In late September 2025, the Andean Community (CAN, for its acronym in Spanish) granted observer status to China, marking Beijing’s latest diplomatic advance into a sub-regional body of Latin America and the Caribbean.
Access to the CAN is part of a broader trend of Chinese diplomacy in the region, which is evolving beyond cooperation with central governments. Nowadays, Chinese diplomats are eager to engage at all levels, reaching out to local authorities — cities, towns, and provinces — as well as regional and sub-regional organizations, weaving a complex network of relationships designed to foster both state-to-state partnerships and people-to-people connections.
The CAN’s decision offers a clear window into how China is deepening its presence across Latin America, not just as a trade partner but as a proactive and versatile diplomatic actor.
The Andean Community
Established in 1969, the CAN seeks economic, political, and social integration among its member states — Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru — and counts several South American countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay, as associate members.
The CAN is part of the ‘integration phenomenon’ of the Americas, which spans the region from North to South, all over the continent – including the Caribbean – with as many integration efforts and multilateral bodies as the number of states in the region.
In the case of South America, there are at least four integration efforts based on geographical lines: the CAN, MERCOSUR, UNASUR, and PROSUR. Membership overlaps are common, with most countries participating in multiple organizations as full, associate, or observer members.
This phenomenon has led to the fragmentation of the continent into different sub-regions and integration efforts, which allows extra-regional actors to be very selective and strategic whenever engaging with these sub-regional bodies.
The Battle for Multilateral Spaces
For many years, Latin America and the Caribbean have remained an important theater in the competition for diplomatic recognition between Beijing and Taipei. This competition has been largely settled since 2023, when China displaced Taiwan from the Central American Parliament, following successive recognitions by Panama (2017), El Salvador (2018), the Dominican Republic (2018), Nicaragua (2021), and Honduras (2023).
Nonetheless, although few, Taiwan’s allies – most notably Paraguay and Guatemala – remain staunchly committed to defending Taipei’s presence in certain regional forums while working to block Beijing’s entry.
Paraguay, in particular, plays a crucial gatekeeping role. As a full member of MERCOSUR, UNASUR, and PROSUR, Asunción’s consensus-based veto effectively prevents China from joining those bodies.
In that last regard, Paraguay – a full member of MERCOSUR, UNASUR and PROSUR – remains one of the most important obstacles for China acceding to them, as the rule of consensus grants Asunción an effective veto power over such possibility.
The CAN, however, is a rare exception: Paraguay is only an associate member, limiting its ability to obstruct China’s participation.
The CAN’s Importance for China
Beyond diplomatic symbolism, the CAN offers Beijing a platform to advance its strategic interests in the region. In recent years, China has cultivated strong bilateral ties with all four CAN members, making collective engagement with the bloc a logical next step.
Of all, the most recent one to cozy up to China has been Colombia. As signaled by President Petro, Bogota is rethinking its partnership with Washington and may be open to an alternative with Beijing. In fact, recent tensions in the bilateral relationship between Colombia and the U.S. may have just provided the adequate push for Colombia not to veto China’s observer status at the CAN.
In the case of Ecuador, Beijing granted an economic lifeline to Quito in 2025, which adds up to years of economic engagement.
In Peru, the flagship Chancay Port, a cornerstone of the Belt and Road Initiative, continues despite political instability and the removal of President Dina Boluarte.
Lastly, we have Bolivia, whose current government has more than 20 years of close engagement with Beijing. Although not the result that China wanted, the election of Rodrigo Paz grants Beijing some breathing room – as the runner up Horacio Quiroga was the one openly calling for scraping the lithium extraction deals.
As long as China is willing to negotiate and concede by reaching a modus vivendi with President Paz, some of its lithium extraction plans may be able to survive. To this end, the CAN observer status may have come at the perfect time and could prove to be a valuable tool for diplomatic engagement.
China’s Multi-level Diplomacy
The CAN’s composition — four states, each with close but distinct ties with Beijing — exemplifies the multifaceted nature of China’s regional influence. Its engagement spans geopolitical (Colombia), economic (Ecuador), infrastructural (Peru), and energy (Bolivia) dimensions.
In that same vein, China’s diplomatic engagement with such countries is also as diverse as it gets, not limited to the traditional bilateral and multilateral levels.
Crucially, this diplomacy is not confined to national capitals. Through sister-city partnerships and twinning agreements, Chinese diplomats engage directly with local governments — a level of outreach that Western powers like the U.S. or U.K., and even Japan or South Korea, often overlook. For China, these decentralized relationships are central to its global strategy.
At the multilateral level, China’s approach also extends beyond the headline-grabbing forums such as the Organization of American States or the China-CELAC Forum. Sub-regional bodies like the Central American Parliament and, now, the Andean Community, play a key role in advancing Beijing’s goal of embedding itself in the institutional fabric of Latin America and the Caribbean.
The Fourth Joint Plan of Action of the China-CELAC Forum explicitly highlights this ambition — promoting exchanges “at all levels,” including regional, sub-regional, and legislative. China’s new observer role at the CAN is a tangible expression of that plan in action.
Alonso Illueca is CGSP’s Non-Resident Fellow for Latin America and the Caribbean.
