By Felix Brender 王哲謙
The mood in Taiwan’s capital Taipei is as somber as it tends to be mere days before the elections. As usual in the runup to the elections, the PRC has increased its posturing, as part of the wider strategies Beijing has ramped up to win the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese or — increasingly — demoralize them. Going off past experience, Chinese threats are likely to strengthen Taiwanese resolve rather than sway public opinion in China’s favor.
Beijing’s response does, however, serve as a reminder of an increasingly widening gap and fundamental contradiction between China’s domestic/regional, and foreign policy tenets, especially positioning itself as a leader of the Global South. This is probably most pronounced in China’s ambiguous yet Palestinian-leaning stance on the Israeli-Gazan conflict. Previously considering any national independence or sectarian movement as well as any changes to national borders anathema, China has publicly supported Palestinian statehood as a legitimate aim and condemned Israel’s response while having no qualms violently suppressing any such sentiment and activity in Xinjiang, Tibet and Taiwan.
By contrast, Russia’s ongoing assault on sovereign Ukraine hasn’t drawn as much ire from Beijing as one would have expected in light of the PRC’s insistence on national sovereignty. We observe similar developments in Yemen, where China has tacitly approved of both Houthi claims to political power and Houthi attacks on container vessels in the Red Sea, abandoning long-cherished calls to maintain free and open trade routes. Even though states in China’s regional orbit might rightfully claim that China’s double standard isn’t exactly new to the region.
In the context of Taiwan, China’s tightrope walk of ambiguity has certainly paid off: in the Middle East, nations tend to side with China on Taiwan, and the dwindling numbers of official Taiwanese allies in Central and South America suggests that Beijing’s strategy of alienating Taiwan is working there as well. Superficially, at least — after all Taiwan is growing ever closer to its East and Southeast Asian neighbours, and maintains good relations with many states in the Middle East and South America.
The Taiwanese elections themselves are unlikely to have much of an effect on Taiwan’s relations with the Global South, just like they are unlikely to change much about Sino-U.S. relations. If anything, many in the Global South are set to benefit from continuing Tsai Ing-wen’s strategies around Taiwanese divestment from China and a greater emphasis on relations beyond the PRC.
Nevertheless, the upcoming elections might inspire international partners to reflect on how good a friend China can be in the long run. Not least because the Global South’s response to and engagement with PRC aggression vis-à-vis Taiwan might make all the difference one day.
Felix Brender 王哲謙 is a PhD candidate at the London School of Economics & a Project Associate at LSE Ideas.
