The upcoming 4th Ministerial Meeting of the China–CELAC Forum (CELAC is the Spanish acronym for Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) will take place in Beijing later this month against the backdrop of growing strategic rivalry—some would say open confrontation—between the United States and China. In this rapidly shifting landscape, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) have become a key battleground. Tariffs and the ongoing trade war between the two superpowers are reshaping LAC’s relationships with China and will heavily influence the tone and outcomes of the upcoming forum.
Squeezed Between the U.S. and China
Since the outset of the Trump administration, the U.S. signaled its intent to counter and displace China from LAC. The most visible example concerns the Panama Canal, with the U.S. president claiming that China “controls” the waterway.
This unsubstantiated claim has led to several concessions from Panama, including its Belt and Road exit, the BlackRock-Hutchison deal, the establishment of joint military sites, the First and Free framework for U.S. warships en route through the Canal, and the characterization of China’s presence in the isthmus as problematic.
Yet this is not the only place where the U.S. has sought to counter and displace Chinese influence. One of the first items on the agenda of U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio included China and Central America.
In fact, his first trip abroad was to Central America – including Panama, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic. A constant throughout this trip was Secretary Rubio’s intent in countering China’s influence in the region. He was particularly keen on preventing the advance of Chinese 5G technology in Costa Rica.
He also sought to reinforce the U.S.-Guatemala-Taiwan partnership and contain China by transforming Puerto Quetzal into a regional logistics hub.
These developments barely went unnoticed in the region. A regional powerhouse like Brazil seems to be exerting caution and trying to establish – at least figuratively – some sort of healthy distance with Beijing.
When taken together with the current U.S. stance, it also becomes a divisive issue for the region, with some countries aiming for strategic autonomy while others advocating for taking either the U.S. side or China’s. In this context, it is unlikely that any significant commitment will be undertaken in the next China-CELAC Forum.
A good example is the recent tour of Brazilian President Lula Da Silva to Japan and Vietnam, with the notable absence of a layover in its BRICS founding partner, China. While attempting not to send the wrong signal to Trump, there are also some preliminary attempts from China, Peru, and Brazil to find an alternative to the Panama Canal with the Bioceanic Corridor, connecting the Chancay mega port in Peru with the Santos port in Brazil through a railroad.
In contrast, Argentinian president Javier Milei has toned down his China rhetoric from ideological to pragmatic. The examples of Brazil and Argentina resonate as the LAC region as a whole is striving to find a happy middle in the current U.S.-China rift.
In the current context, LAC countries could also be prone to polarization or undertaking a binary approach, i.e. U.S. or China. In that regard, the current electoral calendar suggest that the pendulum could go to Washington’s side, with election cycles coming in Bolivia, Chile and Honduras for 2025, and Peru, Colombia, Brazil and Costa Rica for 2026.
In all of these, Trump-aligned candidates are well-positioned to turn the tide. It remains to be seen if those eventual victories would translate into an anti-China regional wave or if these new governments will find a pragmatic approach like Milei’s.
The Fog of Tariffs and Trade War
On April 2, 2025, the so-called Liberation Day, U.S. President Trump announced the imposition of “reciprocal tariffs” on most countries. In the case of LAC, all the countries, except for Nicaragua (18%), Guyana (38%), and Venezuela (15%), received the minimum tariff of 10%. While President Milei celebrated that Argentina had received the minimum tariff, the U.S. also imposed a 41% reciprocal tariff on the Falkland Islands – indirectly taking a stance against Argentina in their bilateral dispute with the United Kingdom over the islands.
The minimum tariffs were far from a wink to LAC, since the new tariffs are all but reciprocal as they are linked to trade deficit or surplus each country has with the U.S., which means that especially affected States are the ones with a large trade surplus with the U.S.
These developments are also combined with the current trade war between the U.S. and China, with the U.S. imposing a 145% tariff on Chinese goods and China imposing a 125% tariff on U.S. goods. Taken together, the escalating tariff regimes reflect an increasingly polarized global trade environment, making it nearly impossible for LAC countries to strike a neutral or balanced position between the two superpowers — particularly given the current U.S. approach to trade.
Against this backdrop, the upcoming China-CELAC Forum is expected to be tightly managed, with participants cautious not to appear aligned with either side.
What to Expect From the China-CELAC Forum?
Since the establishment of the China-CELAC Forum in 2014, the Joint Plans of Action for Cooperation (2015-2019, 2019-2021 and 2022-2024) have remained a key document to understand the existing frameworks between Beijing and LAC.
The 2015-2019 Plan was focused on promoting inclusive growth and sustainable development, while reducing social inequality and diversifying production, calling upon china to invest $250 billion dollars in the next decade and achieving an inter-trade volume of $500 billion dollars.
For its part, the 2019-2021 Plan of Action continued to promote sustainable development and cooperation, incorporating the Belt and Road Initiative and priority areas such as (a) politics and security, (b) infrastructure and transport, (c) trade, investment and finance, (d) agriculture, (e) industry, science and technology, (f) cooperation on the environment, (g) cultural exchange and (h) other areas.
The 2022-2024 Plan of Action continued the cooperation model through these key areas of cooperation while emphasizing on deepening political cooperation, fostering economic and financial partnerships and promoting collaboration in infrastructure, technology and culture.
For 2025, it is yet to be determined if a new cooperation plan will be enacted or if the China-CELAC Forum is entering a new stage in its inner workings. This will also set the tone for another lengthy discussion: China’s push for the CELAC’s institutionalization.
Currently, the CELAC is an informal multilateral mechanism that lacks a permanent seat and the formal characteristics of an international body. The continuation of institutionalized dialogues suggests that Beijing is still interested in formalizing the CELAC, whose role is seen as complementary to other forums such as APEC, G20, and the BRICS.
The China-CELAC Forum would also be an interesting space for fostering partnerships in the transition minerals realm, particularly regarding lithium and copper.
The “lithium triangle” – Argentina, Chile, and Bolivia – which together with Peru and Brazil mark more than 50% of the world’s lithium reserves, is set to dominate any discussion about energy transition.
This, along with copper and the role that both Chile and Peru currently have in this industry, together with the prospect of Argentina expanding exploration and extraction activities, will make side meetings at the China-CELAC Forum very important, given continued interest and previous successes of Chinese companies in the extraction and refinement industries in LAC.
What to Expect at This Year’s CELAC
A few weeks ago, the 9th Summit of the CELAC at Tegucigalpa, Honduras, ended without the adoption of a final declaration. Argentina and Paraguay objected to the document as it included a critique of the U.S. tariff policies.
While 30 out of 33 members did support the document, LAC remains without a unified regional position. Engaging with China remains a complex and difficult issue for LAC, which should be approached with caution and strategic foresight.
When taken together with the current U.S. stance, it also becomes a divisive issue for the region, with some countries aiming for strategic autonomy while others advocating for taking either the U.S. side or China’s. In this context, it is unlikely that any significant commitment will be undertaken in the next China-CELAC Forum.
The major outcomes may be the enhancement of cooperation in specific areas while also serving as a venue for discussions of the broader strategic landscape.
Alonso Illueca is CGSP’s non-resident fellow for Latin America and the Caribbean
