Colombia’s move to join the Beijing-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) marks a significant shift in the strategic competition between China and the United States in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). At a moment when the U.S. is seeking to counter China’s influence in the region, Bogotá’s decision should not go unnoticed and carries broader implications for Colombia and the region.
Colombia is one of the most traditional U.S. allies in LAC. For example, it is the only country in the region that is a NATO global partner. The U.S. is Colombia’s largest trading partner, a relationship expanded by a Trade Promotion Agreement currently in force. It also provided significant aid to the Colombian government in their armed conflict with guerrillas and drug cartels, the so-called “war on drugs.” All of this is to say, Colombia has remained closely aligned with the U.S. in the economic, strategic, and security realms throughout the years.
In contrast, since establishing diplomatic ties in 1980, the Colombia-China relationship has been mostly focused on trade, with Beijing becoming Bogota’s second-largest trading partner. But frictions have persisted. Colombia has viewed China’s assertive posture in the South China Sea as a challenge to international norms, particularly as it relates to Bogotá’s own maritime disputes with Nicaragua. In fact, a former Colombian foreign minister even equated Nicaragua’s goals to China’s, titling her book The Arrival of the Dragon.
In a country with a history of conservative and anti-communist governments, the decision to strive for strategic independence is not easy.
The 2022 election of President Gustavo Petro introduced a potential rebalancing of Colombia’s foreign relations. A year after his inauguration, President Petro traveled to China and met with President Xi Jinping—a continuation of a long tradition of high-level visits, including those by Presidents Samper (1996), Pastrana (1999), Uribe (2005), Santos (2012), and Duque (2019). What set Petro’s visit apart was the establishment of a Strategic Partnership between the two countries, which pledged to expand commercial ties and hinted at the possibility that the expansion could include the BRI.
Since 2024, Colombia has been exploring joining the BRI, even establishing a working group with China to that end. Recently, President Petro announced that he would be formalizing Colombia’s accession to the BRI in an upcoming visit to China. This move comes a few months after Panama, another country closely aligned with the U.S., announced its withdrawal from BRI after Washington exerted diplomatic pressure over the Central American nation.
In LAC, the BRI has delivered mixed results. While several infrastructure projects in the region have been linked to Chinese state-owned or private companies, their formal connection with the BRI is often ambiguous. This reflects a broader misunderstanding: the BRI is not simply a collection of roads, railways, and ports. It also includes energy projects, mining investments, project financing, media cooperation, and even the creation of business and trade networks.
The wider economic and political objectives pursued by the BRI in LAC—be that power projection or win-win partnerships—must also be considered. This is precisely why Colombia’s decision could be so consequential.
Tensions between Bogotá and Washington recently flared during a brief diplomatic crisis in January 2025, sparked by a social media exchange between Presidents Petro and Trump. As a result of the spat, Trump threatened to impose sanctions on Colombia, causing Petro to back down and highlighting the extent of Colombia’s strategic dependence on the U.S. This episode may have reinforced Petro’s desire to diversify Colombia’s international alliances and reduce vulnerability to external pressure.
Not everyone in Colombia is convinced this is the right path. Critics argue that the BRI may not be a strategically sound choice — even within Petro’s own administration, there are signs of disagreement. In a country with a history of conservative, pro-U.S., and anti-communist governments, efforts to forge a more independent foreign policy are fraught with domestic political risk — especially if they give the impression of siding with China in the broader U.S.-China rivalry.
Colombia’s Belt and Road pivot is more than a diplomatic gesture. It is a test of how far the country—and the region—is willing to go in redefining its place within a shifting global order.
Alonso Illueca is CGSP’s Non-Resident Fellow for Latin America and the Caribbean.
