By Leonardo Bruni and Ahmet Faruk Işık
In recent years, the Chinese Ambassador to Cyprus has repeatedly suggested that China’s Global Security Initiative could be applied to help resolve the long-standing “Cyprus Problem.” This frozen conflict is rooted in the interethnic tensions and violence between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, exacerbated by British colonial policies.[1] The conflict reached a critical turning point in 1974 when Turkish armed forces landed on the island. This invasion, or military intervention, was in response to the Greek military regime orchestrating a coup d’etat aimed at achieving enosis, the annexation of Cyprus by Greece.
Although the Turkish military’s arrival on Cyprus precipitated the collapse of the juntas in Nicosia and Athens, initial peace talks faltered. In a move to allegedly protect Turkish Cypriots, Turkish forces advanced further, ultimately seizing control of the northern third of the island. This action entrenched the displacement of Cyprus’ population, as over a hundred thousand Greek and Turkish Cypriots fled south and north, respectively.
Exceeding its rights under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee—an agreement to ensure Cyprus’ independence and territorial integrity—Türkiye established a de facto state in the north, citing the need to safeguard Turkish Cypriots. This became the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC), a self-declared state recognized solely by Ankara. Meanwhile, the south remained under the control of the (predominantly Greek Cypriot) Republic of Cyprus, internationally recognized as the legitimate government of the entire island and a member state of the European Union since 2004.
Despite decades of diplomatic efforts by the United Nations, a lasting solution to the Cyprus Problem remains elusive. Beyond its impact on the island’s communities, the dispute has significant regional implications due in no small part to Cyprus’ strategic location in the Eastern Mediterranean. Its proximity to the Middle East and the Suez Canal underpins the United Kingdom’s retention of sovereignty over two military bases on the island, to the displeasure of many locals. Recently, these outposts have come under scrutiny from Cypriots activists, as well as Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, for their alleged role in facilitating the supply of Western arms to Israel for its wars in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon.
The situation in Cyprus also all but prevents Türkiye from joining the EU and exacerbates its rivalry with its fellow NATO ally Greece, as both states champion their respective ethnic communities on the island. Unresolved disputes over property rights, Anatolian Turkish settlers, maritime boundaries and natural gas reserves have only hardened positions and will likely hamstring Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s recent attempt at a rapprochement.
A resolution to the Cyprus Problem could have profound implications for regional dynamics, impacting everything from Türkiye’s foreign policy trajectory and the EU’s stance on China to NATO’s strategic presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and Israeli military logistics. Although China has thus far been an insignificant actor, recent statements by the Chinese ambassador, alongside Beijing’s contribution to the Saudi Arabia-Iran normalization deal, underscore the need for a new examination of China’s stance on the Cyprus Problem, its underlying interests and the potential avenues through which it might engage.
China’s Historic Position on the Cyprus Problem
The People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Cyprus established diplomatic relations in 1971. That year also saw Beijing be seated as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the ultimate authority overseeing both mediation and peacekeeping efforts on the island. Despite its initial aversion to UN peacekeeping operations, China shifted its stance in 1981 when it voted in favor of renewing the mandate for the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), its first positive vote for a UN peacekeeping mission.
UNFICYP is tasked with maintaining the military status quo on the island and patrolling the demilitarized UN Buffer Zone, commonly referred to as the “Green Line,” which separates the TRNC from the Republic of Cyprus-controlled territory. China has contributed both troops and police personnel to UNFICYP, with Major General Liu Chao, a Chinese national, having served as the mission’s Force Commander from January 2011 to August 2014.
Following Cyprus’ accession to the EU in 2004, Sino-Cypriot relations flourished, especially economically. Chinese trade, tourism and investment grew rapidly as Chinese businesses and individuals were drawn to the island, courted by its inclusion in the European single market, strategic location, low corporate tax rate, and Golden Visa and citizenship-by-investment schemes. In 2019, Cyprus and China signed a memorandum of understanding on the Belt and Road Initiative, and in 2021, the two countries elevated their relationship to a “strategic partnership.” Notably, Cyprus is one of the very few EU member states, alongside Greece and Croatia, that has not passed legislation to implement the EU regulation on FDI screening.
Further contributing to the positive trajectory of Sino-Cypriot relations was Beijing’s growing partnership with Greece, exemplified by the landmark Piraeus port deal. Simultaneously, tensions between China and Türkiye in the wake of the July 2009 Urumqi riots, coupled with Ankara’s vocal concern for Uyghur rights in Xinjiang, likely encouraged Beijing to align with Nicosia to counterbalance Turkish foreign policy ambitions.
Indeed, China has consistently rejected Türkiye’s proposed two-state solution for the Cyprus Problem, firmly supporting the Republic of Cyprus’ territorial integrity. This stance reflects Beijing’s long-held commitment to the principle of sovereignty and its sensitivity to separatist movements. The parallels that can be drawn between the TRNC, with its Muslim and Turkic population, and “East Turkestan” independence movements are likely not lost on Beijing. Consequently, China does not have any official relations with the TRNC, although Chinese citizens do visit, invest and conduct business on the Turkish side of the island (notably, a warning issued by the Chinese consular network revealed that some Chinese nationals mistakenly believed that investing in the TRNC would qualify them for the Republic of Cyprus’ citizenship-by-investment program, only to later discover that this was not the case).
Cyprus appears to have reciprocated Chinese economic engagement and political support by adopting a comparatively “China-friendly” position within the EU on Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Taiwan, Huawei and, more recently, tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles. Nevertheless, the extent of the Sino-Cypriot partnership should not be overstated; Nicosia’s stances on Xinjiang and Taiwan are arguably more motivated by a desire to avoid setting precedents that could strengthen TRNC claims than by any overt alignment with Beijing.
For its part, although China has repeatedly expressed rhetorical support for the Republic of Cyprus’ position, it has so far refrained from taking an active mediation role, limiting itself to endorsing UN-led diplomatic efforts, the formula of a “bizonal, bicommunal federation,” and a solution aligned with the interests of both sides. Given the protracted and seemingly intractable nature of the Cyprus Problem—earning the island the moniker the “graveyard of diplomats”— Beijing’s reluctance to engage in active mediation is unsurprising. Recently, however, China’s formulaic statements on the Cyprus Problem have received some new additions, warranting closer examination in light of the island’s increasing importance in regional dynamics.
Recent Developments: One China, One Cyprus
In April 2022, shortly after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, China unveiled the Global Security Initiative (GSI), its alternative framework for the international security order. Less than a month later, Liu Yantao, China’s Ambassador to Cyprus since 2020, authored a guest column for Cyprus Mail, outlining the GSI and its positive implications for the island.[3] According to Liu:
“By actively practicing the Global Security Initiative, relevant parties are encouraged to adhere to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, abide by the relevant UN Security Council resolutions on the Cyprus Problem, fully respect the will of the Cypriot people, and promote a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement on the basis of a ‘bi-communal and bi-zonal federation.’”
Since then, Ambassador Liu has continued to highlight the GSI’s potential to contribute to resolving the Cyprus Problem, particularly after Beijing successfully helped normalize ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran in March 2023.[4] On this occasion, the ambassador authored another column, this time for the Greek-language newspaper Philenews, stating that “I believe that following the Beijing Dialogue between Saudi Arabia and Iran, there will be more successful practices under the GSI” as well as “the approach of the GSI to [the Cyprus Problem] can be of great significance.”
Liu’s remarks on the GSI have received coverage in both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot media, though with markedly noticeably less enthusiasm from the latter. This disparity likely stems from the GSI’s emphasis on the centrality of the UN (which does not recognize the TRNC) alongside the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. This is at odds with the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot position, which advocates for the recognition of the TRNC and, if possible, the subsequent establishment of a new federation/confederation between the two sides rather than the integration of Turkish Cypriots into the existing Republic of Cyprus.
Turkish Cypriot commentators have thus repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with the Chinese embassy in Nicosia, which has consistently reiterated its stance that the “Northern Cyprus region” is not a sovereign state, most recently after the TRNC was granted observer status in the Organization of Turkic States in November 2024. Similarly, Turkish experts have also viewed Beijing’s position on the TNRC unfavorably. Professor Kadir Temiz, for instance, has in the past characterized China’s approach as disinterested and opportunistic, suggesting it is driven by a desire to strengthen its collaboration in the UN Security Council with the EU, the U.S., and Russia while also preventing precedents that could benefit Taiwan.
Besides the GSI, another notable addition to Chinese rhetoric is the reappearance of the “One China, One Cyprus” principle. On August 3, 2022, following U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, the Spokesperson of the Chinese Embassy in Cyprus issued a statement condemning Washington for allegedly violating its One China policy. The statement also included a final section specific to Cyprus, declaring:
“The one-China principle and one-Cyprus principle serve as the political foundation of the establishment and development of China-Cyprus relations. Neither China nor Cyprus is entirely reunified till today. National unity is our two countries’ shared core concern and mission. External interference has been the biggest roadblock to the settlement of the Taiwan question and the Cyprus Problem, which the Cypriot people know better than anyone else.”
This “One Cyprus principle,” a clear attempt to draw a parallel between Beijing’s support for the Republic of Cyprus’ territorial integrity and its own “One China principle,” has been intermittently referenced by Chinese diplomats in Nicosia and Cypriot politicians. However, amid rising tensions over Taiwan, the idea of a “One China, One Cyprus” principle undergirding Sino-Cypriot relations has been increasingly employed by the Chinese Embassy in Cyprus. This appears to be an effort to foster a more favorable stance toward China within Cyprus and, by extension, the EU as a whole.
The following day, on August 4, Wang Sheng, the Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of the embassy, employed the term “One Cyprus principle” when he further articulated Beijing’s perspective in an interview for Philenews. It is noteworthy that in this interview, the Greek Cypriot journalist remarked that “Just as Taiwan is an integral part of China, the northern part of Cyprus is an integral part of the Republic of Cyprus, however under the Turkish boot.”
This comment highlights an interesting alignment in Greek Cypriot media, which, likely given Cyprus’ own division due to foreign intervention, tends to show sympathy for Beijing’s stance on Taiwan, with many commentators defending the PRC’s perspective and actions, even embracing the term of “One China, One Cyprus.” This sentiment is not confined to the press alone; a number of Greek Cypriot politicians have also adopted this terminology and China’s position, whether out of genuine conviction or a pragmatic desire to secure the support of a permanent member of the UN Security Council.
For instance, President of the Cypriot House of Representatives Annita Demetriou in December 2022 stated that “the ‘One China-One Cyprus’ principle is a shared conviction” during an event organized at the Chinese embassy in Nicosia. She reiterated this principle when she led a high-level inter-party Cypriot parliamentary delegation to Beijing in October 2024, expressing her appreciation for China’s commitment to “One Cyprus.”
“One China-One Cyprus” has also become a favorite turn of phrase of Ambassador Liu and his staff, who frequently employ it when Taiwan-related issues dominate the news, such as after the Taiwanese elections in January 2024.
Turkish Cypriot media has also reported on Ambassador Liu’s remarks concerning the “One Cyprus principle,” albeit without offering commentary on its significance—or lack thereof. This acknowledgment, while limited, is nonetheless more substantial than the silence observed in Chinese media and, more strikingly, among officials in Beijing.
Chinese diplomats and officials outside the walls of the Chinese Embassy in Nicosia have never referenced “One China–One Cyprus” in their numerous interactions with Cypriot counterparts over the last couple of years. Chinese readouts do not even acknowledge this purported principle when it is referenced by Cypriot politicians, such as by President of the House of Representatives Demetriou during her aforementioned visit to China (though the Chinese never fail to note Cypriot commitment to the One China principle). Chinese media and commentators have also shown minimal interest in the island as well.
This silence suggests that the “One Cyprus principle” may be an initiative of one outspoken ambassador that does not represent a shift in Chinese foreign policy. Beijing, in fact, has continued to refrain from engaging more actively with the Cyprus Problem, including recent mediation efforts led by UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres.
Even Ambassador Liu, despite his critical remarks on Turkish foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, has been careful never to bind Beijing to any commitments. In June 2023, after reaffirming “One China–One Cyprus” and that “China always supports the positions of Cyprus” to a group of Greek Cypriot journalists, the ambassador was asked whether Cyprus could expect China’s support if it appealed to the UN Security Council for sanctions against Türkiye over the blockaded city of Varosha. Liu deflected the question, shifting blame to the West by suggesting the EU and NATO would refrain from implementing requested sanctions (despite China having significant weight on its own, being Türkiye’s largest import partner).
Moreover, in the last few months, the Chinese embassy appears to have scaled back its use of the term “One Cyprus.” Ambassador Liu notably refrained from mentioning it during a speech in September 2024, even while drawing comparisons between Cyprus and Taiwan. He also did not mention the principal in an interview in December with the newspaper Simerini.
This could be due to tensions between the embassy and Nicosia over a Chinese-led consortium’s withdrawal from the contentious Vasilikos LNG terminal project in July. However, a more interesting possible explanation lies in the recent improvement in Sino-Turkish relations.
In June 2024, Turkish Foreign Minister Fidan visited China, including Xinjiang, and seemingly succeeded in opening a new chapter in Ankara’s historically strained relationship with Beijing. This diplomatic breakthrough was significant enough to lead the way for a $1 billion investment from Chinese electric vehicle giant BYD in Türkiye and to prompt plans for reciprocal state visits by Presidents Erdoğan and Xi Jinping.
Beijing has often seemed to respond to Ankara’s criticism—particularly that concerning Xinjiang—by intensifying its rhetoric against Turkish actions in the region, including with regard to the Kurds. As noted by several analysts, this dynamic unfolded in late 2021, after Türkiye participated in a call urging China to “ensure full respect for the rule of law” in Xinjiang—the first instance of Ankara adopting such a public stance. Shortly thereafter, a tit-for-tat exchange unfolded, culminating in China’s Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Geng Shuang, condemning Ankara’s actions in northeast Syria as “illegal.”
China’s relationship with the Republic of Cyprus can also be viewed within this dynamic. In the context of warming Sino-Turkish relations, China’s support for Nicosia appears to have become less vocal. During a meeting earlier this month with a Chinese delegation led by Wang Aiwen, a member of the standing committee of the CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, Cypriot MPs expressed appreciation for the “One China, One Cyprus” principle and criticized “Türkiye’s destabilizing role.” However, Wang seemingly sidestepped these remarks, instead emphasizing UN resolutions, the China-Cyprus Strategic Partnership, the Belt and Road Initiative, and Cyprus’s constructive role in fostering China-EU relations.
This does not suggest that China is likely to abandon its long-standing stance on the Cyprus Problem, as it remains consistent with its foreign policy principles. However, should relations between Beijing and Ankara continue to improve, Chinese diplomats may adopt more cautious language when addressing the Cyprus question or refrain from actively championing Nicosia’s interests at the UN—a role traditionally fulfilled by Russia. Additionally, Türkiye’s strengthened position in the region following the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria (a development highlighted by numerous Chinese experts) could make Beijing more reluctant to openly oppose Ankara. Notably, Chinese commentators have already become markedly less critical of what they once characterized as the “assertiveness” and “overreach” of Turkish foreign policy, a significant shift in tone from earlier years.
Furthermore, the Chinese embassy’s promotion of the GSI and the “One China-One Cyprus principle” have not yielded desired results. While endorsement of the GSI was likely aimed at advancing Beijing’s global security narrative and challenging the Western-led framework, the Republic of Cyprus has instead increasingly aligned itself with the West. This shift has been expedited by the deteriorating viability of Cyprus’ ties with Russia and by heightened U.S. interest in the island as a strategic link for supplying Israel. Notably, Cyprus has initiated its first strategic dialogue with the United States and is drawing closer to NATO—much to the chagrin of Turkish commentators and the government.
With regard to “One China-One Cyprus,” the term has gained traction among Cypriot politicians. Nicosia has also maintained a relatively “China-aligned” stance on Taiwan, with it quickly reaffirming its commitment to its One China policy after both Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan and the 2024 Taiwanese elections—receiving praise from the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson. The main opposition party, the Marxist-Leninist AKEL, has gone further by explicitly supporting Beijing’s One China principle, framing it as a matter of international law and criticizing Pelosi for violating “the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the People’s Republic of China.”[30]
However, as previously noted, Cyprus’s stance on Taiwan is likely more shaped by its own concerns about secessionism rather than any deep alignment with Beijing’s global agenda. Unlike Hungary, for instance, Nicosia has not been actively promoting Chinese positions at the EU level.
Could China Get More Involved?
As argued elsewhere, China’s international conflict mediation efforts are primarily driven by its strategic interests, which currently center on enhancing its global standing in relations to the U.S. at the lowest possible cost. Consequently, Beijing favors high-profile, cost-effective mediation initiatives that promote its role and narratives without necessitating significant financial or logistical commitments.
In light of this approach, it is highly improbable that China will take an active role in addressing the Cyprus Problem. The centrality of the UN in Chinese foreign policy, coupled with this organization’s existing involvement diminishes both the opportunity and rationale for Beijing to assert a distinctive or pivotal role in the resolution process. Furthermore, the Saudi-Iranian case underscores that Chinese engagement typically requires an invitation from the parties concerned, a scenario that remains unlikely in the current context of Cyprus.
Furthermore, the overlapping and conflicting interests of regional actors make it very difficult for Beijing to keep a neutral posture, and its “principled stance” is already sufficient to maintain goodwill from Nicosia. Deeper engagement also risks jeopardizing ties with Türkiye, a key regional actor—as well as with Greece and Cyprus, two of China’s few remaining “friends” within the EU. In addition, despite its strategic location (which proved useful when evacuating Chinese citizens from Lebanon), the island holds few economic and political interests for Beijing, especially after the Vasilikos LNG terminal debacle.
Active engagement in Cyprus would also expose the contradictions in Beijing’s foreign policy. The Cyprus dispute increasingly centers on maritime boundaries, as Türkiye, under its “mavi vatan” (Blue Homeland) maritime strategy, asserts sovereignty through agreements with the TRNC and pro-Turkish Libyan authorities (and potentially with the new Syrian government) over vast swathes of resource-rich waters in the Aegean, Eastern Mediterranean, and Black Sea—claims that conflict with those of the Republic of Cyprus and Greece. While China supports Cyprus’ territorial integrity, including its maritime boundaries—a stance that has led some Cypriot commentators to praise China as a defender of UNCLOS and the law of the sea—Ankara’s actions mirror Beijing’s own controversial claims in the South China Sea. By defending Nicosia, the Chinese government risks setting a precedent that could weaken its own claims and expose it to accusations of double standards, undermining its credibility as a proponent of global governance.
Nonetheless, for the sake of argument, it is worth exploring the potential actions Beijing could undertake and the advantages it might leverage if it chose to pursue a more active role—whether to secure goodwill from Türkiye, Cyprus and Greece; strengthen its ties within the EU; counter NATO influence in the Eastern Mediterranean; or bolster its reputation (bringing peace to the “graveyard of diplomats” would be a feather in the GSI’s cap).
China’s most viable avenue for expanding its involvement would be strengthening its support for UN mediation efforts. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Beijing is well-positioned to champion resolving the Cyprus Problem. Its experience with UNFICYP could prove useful with the issue of security guarantees, while promises of expanded economic engagement could incentivize dialogue.
China’s primary advantage lies in being a possibly more acceptable external mediator to all parties involved. Beijing enjoys good relations with the Republic of Cyprus and Greece, and although its ties with Türkiye remain tepid, likely limiting Ankara’s trust in China on this issue of national concern, the Turkish side might perceive Beijing as more neutral or tolerable compared to other actors, such as the EU, the UK, Russia, or the U.S.
The EU has historically relied on the prospect of EU membership as a means of incentivizing Türkiye and Northern Cyprus to engage in dialogue. However, this approach has become less effective as Ankara prioritizes foreign policy diversification over EU accession, evidenced by its pursuit of membership in BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Greek and Turkish Cypriot disillusionment with the EU is also reflected in the recent European elections, where low voter turnout led to the only Turkish Cypriot MEP losing his seat to an anti-politics YouTuber.
The UK, as a guarantor power with sovereign military bases on the island, has played a role in Cyprus since the start (being to a large degree responsible for the conflict in the first place). Nevertheless, Turkish Cypriots have increasingly lobbied for the exclusion of Britain from talks, perceiving London as too partial toward the Greek Cypriot side.
Increased Russian involvement, exemplified by the 1997 Cypriot Missile Crisis, remains unacceptable to Ankara and likely now to Nicosia as well. Although the U.S. is gradually filling in the vacuum left by Russia vis-à-vis the Republic of Cyprus, this shift has generated suspicion in Türkiye, exacerbated by ongoing tensions between Ankara and Washington over northeast Syria and Israel. Compounding these concerns, President-elect Donald Trump has likely not inspired confidence among Turks given his rather mercurial remarks on Türkiye’s role in the Assad regime’s downfall, coupled with the criticism of Turkish foreign policy and President Erdoğan by his key nominees—Marco Rubio for Secretary of State, Michael Waltz for National Security Advisor, and Tulsi Gabbard for Director of National Intelligence.
This leaves China, which—despite its pro-Greek Cypriot stance—might be seen by Ankara as a counterbalance to the growing U.S. influence on the island. Beijing’s position is, however, constrained by its highly probable refusal to legitimize the TRNC due to the implications for Xinjiang and Taiwan. This directly conflicts with the Turkish side’s position, which is predicated on the recognition of the TRNC. Moreover, Ankara, currently in a strong position following the developments in Syria and its own successful mediation attempt in the Horn of Africa, may not be interested in seeking a quick resolution to the Cyprus Problem. Although Cyprus remains a stumbling block with regard to relations with Greece, the current status quo benefits Türkiye, as it enables it to assert maritime claims in the Eastern Mediterranean and to construct military installations on the island.
It is also crucial to recognize that the Cyprus Problem is not solely shaped by regional and international dynamics. The entrenched complexities of the dispute—such as over property rights and between the federation and confederation models—pose significant barriers to mediation. These issues have thwarted previous peace efforts, including the Annan Plan, and contribute to the high likelihood of failure for any future initiatives. Given these challenges, it is highly improbable that China or any power will take a strong interest in contributing to bringing a permanent solution to Cyprus, leaving the island’s division likely to persist.
Leonardo Bruni is a project officer and research fellow at the ChinaMed Project. He is also a Research Fellow at the University of Turin and a graduate of the Sciences Po-Peking University Dual Master’s Degree in International Relations.
Ahmet Faruk Işık is a research fellow at the ChinaMed Project. He is also a Ph.D. candidate at Shanghai International Studies University with a project on Comparative Politics and Area Studies.
This article was originally published on the ChinaMed Project and was republished here with permission.
