Southeast Asia is not the world’s workshop or a passive trade partner. As the U.S.-China tariff war escalates, the region is asserting a new kind of agency, trade independence rooted in national interest. Economies like Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia, at the end of the day, choose to protect their trade independence and sovereignty.
“Southeast Asia refuses to be cornered,” says Manu Bhaskaran, CEO of Centennial Asia Advisors and a leading voice on regional economic policy. “We have agency. We can act. And we will act in our national interests.”
In a conversation with the China-Global South Project Southeast Asia Editor, Edwin Shri Bimo, the Singapore-based senior economist warns that both Washington and Beijing risk underestimating the resolve, capability, and independence of Southeast Asian economies.
The Southeast Asia Tariff: Unequal Pain, Unexpected Gains
According to Bhaskaran, U.S.-driven tariff hikes on China present a serious short-term challenge for the region but also a unique long-term opportunity.
“Say the average tariff rate at China settles at, I don’t know, 35%, which I think many people are talking about. But the average tariff rate against Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Philippines, and so on, settles at 13%, 14%, or 15%. Then there’s a relative advantage to producing in Southeast Asia compared to China.” Bhaskaran explains.
Washington’s aggressive tariff stance, he argues, unintentionally boosts Southeast Asia’s competitiveness.
Regional manufacturing clusters in Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia are now even more attractive for foreign direct investment, previously centered in China.
China’s Export Boom Risks Regional Backlash
China, meanwhile, is successfully expanding its export footprint in Southeast Asia by offering lower-cost goods. But Bhaskaran says this strategy risks triggering a backlash.
“Our Chinese friends sometimes may underestimate the impact that their exports are going to have,” he cautions.
“The influx of Chinese goods is beginning to create problems. Indonesia’s largest textile companies are already feeling severe pressure from these imports. Similar sentiments are growing across the region.”
Bhaskaran predicts a wave of regional protectionism unless Beijing recalibrates. “China needs to respect regional concerns around overcapacity and exports,” he warns.
The U.S. Blind Spot on Southeast Asia
Washington, Bhaskaran says, often overestimates its leverage in trade talks and underestimates the region’s ability to push back.
“One assumption in the current administration in the US is that the US holds all the cards because the rest of us have trade deficits with the US, and we have more to lose. I think the US administration is beginning to realize that maybe that is not entirely true, that the rest of us also have cards to play.”
He also questions the competitiveness of U.S. exports in the region.
“If you want to improve exports to Southeast Asia, you have to produce stuff that is in line with what we want. You have to be competitive.”
Unlike China, Bhaskaran says, the U.S. struggles to offer goods that meet the needs of developing economies.
“China, because it has been a poor country until recently, understands better what the needs of lower-middle-income groups in developing countries are, and they are very efficient in producing goods that meet the needs very well.”
Beyond Markets: Southeast Asia’s Manufacturing Power
A persistent miscalculation, Bhaskaran emphasizes, is seeing Southeast Asia merely as a consumer market rather than a manufacturing powerhouse.
“Southeast Asia actually has improved and strengthened its value proposition. And I think that alone should attract global investors to the region.” said Bhaskaran.
“No other region outside China has clusters of manufacturing competence comparable to Southeast Asia,” Bhaskaran points out.
From Thailand’s Eastern Economic Corridor to Penang’s chip sector and Jakarta’s industrial zones, the region has developed robust production ecosystems capable of absorbing investment and driving growth.
Yet, Bhaskaran observes, U.S. firms have been slow to align with these regional strengths.
Strategic Neutrality Is a Choice
Perhaps the greatest misreading is the assumption by Washington and Beijing that Southeast Asia’s strategic neutrality reflects indecision, stressing that being independent is a deliberately chosen path.
“We in Southeast Asia do not want to take sides, right? We want to pursue our own independent parts, want to be friends with everyone: China, Indonesia, Japan, India, whatever, right? But what if one power comes and says, No, you must do this, this, and this, even if it hurts your relationship with the other power? That’s a very difficult one,” Bhaskaran explains.
That difficulty, however, doesn’t mean capitulation.
“My view is you have to stand up and base it on principles and say, I’m sorry, you may pressure us, and you may even punish us with tariffs, but we will not take sides the way you insist,” he continues. “Because sometimes it’s better to pay a price in the near term. Otherwise, the price in the longer term of constant bullying and intimidation and pressure will be even greater.”
Southeast Asia’s refusal to be drawn into a binary geopolitical contest is deliberate and sustained.
Mini-Lateralism: The Future of Economic Integration
Bhaskaran also offers insight into Southeast Asia’s internal dynamics. While complete ASEAN unity on economic policies remains elusive, the emergence of small, pragmatic coalitions is becoming a dominant force.
“I think realistically to expect ASEAN as a whole to unify, consolidate, and do things collectively, let’s be realistic. It’s not going to happen in the next 12 months. What you’ll find is what I call coalitions of the willing. Two or three countries coming together, doing things together.” said Bhaskaran.
Examples include Singapore and Malaysia developing special economic zones and Vietnam, Malaysia, and Singapore collaborating on renewable energy. These focused partnerships are quietly shaping the region’s economic future.
What Beijing and Washington Need to Understand
Ultimately, Bhaskaran urges policymakers in both capitals to reassess their assumptions.
“At the end of the day, just like they pursue their national interests, we will pursue our national interests. Our national interests, I think if I generalize, is we want to be independent. We will not lean more to one side than another.”
Bhaskaran concludes that China needs to respect regional concerns around overcapacity and exports. Ignoring these truths will only deepen misunderstandings and unintended consequences.
As tariffs and trade tensions escalate, Southeast Asia is not passively absorbing the fallout. It is responding with calculated resistance, long-term planning, and a firm grip on its economic direction. Misreading Southeast Asia today could prove costly tomorrow.
About Manu Bhaskaran
Manu Bhaskaran is the Founding CEO of Centennial Asia and a leading economist with over 40 years of experience. A Cambridge and Harvard graduate, he has advised governments, investors, and corporations across Asia, with prior roles in the Singapore government and Société Générale. He is also a fellow at the Institute of Policy Studies and a frequent commentator on regional finance and China’s economic role.
Key takeaways:
- Strategic neutrality is not indecision. Southeast Asia refuses to be cornered; balancing ties with both powers is a deliberate, principled stance.
- Tariff hikes will hurt, but not evenly. If Southeast Asia negotiates better U.S. terms than China, it could benefit from investment and production shifts.
- China risks backlash. Overcapacity and aggressive exports are already sparking protectionist sentiment in the region.
- The U.S. misread Southeast Asian economies. There’s a dangerous lack of nuanced knowledge and understanding in U.S. policy circles. Manu presents critical details that Washington policymakers still misunderstand about Southeast Asian economies.
- Southeast Asia is not just a market; it’s a global manufacturing base. Manufacturing clusters are more advanced and competitive than many outsiders assume.
- ASEAN unity is unlikely; mini-lateralism will lead. Expect small coalitions to drive meaningful economic integration. Southeast Asian nations (Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore) are strategically positioning themselves individually amid global tensions.
- U.S. products often miss the mark. China’s consumer understanding gives it a competitive edge; the U.S. must rethink how it competes.
- Economic diplomacy is key. Southeast Asia’s vibrant manufacturing clusters are poised to thrive despite geopolitical turbulence.
Interview Notes
- The New York Times: Trump Wants the World to Squeeze Out China. He’s Starting With Vietnam by Alexandra Stevenson
- Bloomberg: Trump Aims to Shut Trade Loopholes China Uses to Evade Tariffs by Claire Jiao, Philip Heijmans, and Katia Dmitrieva
- The China-Global South Project: Southeast Asia Digest: Caught Between U.S. Tariff and China Shadow
Transcript:
Edwin Shri Bimo
Hello and welcome to Southeast Asia Talks. I’m Edwin Shri Bimo from the China Global South Project. Today, I’m joined by Manu Bhaskaran, the founding CEO of Centennial Asia, an advisor in Singapore, and a distinguished economist with over 40 years of experience. He’s a Cambridge and Harvard alumnus. Manu has shaped both public and private sector economic strategies, and through his leadership at Centennial, he’s advising top governments, corporations, and investors across Asia, particularly in Southeast Asia. He is now a fellow at the Institute of Policy Studies and a regular voice on regional finance and trade. So, Pak Manu, welcome.
Manu Bhaskaran
Thank you, and good morning.
Edwin Shri Bimo
I have a few questions that perhaps are pretty general for your knowledge, but could you please provide us, the global audience, your assessment of the situation in key economies in Southeast Asia, particularly when we are now experiencing quite a crunch between China and the USA in terms of tariff and trade and overproduction, an increase of tariff for key sources Asian economy, the current trade, some trade agreement between China and USA. So, please, sir, can you provide us with an understanding of the situation?
Manu Bhaskaran
That’s right.
Manu Bhaskaran
So currently, economies overall in the region are doing reasonably well. Growth is not too far from the trend rate of growth you’d expect, and the external balances, currency situation, all seem to be reasonably good. If you dig a bit deeper down and look at the lead indicators, things like export orders, composite lead indicators put out by OECD and so on, then you start seeing signs of concern, business confidence as well. That’s really new to the uncertainty created by geopolitics, by trade disputes, and the big question mark in the long term about the impact of AI and so on.
So there’s a lot of uncertainty that is holding back businesses from hiring, businesses from expanding with capital equipment and so on. I think that’s the situation. So the trade issue, as you point out, is critical. We have a deadline of 9th of July approaching. Different countries in the region have made different rates of progress in talking to the United States, but there is no deal yet. And there is a lot of uncertainty, lack of clarity on where each country stands.
Edwin Shri Bimo
Yeah, we are looking at this on the ground in key economies in Southeast Asia. Businesses complain that their factories are starting to close. Also in the media, it reported that job cuts are starting to increase. on the other side, we see that imports are rising from China to key Asian economies. But when we take a deeper look into the imports, the imports are mostly industrial input and intermediary goods such as machinery, mechanical or electrical, steel, textile, and a spike of precious metal imports, but that’s general. That doesn’t look like an economy and manufacturing in a downward curve, so what is going on?
Manu Bhaskaran
Yeah, so unfortunately there’s lot of distortions in the trade data, primarily because the fear of tariffs has caused a lot of what we call front-loading. So a lot of companies rush to buy imports from China and everywhere else before the tariffs will be imposed. So you get a sudden rush of export orders, big increase in container ships taking stuff from Asia into the US.
Edwin Shri Bimo
Yes.
Manu Bhaskaran
And that is continuing although it’s beginning to slow down. we all know that when you have front loading, there is a payback to it. So in a couple of months time, you’ll start seeing exports and therefore production coming down. So there’s a payback to this. It can’t last.
Edwin Shri Bimo
Yeah, so okay, that’s kind of events that may not translate into manufacturing, closing and increase. Now these countries in Southeast Asia, they are negotiating a tariff with the United States. Southeast Asia’s economies are kind of culturally, they are closer to China. And production-wise, their supply chain, are close to China. And that’s shown in its trade, import and export data, always a deficit, but on export side, always surplus to the US. That’s why perhaps the US demanded tariff and negotiation to balance that. But from Southeast Asia’s perspective,from a layman perspective, they are just trying to develop and that’s the best option that they have at the moment. Now, the pressure is like the tariff from the United States and the need to develop, and in China the opportunity to produce so that these key countries can provide jobs to its people.
So if tariff negotiations fall short for Southeast Asian economies’ expectation, and if Southeast Asian economies here like Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia fails to secure a meaningful tariff arrangement with the US in time, how might that reshape in region’s trade and industrial landscape over say 6 or 12 months ahead? What sort of response do you expect from China towards Southeast Asian economies?
Manu Bhaskaran
So that is really the million dollar question, the billion dollar question, I think there are a number of things we need to look at. First is, however you cut, slice, it, in X months time, say in four five months time, the average US tariff level against the rest of the world is going to be much higher than it was before Mr. Trump came to power. I think that is very clear. For a variety of reasons, he’s not going to concede 10% tariff rate is probably the minimum on top of which there will be sectoral tariffs.
The average US tariff rate probably will end somewhere in the region of 15, 16, 17 percent. That is very high because before all this happened, the average tariff rate was about 2.3 percent or something. So overall, for everyone, that is a bad outcome because higher tariffs will depress things for everyone. The second thing is some countries may get a lower tariff rate than others.
So there’s a relative effect. relatively, China gets hit very hard. Say the average tariff rate at China settles at, I don’t know, 35%, which I think many people are talking about. But the average tariff rate against Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Philippines, and so on, settles at 13%, 14%, or 15%. Then there’s a relative advantage to producing in Southeast Asia compared to China. And that relative difference could mean that there is a case for production to relocate from China to Southeast Asia. So we will lose out overall, but at least there is some potential offsetting gain that production is moved to our countries.
So we get foreign direct investment coming as Chinese and foreign multinational companies currently in China feel that it is not optimal anymore to produce in China and they move stuff. If they move stuff, where will they go? They go to countries where the average tariff protection is not as bad as China. And Southeast Asia also has the advantage, don’t forget, we have been open to foreign investors for a very long time. We have clusters of manufacturing activity in many parts of our region where you have suppliers, local producers who understand the high standards required by foreign investors. It’s easier to plug into such systems compared to moving to a completely different location further away. So I think absolute terms, everyone suffers from higher tariffs.
In relative terms, South East Asia may not be so badly off. But the key assumption is we manage to negotiate tariff rates that are materially better than what China gets. And I think that’s a reasonable assumption.
Edwin Shri Bimo
So, yeah, so basically are you saying that we should worry but not too worried.
Manu Bhaskaran
We worry. We definitely should worry. But yeah, I, yeah, sorry.
Edwin Shri Bimo
What sort of response do you expect from China towards Southeast Asian economies? in these trade negotiations, for example, Vietnam were demanded by the US to cut tech with China and to cut supply chains for goods that they are going to export to the US. I remember one time, Ibu Marie Pangestu from Indonesia, an economist, maybe you know her. She proposes a dual supply chain to cater the demand from US and to cater the rest of us. So, I mean, do you find those kind of ideas feasible or do you have other ideas to keep the engine running and growing but not hurting the feelings of the US perhaps or China?
Manu Bhaskaran
Yes, but again, this is a very interesting question and it’s actually a very, very important question, but it’s also a very difficult one. And if we take the 30,000 feet level view, the most important principle is how do you balance? What is the optimal policy to this kind of pressure from the US to choose?
We in Southeast Asia do not want to take sides, right? We want to pursue our own independent parts, want to be friends with everyone, China, Indonesia, Japan, India, whatever, right? But what if one power comes and says, no, you must do this, this, and this, even if it hurts your relationship with the other power? That’s a very difficult one. Different countries will have to decide for themselves what the optimal, the best possible way is, because everything you decide to do will involve some costs.
My view is you have to stand up and base it on principles and say, I’m sorry, you may pressure us and you may even punish us with tariffs, but we will not take sides the way you insist. Because sometimes it’s better to pay a price in the near term. Otherwise, the price in the longer term of constant bullying and intimidation and pressure will be even greater.
So unfortunately, there is no easy solution and we may have to take some pain in order to establish the key principles that are necessary for other powers to understand.
Edwin Shri Bimo
So that goes to both rivaling powers from Southeast Asia. So what do you think are missing from the perception of the policymakers in Beijing, in Washington, or in Brussels right now that you think that they need to understand about Southeast Asia?
Manu Bhaskaran
Thank you, but again, that’s a very important question. One of the things that I worry about is that there’s not enough think tanks, research centers that focus on Southeast Asia in many of these places. The US used to have, but I think that’s come down. China is beginning to invest in more, but still, the level of understanding of each country, of the different nuances in each country, the different sensitivities, the different particular predicaments that we have, I think still wanting. And unfortunately, that could lead to policy decisions in Brussels and Beijing, in Washington that could be hurtful to everyone.
So I think that’s one big concern I have, the lack of deep knowledge about our region. And I think it’s very important for us in our region to engage more, because we are the smaller party, we have no choice. We have to accept the world as it is. These are big powers. They have multiple priorities. But we have to shout a bit in order to be heard and we have to explain to them.
Look, we are friends with everyone, but these are the reasons why we have this policy, say the Nickel Value Addition Policy in Indonesia. It makes sense for us, right? And if there’s a difference of view, let’s talk about it and come to a compromise solution. So I think we have to really invest a lot more in economic diplomacy.
Edwin Shri Bimo
Do you think, are there any still persistent assumptions that are no longer reflect the reality that perhaps they might be seeing about Southeast Asia right now?
Manu Bhaskaran
Well, one assumption in the current administration in the US is that the US holds all the cards because the rest of us have trade deficits with the US and we have more to lose. I think in the standoff with China, the US administration has realized or is beginning to realize that maybe that is not entirely true, that the rest of us also have cards to play. Secondly, don’t forget this is not just economics and trade.
There’s a larger picture here. If you look at it holistically, there’s a geostrategic game as well as an economic game. And Southeast Asia is strategically vital to any big power. Does a big power really want to alienate us and make enemies of us and hurt us? Because there will be a price to pay for that big power if they do not treat us very well. So it’s not true that the US holds all the cards. In Beijing, on the other hand, I think there’s a better appreciation of our sensitivities.
However, the influx of Chinese goods into our markets is beginning to create problems as you probably know Indonesia’s largest textile firm and vast, got a lot of you know and the same thing is happening in many parts of the region and in fact many parts of the global south and I think our Chinese friends sometimes maybe underestimate the impact that their exports are going to have.
My concern is if you look, project out, look at the amount of huge investment going to manufacturing in China, where China’s share of manufacturing production capacity in the world is going to continue rising, and a lot of that will have to be exported. Where will these exports go, and what impact will those exports have on little countries like in our region? And I think that is another problem that is going to become more and more pertinent as we go forward.
Edwin Shri Bimo
Yeah, true. Okay, I’m interested in wanting to know what do they understand about how to approach Southeast Asia, China and the US perhaps. As we all know, the US kind of a generalize the threats of tariffs to, particularly to Southeast Asian economies from Laos, Cambodia to Singapore. Well, some people, some analysts say that it’s not the correct way to approach as you mentioned as well. But look at China, they have different approach, although perhaps in essence, they’re basically the same, to make the most of Southeast Asian economies for their national interest. So the question is how to compete equally in these markets and how to compete equally to get the productivity of these Southeast Asian economies for their own interest, right? Because it’s a question of getting national interest outside of jurisdiction.
So I just visited Jakarta fair last Friday and Saturday and perhaps this also happens in Thailand or in Vietnam or in other countries in South Asia that China is aggressively promoting their products, electric vehicle appliances, electronics up to the level that it seems like it’s a local product in small expo, in big expo, in shopping malls they’re aggressively what do you think that the West, perhaps the US, can learn about this in winning Southeast Asian economiesd
Manu Bhaskaran
Hmm.
Manu Bhaskaran
So I think the key thing is if you want to sell into a market, have to have goods that are designed to be aligned with the consumer preferences in that market. And China, guess, coming from, because it has been a poor country until recently, they understand better what the needs of lower middle income groups in developing countries are, and they are very efficient in producing goods that meet the needs very well huge economies of scale.
China is a huge market. They’ve been playing the manufacturing exporting game for 40 years now. They’ve developed incredible expertise, a fantastic base of local producers who are ferociously competing with each other. So they drive their costs down, they compete to improve their product design-wise, whatever. So as a result, China has become very competitive. And if China is increasing its market share, in many parts of the world. It’s because they produce goods that are aligned with our interests.
Now, if take the United States, they’ve moved away from manufacturing over the last 40 years, partly as a result of their own policies, not because other countries try to block their exports. They do not design products that are generally what a middle-income country wants. I look at their cars, right? The way the American cars, the very big, typically not very fuel efficient are designed. It’s designed for an American consumer preference and they don’t sell very well in poorer countries. And the same goes for many other goods that the United States produces, except maybe aircraft and very, very high tech equipment. You know, if you want to improve export to Southeast Asia, you have to produce stuff that is in line with what we want. You have to be competitive.
Edwin Shri Bimo
Do you see any difference in both powers approach to get the manufacturing sides? We talk about the market side, how to make the most of the Southeast Asia’s economy productivity? Can you tell me about that, sir?
Manu Bhaskaran
Yeah, very interesting.
Manu Bhaskaran
So we’ve been talking until now about Southeast Asia as a market. But I think the key role that Southeast Asia plays in the world economy is as a production base for global producers. I think no other region in the world outside China has the kind of clusters of manufacturing competence that we have. For instance, if you look at the Eastern Economic Corridor of Thailand, look at the Penang-Kulim Corridor in the northern part of Peninsular Malaysia, the Iskandar region in Malaysia bordering on Singapore. You look at the industrial towns surrounding Jakarta, there are clusters of manufacturing that are globally competitive. And with the improvements that we’ve seen in the last few years, infrastructure has been ramped up in every country in our region.
Philippines, which is a laggard now, actually investing heavily. As a result, logistics costs are coming down and manufacturing is becoming more competitive in Indonesia, in other countries as well. At the same time, we’ve also improved our policy environment. For instance, labor market reforms. Pak Joko Widodo, I think, has brought in a lot of reforms, for instance, in other countries as well as in Indonesia.
Restrictions on foreign investment have been eased. There’s been a lot of cutting of red tape. So what I’m saying is that Southeast Asia actually has improved and strengthened its value proposition. And I think that alone should attract global investors to the region. It’s not just because China has a problem with the U.S. and companies are doing this for political reasons. I think there are sound business economic reasons why
Southeast Asia can become a much more competitive, bigger global manufacturing center.
Edwin Shri Bimo
So you think there’s still huge potential for Southeast Asia despite these pressures to keep growing and promote their growth? Well, a closing, so we are near 30 minutes of our interview, of our discussion. If current trends continue, know, rising Chinese imports to Southeast Asian economies, mounting tariff risk that it in itself provide huge risk for these key economies in terms of production and export and import. And also an even regional response. Each country has their own individual response that creates responses from China and that in itself poses another risk. How do you see Southeast Asia’s industrial trade strategy shifting? I mean, are we going to see a whole new landscape or what?
Manu Bhaskaran
Yeah, so the key thing here is that we may be small countries relatively in the power game, but we have agency. We can do things, right? First of all, there will be policy responses. If there’s an import surge from a particular country, whether it’s China or anyone else, and it damages local producers, no matter what people say about global efficiency and so on. You have to protect your local consumers. I think the way things are going, there will be increased protectionist measures taken against Chinese exports. I think that’s a reality. Secondly, think countries are going to realize that they actually do gain from globalization and it is at risk. And we must do what we can in our own small ways to keep the momentum of trade opening, of economic integration going. How do we do this?
I think realistically to expect ASEAN as a whole to unify, consolidate and do things collectively, let’s be realistic. It’s not going to happen in the next 12 months. What you’ll find is what I call coalitions of the willing. Two or three countries coming together, doing things together. So for instance, Singapore and Malaysia are now cooperating to create this special economic zone in the area in southern Malaya bordering on Singapore.
And that economic integration, I think, is going to be very successful. And maybe, if it is successful, maybe the Riau Islands province of Indonesia may join, as it did in a similar arrangement in the 1990s called the Growth Triangle. Singapore, Malaysia, and Vietnam are cooperating in terms of renewable energy exports and trading within the region. So I think you’ll see a lot more of these coalitions at the willing. Small groups of countries coming together, doing things.
Once they demonstrate the success, and I think it will show success, then more countries will join and then we get a bigger response. So I think we will have to do a lot on our part, part of policymakers in Jakarta, in Kuala Lumpur, in Bangkok, in Manila and so on, in Hanoi, to maintain this momentum of trade, which we are big winners from at the end of the day. So it’s up to us. We have to get our act together.
Edwin Shri Bimo
My last question sir, my last question. I mean we’re seeing in the media from statements of leaders of Southeast Asian countries. Prabowo, it was seen as starting to naturally lean to China in terms of policies, appearance, talks, visits, bilaterals, multilaterals. Lawrence Wong as well, I mean from his statements, his talks in his bilateral visit to China and also his statements at home. Anwar, well we don’t have to talk about Anwar because he’s pretty obvious, very obvious. Vietnam, To Lam. To Lam is kind of a, know, yeah, pretty smart. So yeah, so what do you, of all this, what do you think that policymakers in the US and Beijing need to understand about all these movements about Southeast Asia because obviously this is a very important region sir. That’s my last question. Thank you.
Manu Bhaskaran
I think they have to understand that at the end of the day, just like they pursue their national interests, we will pursue our national interests. Our national interests, I think if I generalize, is we want to be independent. We will not lean more to one side than another. There will be times when we make a bigger effort with one party than another. But overall, Southeast Asia cannot afford to be an enemy of any of the big powers.
We have to maintain good relations with the United States, which is a very important economic power, foreign investor, military power. But we also have to keep very good ties with China because China is nearby. China is our neighbor. It’s not going to go away. Right. So we have to learn to do this. And the point must be made that Southeast Asian countries will have good relations with both sides.
And we will not be forced, we will not allow ourselves to be forced to take sides. Now maybe one or two countries in ASEAN may have decided that for their own national interest, but the majority of Southeast Asian countries realize that you cannot give yourself totally to one power rather than another. And we must get together, pursue policies that enable us to do that.
Edwin Shri Bimo
Yeah, so from my assessment, my own assessment is that Southeast Asia is nobody’s warehouses or workshop, right? So, okay, thank you, Pak Manu Baskan. By the way, I’m just interested in this. Do you think Southeast Asian leaders behind the curtain, they’re contacting each other like, I’m going to do this. Are you going to do what? Okay, coordinate a position? Behind the screen or because they’re very close. You remember that on the day or maybe a day after that tariff hammer from Trump, Prabowo went to visit Anwar and they have a phone talk.
Manu Bhaskaran
I think that we have a tradition of having four eyes meetings between the leaders. So they’re very frank discussions with no other persons, no notes taken. I think that is a great innovation in diplomacy. It enables very frank understanding of each other. And I think that’s one reason why ASEAN may not have succeeded as an economic organization, but as an organization that helps to keep the peace and keep us in good terms with each other. It’s been very, very effective.
And I think with the current batch of leaders, there is a certain level of comfort, certain level of trust I think and we all understand of course that we have different policies, we have different interests, but we try our best to work together and where we can we will act collectively. I think Dr. Sri Anwar Ibrahim, as Prime Minister of Malaysia and Chairman of ASEAN has worked very hard at this.
Edwin Shri Bimo
Yeah, this kind of situation doesn’t happen in Africa or in Central Asia or in Europe. That’s the strength of the situation here. So thank you for your time. Thank you.
So listeners, that was Manu Bhaskaran, a very senior economist and advisor to so many countries in Asia and Southeast Asia. I’m Edwin Shri Bimo. Thank you for listening. I’ll see you next time.
Manu Bhaskaran
Thank you.
