By Lukas Fiala
Angolan President João Lourenço’s desire to have China build an air force base in Angola again highlights the issue of military cooperation between Africa and China. What are the drivers of China’s foray into African military aviation?
The first reason, in relation to Angola, points to the omnipresent issue of overseas basing. Since China opened its first base in Djibouti, there has been a steady stream of analyses about where Beijing might place another base on the continent. The obvious locations discussed in the literature usually include China-financed and -constructed ports, especially on the West coast of Africa in countries such as Equatorial Guinea.
Constructing an air force base for a foreign country does not necessitate establishing a Chinese military facility. However, it might create opportunities for closer military cooperation, intelligence gathering, and standard setting that may augment Chinese capabilities in the event of a more extensive operation in the region, such as an evacuation involving significant airlift.
Any military use would, of course, require the host country’s consent. And that’s far from straightforward — as the U.S.’s recent diplomatic spat with Niger surrounding a drone base demonstrates. And yet, an airstrip on familiar terrain and built to certain specifications is undoubtedly better than not having any logistical support at all.
All this is, of course, still a far cry from the current status quo in Angola, but thinking about this bigger picture is essential.
The second driver behind China’s foray into military aviation is the objective to become a security partner with something to offer the continent. One of China’s selling points is providing air capabilities at an affordable price tag. Of course, China has done better in certain areas than in others. Apart from Nigeria’s purchase of JF-17 multi-role fighters, advanced Chinese fighters are not common in African skies. Chinese suppliers have, however, provided ground attack-capable jet trainers and UAVs to African militaries.
A good example of China’s approach is a drone assembly, maintenance, and training center, which the state-owned Chinese defense firm NORINCO began building in Uganda last November. The center will eventually enhance Ugandan air capabilities and demonstrate China’s willingness to transfer technology to Uganda’s defense-industrial base.
With Chinese firms such as NORINCO sanctioned by the U.S. and facing headwinds in Asian markets due to political tensions across the South China Sea and elsewhere, Africa readily emerges as a continent of commercial and political opportunity.
Finally, domestic African politics also drives cooperation on military aviation issues. Air forces usually have status derived from their prestige as highly specialized and technologically sophisticated military branches. As in Zambia, Chinese firms may use relationships with politically connected air forces as a stepping stone to access other economic opportunities.
For their African military counterparts, accessing affordable equipment from China can help signal military prowess domestically and vis-à-vis regional rivals. Air power becomes a key asset when conducting military campaigns in regions with poor road infrastructure.
Relatively affordable Chinese hardware, such as UAVs, can readily meet the needs of African air forces, with examples ranging from Nigeria to Ethiopia and Libya. With the dangers of unchecked proliferation all too visible in recent months, this should undoubtedly remain at the top of arms control agendas globally.
Lukas Fiala is the project head of China Foresight at LSE IDEAS.
