A think tank affiliated with China’s top economic planner, the National Development and Reform Commission （国家发展与改革委员会), said in an analysis that current tensions between the United States and India extend beyond President Donald Trump himself, pointing instead to deeper structural factors that could make the strains more enduring. This could even create opportunities for China to recalibrate its approaches to both nations.
A Threat to the U.S. Economy
Mao Keji, an associate researcher at the International Cooperation Center of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), wrote in a recent report that behind Trump’s repeated threats toward New Delhi lies a growing U.S. tendency to prioritize domestic development over external geopolitical rivalry.
According to Mao, one of China’s most well-known young India affairs scholars, a growing consensus has emerged in U.S. society, particularly among right-leaning circles, that India poses a competitive challenge to the domestic U.S. economy. He argued that India’s service-dominated economic model mirrors that of the United States, while its expanding export of skilled labour to the U.S. market has intensified pressure on similar sectors at home.
As a result, frictions between Washington and New Delhi are unlikely to be resolved through a simple change of administration or personnel reshuffles in the White House, especially if another Republican president is elected.
It reflects a broader structural shift in Washington’s priorities from external threats to domestic economic concerns, Mao said, and this shift led by Trump officially changed Washington’s decades-long tradition of heavy investing in India aimed at counterbalancing China, with little to show in terms of tangible returns.
“The Ungrateful Ally”
India is also likely to face greater costs than U.S. Asia-Pacific allies such as Japan and South Korea, because its value to Washington lies almost exclusively in its strategic role as a counterweight to China.
As Trump has made U.S. diplomacy in the region increasingly transactional, India’s limited ability to offer broader value alignment could further aggravate friction with Washington, particularly given New Delhi’s close ties with U.S. rivals such as Russia.
For years, the U.S. pursued a strategically altruistic policy toward India, prioritizing long-term geopolitical gains over short-term returns, confident its dominance would remain unchallenged. But as fears of relative decline grow, such concessions become harder to sustain, prompting a “creditor mindset” in Washington that seeks repayment for past support, he said.
Opportunity for China?
Mao went further, adding that if China “took advantage” in global rivalry, the U.S. and India could enter an even fiercer competition due to their similar service-dominated economy.
“If China consolidates a position of clear superiority through its defence capabilities and industrial-technological strength, particularly by gaining a relative edge over the United States, it would, objectively, intensify the structural competition between Washington and New Delhi within similar economic and strategic domains.”
And this would naturally solve Beijing’s current frictions with both Washington and Delhi, he said.
WHY IS THIS IMPORTANT? The NDRC has long served as the chief navigator of China’s economic development, and its structural reading of U.S.–India ties underscores how closely Beijing is scrutinizing both competitors and the dynamics between them. This assessment is notably U.S.-centric in its framing, suggesting some Chinese policy advisers see Washington’s current political moves as driven by anxiety over relative decline and a loss of confidence.
