
By Yunis Sharifli, CGSP Non-Resident Fellow for Central Asia
The Trump administration’s tariffs are reshaping more than the U.S.’s trade balances—they’re redrawing geopolitical lines. Although the administration announced a pause on some tariffs this morning, the broader strategic and regional effects are already in motion. Nowhere is this more evident than in Central Asia, where Kazakhstan faces a 27% tariff and others—Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan—have been hit with 10% in tariffs. In response, China is likely to step up its economic engagement in the region, further sidelining the U.S.’s already fledgling presence. This shift in dynamics could have three key implications for the future of China-Central Asia relations.
The first implication is about the shifting trade dynamic between China and Central Asia. With U.S.-China trade severely strained, Beijing is seeking alternative markets to sustain its export-driven economy. Geographically close, cooperative, and open to Chinese goods, Central Asia is emerging as a key region for Chinese exports.
The region’s push for a green transition, especially in electric vehicles (EVs) and renewable energy, aligns with China’s industrial strengths. While the U.S. and EU raise barriers for Chinese EVs, Central Asian governments are welcoming EV imports through tax breaks and duty-free schemes. This convergence of interests suggests that Chinese EV exports to the region will likely grow rapidly.
Currently, Central Asia’s heavy reliance on raw material exports shields the region from immediate fallout, as many of these commodities are either exempt from U.S. tariffs or not significant to U.S. import patterns. However, as regional governments push toward value-added production and seek access to diversified markets, including the U.S., tariffs could become a barrier to competitiveness.
As Central Asian countries seek to export value-added goods, these tariffs could reduce their competitiveness and limit access to the U.S. market. In the long term, as export alternatives narrow, Central Asian countries might further turn to the Chinese market due to the low barriers and cooperative trade relations. This shift in the trade relationship could, in turn, boost China’s exports to the region and also deepen Central Asia’s export dependence on the Chinese market.
The second implication concerns the evolving investment relationship between China and Central Asia. China used to invest primarily in Southeast Asian countries to strengthen its market presence and establish re-export hubs that could evade Western tariffs. However, the Trump administration implemented much higher tariffs on Southeast Asian nations—46% on Vietnam, 49% on Cambodia, and 48% on Laos—but much lower rates on Central Asian countries.
This shift in tariff dynamics creates an opening for China to reorient its investment strategy toward Central Asia. In the background of rising U.S. protectionism and ongoing uncertainty surrounding American economic engagement in the region, Central Asian governments are likely to be increasingly open to Chinese financing and investment in hopes of it promoting industrialization, diversifying of economic product output, and building value-added sectors.
China has already invested beyond extractive industries in the region, turning instead to value-added sectors such as EV manufacturing. This shift would not only allow China to maintain access to global markets via re-exports—especially from countries like Uzbekistan—but also help solidify its presence in the region, outcompete Western manufacturers, and support the industrialization goals of Central Asian governments.
This alignment of interests can result in deeper economic ties, enhanced manufacturing capacity, and greater value addition in local economies. At the same time, it may boost Beijing’s economic clout in Central Asia, gradually integrating the region into China’s global supply chain and increasing its economic dependence.
Beyond the material impact, the final implication lies in the shifting balance of power. While the Trump administration rhetoric emphasized renewed U.S. engagement in the region, its actions told a different story. Tariffs that restrict trade with the region, coupled with the reduction of development and humanitarian aid following the USAID shutdown, have undermine Washington’s credibility when it comes to wanting to build a stronger relationship with Central Asia. This contradiction between words and deeds risks eroding U.S. soft power at both the public and elite levels in Central Asia.
In contrast, while U.S. policy in the region remains ambiguous and often inconsistent, China is presenting a much clearer narrative. Through increasing investments in green technologies aimed at reducing environmental pollution, expanding educational diplomacy, and offering vocational training programs, Beijing is steadily enhancing its reputation and strengthening its long-term position in the region.
Although Central Asia may not feel the immediate sting of the U.S. tariffs, the long-term impact is likely to shape China’s policy in Central Asia in ways that are unfavorable to U.S. interests. Unless the U.S. translates its rhetoric into actionable policies, China will have the opportunity to solidify its foothold in the region, leaving little room for the United States to reclaim the limited influence it once had.