In a global scenario marked by strategic competition between the world’s two largest powers, Latin America’s role has ceased to be peripheral and has become a critical terrain of influence.
As Washington watches with growing concern Beijing’s advance on vital infrastructure—from power grids to megaports like Chancay—an unavoidable question arises: Does the United States have the real capacity to curb or replace China’s economic presence in the region?
To delve deeper into this complex geopolitical balance, we spoke with Carlos Aquino Rodríguez, one of the country’s leading experts on Asia-Latin America relations. He holds a PhD in Economics from Kobe University (Japan), teaches at the National University of San Marcos, and directs the Center for Asian Studies (CEAS) at the same institution. Aquino combines a solid academic background with a pragmatic view of international trade.
MARÍA CERVANTES: The United States has expressed concern about Chinese control over critical infrastructure. Could Washington really remove China from the region?
CARLOS AQUINO: It’s impossible to remove China from Latin America for one simple reason: who will replace it? And the United States can’t. The United States understands that it cannot replace China economically; it doesn’t have the capacity because its companies are leaving.
U.S. officials had warned and advised the Peruvian government to be careful because China is controlling the country’s basic, vital infrastructure.
It’s ironic: the United States complained about a foreign state controlling electricity distribution, but what country was Enel from? It was Italian! And who owned Luz del Sur?
It was Sempra Energy, a U.S. company. They themselves sold it to the Chinese! Private companies in the United States don’t operate at a loss; if they don’t make a profit, they leave.
The United States understands that it cannot replace China economically.
The Chinese can operate at a loss in the first few years because their vision is long-term. The United States lacks this capacity because its companies are withdrawing.
But that’s not all; if you look at exports, 36% of everything Peru sold to the world last year went to China. And how much do you think went to the United States? Only 11%. That is, China buys more than three times as much from Peru as the United States does. Today, it is by far Peru’s largest trading partner, representing more than a third of Peru’s total exports.
And this trend is going to increase. Let me explain why, and this also answers your previous question: it’s impossible for the United States to displace China from Latin America for very simple reasons.
What does Peru export? Between 70% and 80% are raw materials: minerals, energy, fish products, and food. And where is the market for that? It’s no longer in the United States or Europe.
The market for mineral and energy resources is the manufacturing industry, and that industry moved from the West to Asia and China decades ago.
Imagine if we listened to the United States and stopped selling to China: they buy 70% of our copper. Who else would buy that volume? Not the United States, not Japan, not Europe has that capacity to absorb it.
Therefore, whether you like it or not, China is the market. The same is true for the rest of South America. The exception is Mexico and some Central American countries that, due to geography and history, are integrated into the United States.
MARÍA CERVANTES: What then is the U.S. response on the geopolitical chessboard to curb this influence?
CARLOS AQUINO: What the United States can do are two things. One is to limit China’s influence to the strictly economic sphere, preventing it from extending to the political sphere and, what worries them most, to the military sphere.
Look at Venezuela: its trade relationship with China was minimal compared to that of Peru, but the United States intervened because it saw that it was becoming a beachhead for Russia and Iran.
The second thing it’s doing, and it’s obvious, is strengthening military ties. Peru is going to be designated a major non-NATO ally in Latin America; it’s the only one after Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. The United States can strengthen its military presence.
You saw the investment they’re going to make in the Callao naval base; well, the United States is going to have a presence there, so they can keep an eye on the Chinese in Chancay.
And it’s likely that Peru will now buy 24 F-16 fighter jets from the United States, because Marco Rubio, the architect of this increasingly assertive policy, is coming. They’re going to strengthen their political and military alliance to compensate for the economic shortcomings.
Latin America is one of the few regions in the world with a surplus of natural resources and food. Even if we industrialize, we have more than enough copper, iron, meat, and soybeans. These are precisely the resources that China lacks.
MARÍA CERVANTES: How does timing play out in this competition? Does China feel pressured by Washington’s aggressive stance?
CARLOS AQUINO: The Chinese work with a long-term perspective. In four years, US policy will change because Trump cannot be re-elected. Whether a Republican or a Democrat wins afterward, policy will change because if the United States continues with this aggressive policy, it will continue to lose support in other countries; nobody likes having things imposed on them.
China is looking ten years ahead, when perhaps no one will remember Trump. The Chinese need us as much as we need them. Latin America is one of the few regions in the world with a surplus of natural resources and food. Even if we industrialize, we have more than enough copper, iron, meat, and soybeans. These are precisely the resources that China lacks.
China’s relationship with Latin America is, I believe, as economists say, complementary. We both need each other. And I think, at least so far, in broad terms, it has been quite beneficial for both.
MARÍA CERVANTES: Carlos, considering this pressure from Washington, how would you characterize the true nature of the relationship with China? Is it a risk or a mutual benefit?
CARLOS AQUINO: I personally believe that our relationship with China is very good, I don’t think we’ll fight.
However, one country cannot be dependent on another; if you are, the other has no choice but to accept everything the first country tells you. Mexico is completely dependent on the United States: 80% of its exports go there. That’s why Trump tells Claudia Sheinbaum to stop sending oil to Cuba, and she has to comply.
I fear that some Latin American countries are heading in that direction with China. 36% of what we sell goes to China, and 70% of our copper exports go to China.
Last year, more than half of Peru’s trade surplus came from China. Imagine if China gets angry with us and stops buying from us: not only will our income decrease, but our large trade surplus will also disappear.
MARÍA CERVANTES: Finally, given this global competition and the arrival of figures like Marco Rubio, do you see Peru’s political class prepared to manage this balance?
CARLOS AQUINO: Imagine! Marco Rubio, the architect of this U.S. policy, is coming. And what can they possibly talk about if the president is embroiled in these cases with the Chinese? It undermines his authority. Our politicians are completely ignorant. In other countries, they rely on their bureaucracy, their business and academic communities; here, they don’t see that.
However, Peru has options: we are not Mexico or Venezuela. We have many trading partners and a privileged geographic location; we are the gateway from Asia to South America. Let’s hope we take full advantage of this, and in particular, let’s hope our politicians rise to the occasion. That’s what we’re lacking.
