By Lukas Fiala
From the U.S. CHIPS Act to the de-risking of supply chains, during the last five years, Beijing has been confronted with the question of how strongly it should push back against U.S. attempts to isolate China globally.
Throughout the first three months of the Trump presidency, however, this question has become even more relevant. Just this week, in the context of the trade war, headlines emerged of China warning third countries against “reaching a deal [with the U.S.] at the expense of China’s interests.” But is China willing to be a bully in response to what it perceives as bullying from the U.S.?
While some observers often like the image of an assertive China prying for cracks in the façade of U.S. primacy, the above also presents a potential diplomatic dilemma for Beijing. Given that most of China’s current diplomatic framework is built around differentiating its approach from that of a post-hegemonic U.S., Beijing must carefully calibrate its responses to avoid alienating the Global South and undermining its own exceptionalist rhetoric.
For this purpose, China will draw on the strategic framework it has built since 2020. The central premise of these concepts is that China is capable and willing to offer a diplomatic alternative to the U.S., premised on common security instead of zero-sum alliances (Global Security Initiative), economic development instead of protectionism (Global Development Initiative), and acceptance of all regime types instead of liberal universalism (Global Civilization Initiative). The underlying exceptionalist premise is that Beijing offers a better example of international leadership than Washington.
Beijing has also improved existing and created new tools to enable the implementation and enforcement of this vision. First, China’s economic statecraft toolkit has evolved considerably. For instance, China’s first unified export control framework, introduced in 2020, has enshrined an extra-territorial application of Chinese power to extend control over economic actors and supply chains.
Second, China has fine-tuned its public communications. Gone are the days of hard-headed “Wolf Warriors,” who became so hawkish that even Xi himself had to intervene and tame their rhetorical belligerence. The GSI, GDI, and GCI offer plenty of consensual talking points for Chinese officials to convey Chinese positions with plenty of force but without the war of words by the likes of former MOFA spokesperson Zhao Lijian.
Third, the mobilization of the Global South across international fora has intensified over the last three years, particularly through the expansion of BRICS and the formation of coalitions in support of China’s (and Russia’s) framing of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This occurred in the context of Beijing’s renewed post-COVID outreach and the revitalization of Sinocentric diplomatic settings, such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).
Taken together, these tools provide China with options to navigate this situation and counter U.S. leverage in places where it matters. But China’s ability to exercise power to protect economic interests is only one part of the puzzle. Indeed, confronted with a revisionist U.S. and an assertive China, third countries may choose a variety of strategies to hedge their bets.
While the Chinese proverb “killing the chicken to scare the monkey” (杀鸡儆猴) has clear implications, Beijing is facing a series of delicate decisions should it choose to make an example of one country to deter another from acquiescing to U.S. demands.
Lukas Fiala is the project head of China Foresight at LSEIDEAS.
