. Both aim to position China as a development partner to emerging economies, helping them bridge the digital divide through training, infrastructure support, and access to AI technologies. Central Asia has quickly become one of the most revealing laboratories for this approach.
Across Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, new agreements with China show a two-track model of engagement through the hardware infrastructure, providing the physical backbone for AI systems, and capacity building, nurturing the human capital needed to sustain them.
Together, these efforts signal China’s expanding technological footprint in the region, as well as its ambition to anchor the next phase of AI globalization within its own digital ecosystem.
Hardware Infrastructure Cooperation
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have emerged as the two primary Central Asian partners for China’s growing artificial intelligence infrastructure exports.
In Kazakhstan, the National Academy of Sciences signed a memorandum with Zhejiang University of Technology to establish the Laboratory of Spatio-Temporal Artificial Intelligence and Sustainable Development. Funded by Chinese investors with an estimated one billion yuan, the project marks one of the country’s most ambitious technological collaborations.
The investment focuses on advanced AI research equipment with computing capacities ranging from one to ten exaflops, a measure of processing speed equal to one quintillion (10¹⁸) calculations per second. This is a scale of computing power that was previously unavailable in Kazakhstan.
The AI systems are designed to address practical challenges within the country, such as water resource management, disaster early warning systems, and agricultural digitalization.
Uzbekistan has taken a similar path. Shanghai-based AI firm LinkWise has partnered with Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Digital Technologies to build a Modular Intelligent Computing Center. The center will serve as a deployable and flexible “AI brain” to support Uzbekistan’s ambitions in digital governance, smart cities, and industrial modernization.
Additionally, LinkWise Data Intelligence Co. is planning to construct two large-scale data centers with a capacity of 300 MW each, located in Bukhara in central Uzbekistan and Surkhandarya, a southern border region known for its energy infrastructure.
This wave of cooperation aligns with the long-term interests of both sides. For Central Asian states like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which currently lack domestic high-performance AI infrastructure, these partnerships with China provide a much-needed technological foundation.
Beyond the hardware itself, these projects have garnered enthusiasm for their potential to generate local employment, enhance technical skills, and help build human capital around critical technologies. Leadership in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also hopes that the new infrastructure will strengthen their ability to attract foreign investment and cultivate tech startup ecosystems.
For China, expanding digital infrastructure in Central Asia advances the goals of the Digital Silk Road, China’s initiative to build digital infrastructure and enhance connectivity across developing countries. These AI partnerships complement existing investments by Chinese telecom giants like Huawei and ZTE, further establishing China’s tech footprint in the region.
There’s also a long-term benefit for these technologies: As demand for AI infrastructure grows, Central Asian countries are likely to increase their imports of advanced Chinese technologies, including AI chips, servers, and data-processing equipment. These technologies also often come with long-term maintenance contracts, which further secure China’s position in the region’s tech infrastructure.
More importantly, deploying complex systems such as AI laboratories and data centers abroad allows China to test and refine its technologies in overseas environments, gaining valuable operational experience. This not only consolidates its technological leadership in Central Asia but also positions Beijing to scale its AI ecosystem globally, especially across the broader Global South.
Capacity-Building Cooperation
In addition to hardware infrastructure development, China also engages in capacity-building cooperation with Central Asian countries. For instance, Uzbekistan and China have agreed to establish a joint center for artificial intelligence aimed at training future specialists.
Similarly, during the Second China–Central Asia Summit, China and Kyrgyzstan signed an agreement to establish a cooperation center in the field of artificial intelligence, and a comparable initiative was announced with Tajikistan.
Such capacity-building initiatives enable regional countries to develop human capital with transferable AI-related skills applicable across government, academia, and industry. This helps optimize operations, strengthen domestic innovation ecosystems, and reduce dependency on external expertise.
By fostering local talent, Central Asian countries can move from being mere consumers of foreign technology to active contributors to digital infrastructure development and application.
Beijing is used to this kind of capacity building and training for Global South partners. After all, these collaborations bring several strategic advantages. Training human capital familiar with China’s technological ecosystem strengthens long-term people-to-people connectivity and enhances China’s soft power in the region.
Capacity-building projects are also less capital-intensive than large infrastructure investments, making them suitable tools for engaging economically weaker partners such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
Over time, this approach cultivates technological curiosity and demand for Chinese technologies, reinforcing China’s role as a reliable and benevolent partner in technology cooperation.
The Long Run
The deepening wave of China-Central Asia digital cooperation signals a turning point in the region’s technological trajectory. What began with the rollout of 5G networks and fiber-optic cables is now evolving into a far more ambitious phase, anchored in data centers, AI laboratories, and large-scale computing facilities. This shift promises to accelerate digital transformation across Central Asia, but it also carries significant strategic risks that should not be overlooked.
China’s dual-track model, combining hardware infrastructure with human capital development, offers Central Asian states the means to leap forward technologically. Yet, it simultaneously embeds Chinese technology, standards, and digital governance practices into the very foundations of these countries’ digital ecosystems.
As AI infrastructure and training programs proliferate, Beijing’s influence over data governance, cybersecurity norms, and future technology standards could deepen, potentially narrowing the region’s room for independent digital policymaking.
The growing reliance on Chinese AI hardware, cloud systems, and software frameworks also raises long-term concerns about technological dependence and security vulnerabilities. Once embedded, Chinese-built data centers and AI systems are difficult and costly to replace, effectively locking Central Asian states into asymmetric relationships with Beijing. This dependency could, over time, limit the region’s ability to engage with alternative partners or adapt to emerging global standards outside China’s technological orbit.
To avoid these pitfalls, Central Asian countries must balance the immediate advantages of Chinese support with a strategic diversification of their digital partnerships. Encouraging open, multi-stakeholder collaboration, engaging not only China but also Western, regional, and private actors, can help safeguard digital sovereignty. Ultimately, the challenge for Central Asia lies not in resisting China’s digital rise, but in ensuring that participation in it strengthens their autonomy rather than constrains it.
Yunis Sharifli is CGSP’s Non-Resident Fellow for Central Asia.
